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In the Sheffield cutlery trades, handicraft production in 
an isolated location determined to a substantial degree the 
character of the population. Geographical remoteness and the 
rapid redundancy of early locational factors necessitated 
concentration on high quali t y goods, embodying the technical 
expertise of successive generations of craftsmen. Reliance on 
quality and craftsmanship reinforced the small-scale,skill 
intensi ve structure of the trades. In turn this confirmed the 
predominant values of pride in craftsmanship and respect for the 
artisan. The industrial structure permitted independent 
production and produced a social structure in which social 
mobility and self-employment were legitimate expectations. 
Competition and the absence of large-scale mass-production meant 
that few fortunes were amassed and few major socio-economic 
gulfs developed between masters and men. 
F aced wi th growing cheap, standardized competi tion from 
abroad, the industry continued to stress and rely upon its 
traditional reputation for the finest quality production, 
crafted by Sheffield's uniquely skilled workforce. The struc-
ture of the industry and aspirations of its members remained 
essentially intact: changes were piecemeal and cautious, made 
within the existing ideological and industrial framework. 
This study seeks to encompass the range of economic and 
social relations in this industry: the origins of traditionalism 
before 1870, developments in the use of new production techn-
iques and raw materials, attitudes to overseas marketing, 
industrial structure, industrial relations, health and sani-
tation, community and culture. 
By adopting this approach, it reveals var ious character-
istics which contradict the stereotypic image of British 
industry in the period 1870-1914. Practices considered as 
irrational were often informed responses to market condi tions. 
Outwork and handicraft production were not necessarily pre-
industr ial remnants, wai ting to be subsumed into large-scale, 
'modern' industry. Ne i ther were industr ies neCRssar i 1 Y homo-
geneous units: like their work forces they remained fragmented 
and sectionalised. Finally, handicraft production exerted an 
enormous influence on wider social and cultural relations in 
Sheffield. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The characteristics of the Bri tish economy In the years 
between 1870 and 1914 remain a matter of dispute among historians. 
Much controversy revolves around the question of whether this 
period was a watershed in Britain's economic growth. Reflecting 
the debates of the time, special attention has been paid to 
Britain's place in the world economy, and the loss of the previously 
unchallenged position of 'first industrial nation'. It is generally 
agreed that the 'drag' of an 'early start' played an important rol2 
in the declining rates of productivity and growth. Newer compet-
itors, like America and Germany, were unhindered by the debris of 
industr ial tradi tions, In the form of both plant and business 
methods. In respect of the latter, particular criticism has 
focused on the complacency of the British entrepreneur in the face 
of changing markets, technology and forms of production. 
More recent contr ibutions to this debate have stressed the 
nature of world economic development, which made Britain's 'decline' 
almost inevitable, a 'natural' outcome of economIC expansIon 
elsewhere. Yet more recent commentators, armed with more specific, 
often quantitative data, based on detailed studies of individual 
industries or regions, have further revised the traditional thesis. 
Entrepreneurs devised rational strategies In response to difficult 
conditions - a kind of 'achievement under adversity'. 
Further controversy surrounds the demarcation of this period 
as a watershed in terms of developments in its industrial structure. 
Until recently, historians have marginalised older forms of 
production. The persistence of outwork and handicraft techniques 
has been regarded as a pre-industrial remnant, an abe~ation which 
detracted attention away from the 'real' course of industrial 
development. This would inev i tably resul t in large-scale, heav ily 
capitalized units of production, manufacturing long runs of 
standardized products. Management was growing more direct, the 
frontier of control was being pushed forwards. Craftsmen were 
losing their skills and their determination of the form and speed 
of production. Commensurately there was formed a more 
homogeneous and class-conscious labour force. 
However, such conclusions have again been criticised for their 
lX 
reliance on generalizations based on studies of national, leading 
sector industries. They neglect more detailed, regional case 
studies which point to the continued buoyancy of traditional forms 
of production. These often coexisted with more 'modern' industry 
and were even linked in a symbiotic relationship, serving the 
demand for small quantities of goods with detailed and often high 
qual it y speci f ications. Such production ensured the surv i val of 
small-scale units of production, of craftsmen, outworkers and 
factors, of informal industr ial relations phrased in tradi tional 
terminolQgy. I ndi vidual identi t y , as well as communal cohesion, 
were still closely related to the structure of the handicraft. The 
form of production was not simply the result of the various states 
of the labour market, demand and technology, but the outcome of a 
whole range of wider social and cultural traditions. 
A study of the Sheffield cutlery trades providEs further 
evidence for revisionism which argues that generalizations on the 
nature and performance of the British economy are severely comprom-
ised by detailed regional investigation. Industr ies frequently 
fail to conform to such broad notions as 'entrepreneurial failure' 
or 'modernization'. In the cutlery trades, geographical remoteness 
and the redundancy of initial locational factors, necessitated the 
concentration on high quality goods, embodying the technical 
expertise of generations of craftsmen. Reliance on quality and 
craftsmanship reinforced the small-scale, skill intensive structure 
of the trades. In turn this confirmed the predominant values of 
pride in craftsmanship and respect for the artisan. 
Faced with growing standardized, mass-produced, German 
competition, the industry continued to rely upon its reputation for 
the finest goods, crafted by Sheffield's uniquely skilled workforce. 
The structure of the industry and the ethos of its members remained 
essentially unchanged. 
The cutlery trades exhibit the close interrelationship between 
economlC forces and social aspirations, and the wider relationship 
of work to social outlook. The traditions of this interrelationship 
embraced and further emphasised the domination - in practice. as 
well as in ideological preferences of specialized, quality 
produccion and local loyalties; enhanced by ~eographical isol21tion. 
x 
Given the existing preconditions in Sheffield, the continuance of 
handicraft production, cautiously modified to suit changing market 
considerations, was a rational policy choice. No competitor 
possessed Sheffield's hard won reputation or abundance of cheap, 
skilled labour; but equally, in no other location was the handicraft 
structure of the industry and resultant social structure so deep-
seated. 
This thesis attempts to approach these problems on three 
levels. Firstly, as a detailed examination of a highly localized 
and inward-looking industry, si tuated ln, to use an oft-quoted 
phrase, the 'largest village ln England'. No comprehensive 
account of these trades has been undertaken since that of 
1 G.I.H.Lloyd ln 1913, which although a source of invaluable 
quantitative data, lacks a perspective for any assessment of 
contemporary political and economic debates. More recent studies2 
have similarly failed to tackle these trades at this period in a 
comprehensive fashion. Research has been concerned with broader 
areas, which mention the cutlery trades as one element in such 
themes as class and political struggle in Sheffield as a whole. 3 
Such accounts deal with cutlery as part of the 'light metal 
trades', to be contrasted in tradi tions, structure, performance 
4 
and values with the newer 'heavy metal trades'. Rarely has the 
subject been considered worthy of study as an individual entirety. 
A detailed examination of these trades, which embraces the 
whole breadth of economic and social relationships, from industrial 
relations to marketing, firm sanitation to mechanization, reveals 
the extent of their diversity. There existed no single industry 
producing a single product, no collective consciousness, few 
issues that all were forced to confront. The force of tradition 
was the only uni fying factor - strictly local shared values and 
understandings, stemming from past experiences. 
Secondly, this thesis attempts to analyse the way in which 
national debates impinged on the consciousness and day to day 
experiences of this community. When mediated through local 
circumstances and predilections, a fresh perspective is given to 
such controversies as boy labour versus apprenticeship or Free 
Trade versus Protection. 
xi 
Similarly, as local conditions resulted In quite unique 
attitudes to contemporary debates, so historians' conceptual 
generalizations have often proved inadequate as methods of 
analysis for these trades. A third tier of concern is, therefore, 
an estimation of the way in which such concepts as labour arist-
ocracy, entrepreneurial failure and choice of industrial techniques 
have to be modified, if they are to remain as useful tools in the 
assessment of these trades. 
Perhaps one reason for the lack of secondary Ii terature 
which examines this industry lies with the absence of concentrated 
sources of authoritative, primary information. Instead, material 
has to be gleaned from a wide variety of sources. Of particular 
note is the absence of business records. Self-employed craftsmen 
and small ephemeral firms, who constituted an important sector of 
producers, were unlikely to have kept sytematic records, and if 
they did, none have survived. The available documentation IS 
concerned with the largest firms and is therefore unrepresentative 
of the industry as a whole. Moreover, this data is mainly 
qualitative, and totally inadequate to attempt quantitative 
analyses of the profitability or economic rationality of commer-
cial decisions. Whilst information from White's trade directories 
has been compiled and used to assess quantitative trends in these 
trades,5 through necessity estimations remain largely qualitative 
and impressionistic. 
However, this gap has been narrowed by the extensive use of 
Parliamentary Papers. Although committees tended to rely on 
similar wi tnesses for each inquiry, a selection which precluded 
I unrespectable' or I submerged I sections of the communi ty, Par li-
amentary Papers are useful in indicating broad themes. A detailed 
examination of the local and trade press permitted the formation 
of a factual, systematic and chronological account of events, not 
previously available. This was supplemented by the use of the 
records of the Chamber of Commerce and the Cutlers' Company, which 
provided a deeper insight into the attitudes of manufacturers; and 
of the few surviving records of trade societies, the Sheffield 
Federated Trades Council and the Webb Trades Union Manuscr ipts 
which are sufficiently complete to allow a reasonably accurate 
insight into the labour history of the cutlery trades. 
XII 
Finally, a note on the deceptively simple issue of definition. 
The number and breadth of products defined as 'cutlery' has been, 
and still is subject to considerable debate; hence the classifi-
cation of 'the cutlery trades' is similar ly ill-defined. Recent 
definitions have tended to limit the term to the lighter, smaller 
implements used mainly for domestic and household purposes: pen 
knives, table knives, forks, spoons, scissors and razors. 6 Other 
definitions are broader, including a range of heavier, larger 
tools which have a cutting edge: saws, files, sickles, scythes and 
7 
shears. For the 
limited to those 
purpose 
trades 
of this thesis, 
which manufactured 
kni ves, steel forks, scissors and razors. 
the definition IS 
sprIng and table 
The reason for this 
preference lie with the industrial structures of the trades 
involved, and the social and economic status and outlook of their 
workers. Spoons have been excluded because thay are more accur-
ately classified as part of the electro-plate industry which, with 
its better paid workforce, and greater level of capitalization, 
was quite distinct from other cutlery trades. Similarly, heavier 
edge tools have been excluded because they merged more easily with 
the engineering trades over this period, and increasingly ident-
i fied wi th that group, economically, socially and politically, 
rather than with the cutlery trades. The cutlery trades as 
defined in this thesis, stand as a group complete in themselves, 
homogeneous In the identity of their structures, aspirations, 
problems and terms of reference. 
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CHAPTER 1 
1 
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY OF THE INDUSTRY 
BEFORE 1870. 
Economic factors to some extent explain Sheffield's preference 
for high quali ty cutlery production. She ffield' s isolation and 
.. 
distance from markets and, once its own natural at tr ibutes were 
exhausted, its removal from raw material supplies, help to explain 
its concentration on high quality products. However, it is possible 
to determine the use of a 'social factor' - what h8s been termed a 
tradi tional "Mass Inhertiance" 1 in the ingrained aptitude of the 
population for skilled metal working - which gradually came to 
rival and surpass physical factors in accounting for the location 
and form of the Sheffield cutlery trades. 2 The nature of the 
handicraft the small capital but great skill required, the 
independence that it allowed, combined wi th the need to produce 
high quali ty items, had a signi ficant impact on the character of 
the already isolated, distinct local community. Great pr ide was 
taken and value set by independent artisan and craft abilities; no 
great divide separated masters and men; social and economlC 
mobili ty were widespread. From the ear liest times, guild regulat-
ions were drawn up which protected and cemented these values and 
customs, regulations which represented the culmination of these 
experiences, and ensured their continued vitality and applicability. 
The breakdown of these restrictions which accompanied the opening 
up of labour supplies and increased demand of the late 18th and 
ear ly 19th centur ies, marked a hugh upheaval and disruption in 
traditional understanding and ways of seelng and dealing with 
problems, a transformation the results of which were never fully 
accepted or understood by many members of the trades. 
i) The Roots of Traditionalism. 
The exact origins of the Sheffield cutlery trades are obscure, 
but there is an abiding local faith and pride in their ancient and 
illustr ious her i tage: the frequent ci tation of the "She ffield 
thwitel" mentioned in Chaucer's Reeve's Tale typifies this belief. 3 
However, ln the 14th century the industry was not yet localized; it 
was present in various towns and practised by many village black-
smiths,4 whilst in Sheffield it was still small scale and often 
2 
carried on as a dual occupation In conjunction with farming~ 
Sheffield's production of cutlery, and early monopolization of 
the industry, is usually accounted for in terms of its possession 
of all the neccessary raw mater ials: wrought iron manufactured 
from local Iron and charcoal, water power, and 'natural draughts' 
harnessed to aid combustion in bloomery furnaces~ Such physical 
attributes were however, reasonably common in the north of England 
and moreover, were quite soon to be made redundant by advances in 
iron and steel making technology. The production of iron, from 
which cutlery was or iginally made, was recorded in Sheffield as 
ear ly as 1161 ~ but the local Iron ore was highly phosphor ic and 
therefore incapable of being heated to the high temper which was 
necessary to obtain a good cutting edge. Thus as early as the 16th 
century, iron ore was imported from northern Europe, and by the 
18th century the use of these high quality ores was far outstrip-
pIng that of domestic supplies, reflecting a preference, even at 
this ear ly date, for a higher quali ty raw mater ial to produce a 
higher quality product~ The manufacture of steel in the Sheffield 
region began in the 17th century but came to centre there after 
1740. This was not only the result of the openIng of a canal to 
Rotherham, which facilitated the importation of Iron ore, but 
because the cutlery trades were exercIsIng considerable local 
'pull' as a market for steel. 9 The manufacture of superior quality 
cutlery was assisted by advances In steel making technology by 
which steel of a more uni form carbon content was produced, which 
was thus capable of receiving a more consistently and evenly high 
temper. However, blister steel, manufactured through the cement-
ation process, 10 had a higher carbon content on the outside, from 
where the heat penetrated, than the inside. F or high quali ty 
cutlery therefore, a more even carbon content and temper was 
assured by breaking up these bars of blister steel, and then 
bundling them together to be reheated and reforged to form double 
shear steel; for the best cutlery the process would then be 
repeated to produce triple shear steel. The lack of uniformity In 
the composi tion of steel perhaps promoted the obsession of the 
early cutlers with the allocation of a precIse steel for the 
quali ty and type of product which was intended: it was to be an 
enduring predjlection. Moreover, the expense of blister stee1 11 
3 
necessi tated a high quality piece of workmanship to match the 
standard and price of the raw material. These tendencies, along 
with Sheffield's developing reputation as a producer of the finest 
cutlery, were furthered by Benjamin Huntsman's discovery, in about 
1740, of techniques to produce steel of an even more uniformly high 
quality. This search for a steel capable of forming reliable watch 
spr lngs, culminated in the discovery of means to further refine 
blister steel, to produce the even more costly crucible steel. 12 
Although these developments entailed the use of different raw 
materials from the early iron industry, fortunately, Sheffield was 
once more endowed with the necessary components: ample local 
ganister and coal, and access to the Bal tic lron ore traffic. 
However, the application of crucible steel to cutlery production 
proceeded slowly in Sheffield, the long-accepted reason being the 
conservatism of the cutlers who were reluctant to learn how to 
handle the new steel ~ 3 But this account is inconsistent wi th the 
constant attempts by local cutlers to ensure means to produce the 
finest cutlery, and has been contradicted by more recent research 
which places the responsibility for slow development on a shortage 
of skilled labour and capital, and dependence on foreign ores. 14 
Furthermore, the will and readiness of cutlers to take action to 
secure super lor raw mater ials is ev idenced by the presence of 
cutlers and toolmakas, who were vertically extending their premlses, 
15 
amongst the first special steels producers. In the post 
Napoleonic period some cutlers continued to make their own steel, 
although this was primarily to ensure a ready supply of steel made 
to their own specialist requirments, rather than an attempt to 
effect cost reductions. Concern with quality above cost consider-
ations is also demonstrated by the unwillingness of most cutlery 
manufacturers to use cheaper Bessemer steel which became available 
16 In 1856, largly because it was of a poorer standard. 
Obsolescence of initial location factors is similarly true of 
power supplies. Water Dower was said to be a crucial factor in the 
early localization of the cutlery trades in Sheffield: its first 
recorded usage was In 1350 and major expansion occured in the 15th 
17 century. However, steam powered cutlery grinding wheels were 
introduced in 1786 and having the advantage of a completely regular 
4 
and predictable supply of power, soon superseded water driven 
wheels. Neither will the presence in the locality of rocks suitable 
for the creation of grindstones, another requisite for cutlery 
production, explain the tenacity of the trades ln Sheffield. 
Millstone was always a reasonably common substance and furthermore, 
by the 1880s it was being replaced by cleaner and safer artificial 
18 
emery wheels. 
Thus, whilst tangible geographical factors may explain the 
original location of the cutlery trades ln Sheffield, their 
localization, tenacity and success is more di fficul t to 
account for in such terms, but better explained by less concrete 
sociological factors: primarily the abilities and outlook of the 
local work force. Al though these quali ties were in themselves the 
product of geographical remoteness and industrial localization 
dependent upon initial palpable physical factors, the effects were 
cumulative: remoteness produced a community in which most of the 
workforce devoted themselves to the working of particular metals in 
a particular manner, creating a highly localized, but highly 
skilled pool of talent. Sociologically, the traditional dual 
economy of South Yorkshire, based on the skills of the peasant 
craftsman and farmer allowed the trades to develop wi thout any 
major or abrupt dislocations in prevlous values or economlC 
structures. 19 Gradually, the artisanal abilities of these handi-
craftsmen compensated for the decline of Sheffield's purely 
physical properties, but also came to shape and direct the form of 
the industry. That new metal related technology continued to be 
attracted to the region was largely the result of the skilled 
labour which was to be found ln Sheffield: "The fact that a highly 
skilled occupation was becoming localized in the district, led to 
new inventions being bought there as a matter of course, for 
nowhere else could the same reserve of skilled labour and super-
vision be found.,,20 Similarly, these new developments helped to 
diversify the industry, thus keeping it buoyant and further 
concentrating it in the Sheffield region . 
• As Sheffield's importance as an industrial centre increased, 
so its geographical isolation was steadily removed as it was linked 
to the national infrastructure. Until the development of turnpike 
roads in the 1700s, the sole outlet for Sheffield's goods were the 
chapmen 
cutlery 
5 
and their packhorses, although this did 
h · L d· . d bl t . t . 21 reac Ing on on In cons 1 era e quan lIes. 
not stop 
By the late 
17th century Sheffield manufacturers were selling their goods 
around the country. Exports however, presented considerably more 
difficulties: the nearest river port was twenty miles away, and the 
sea a further sixty miles, and despite the persistent agitation of 
the Cutlers' Company, the centre of Sheffield was not linked by 
canals to sea access until 1819. 22 However, as ear ly as 1750, 
cutlery firms were exporting their goods direct to the continent. 23 
Although the quality and quantity of road connections improved 
enormously over this period~4 it was the advent of rail transport, 
with its substantial cost reductions, which proved to be the 
25 fundamental development. Despite the indifference of the 
Cutlers' Company, (who realised that railroads would prove to be 
fatal competition to the canal in which they had invested)Sheffield 
had a rail link with London by 1840, and with Manchester by 1845. 26 
By 1870, Sheffield's geographical isolation had been overcome, 
as far as it was capable of being surmounted: it remained remote 
and removed from main communications arteries, providing a further 
economic stimulus to the production of high quality goods which had 
a low bulk to value ratio. However, as the rest of this chapter 
will illustrate, the peculiar concerns and values of the cutlery 
trades can only be understood when such geographical factors are 
understood in conjuction wi th the social factors they engendered. 
The predilections and understandings which developed were so 
tenacious and deep rooted , precisely because they were originally 
founded on the economic rationality of available raw materials 
combined with a remote location. 
ii) A Craft Industry and a Craft Mentali ty In the Ear ly Cutlery 
Trades. 
At the root of the pervasive craft mentality in these trades 
was the concern for the finished product. As illustrated above, 
these preoccupations were the economically logical outcome of a 
remote location wi th waning physical at tr ibutes, which maintained 
its hold on the industry on the basis of the specialist skills of 
its workforce. Craftsmen who undertook such trades were nRcessarily 
skilled, independent and aware of their abili ties, possessing an 
6 
outlook which reflected their economic circumstances and which, In 
turn, further strengthened obsessions with the quality of the 
product. 
Concern for the standard of the product can be seen In the 
ear ly special isms which developed in the trades. Be fore 1624, 
there arose geographical specialisms, according to which better 
quality goods were made In the centre of the town than in the 
outlying villages, whilst the villages began to produce particular 
types of cutlery: Shiregreen cutlers manufactured forks, Stanning-
ton cutlers razors and scissors. 27 In the late 17th century, 
subdivisions developed according to the type of cutlery. In 
pursuit of a finer finished product, such divisions were rigorously 
enforced according to ordinances, (records of which exist from as 
early as 156528 ) by which the cutlers regulated themselves. By an 
Act of Parliament of 1624 the cutlers of Hallamshire and six miles 
beyond were made a sel f -regulating autonomous corporation, with 
powers of detailed super v ision of the trades: laws and penal ties 
were drawn up which were intended to ensure the quali ty of the 
product and the skill of the craftsman, whilst revenue was assured 
through the fees obtained from penalties, and the granting of marks 
d f d Th 1 f ' t d' .. t d 29 an ree oms. e ru e 0 one man, one ra e was lnSlS e upon, 
whilst deceitfully made or marked goods were outlawed, and search-
30 
ers appointed by the Company to hunt them out. So from an ear ly 
date, Sheffield cutlers realised that their livelihood was depend-
, 
ent upon the production of, and a reputation for quality wares. 
Their desire to monopolize the trade in such goods is illustrated 
by their regulations which barred 'foreigners' from participation 
in the Hallamshire trades, and also ban the sale of cutlery parts 
31 to non-Hallamshire men. This abliity to retain exclusive control 
of the industry through such guild restriction which regulated both 
the form and standard of production, was a privilege the loss of 
which many cutlers would find it extremely difficult to accept. 
The next specialism to develop was the subdivision of the 
processes of production entailed in the manufacture of a particular 
product: for example table kni fe forging, gr inding and hafting 
became separate trades, as did pen and pocket knife forging, 
grinding and hafting. 32 The separation of the grinding and forging 
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operations occurred first, ln the mid-18th century, but the 
distinction between the forger and cutler was not widespread until 
after 1800, and even later in some trades. This specialization, 
which speeded up production, but retained an ever perfected 
quality, was a response to the increased demand which accompanied 
the transport developments of this per iod. Moreover, "the decomp-
osition of a handicraft into its different partial operations,,,33 
the main feature of advances in most industries at this time, was 
particularly applicable in these trades, where production, necess-
ar ily di v ided into forging, gr inding and hafting, lay i tsel f open 
to subdivision. The tools, space and capital needed to undertake 
any branch of production were both few and inexpensive, but the 
34 skill required in such handicrafts was commensurately great. 
Whilst the huge variety of goods which were manufactured meant that 
production processes varied almost ad infinitum, the following lS a 
broad outline of the techniques involved in each stage of product-
. 35 lone 
For his trade, a forger needed only a reheating hearth, hand 
bellows, an anvil, hammers and fuel, but the craft involved 
enormous dexterity, judgement and experience. Forgers of small 
blades worked alone, whilst those who forged larger table blades 
employed a striker, who wielded the hammer. A rod of steel was 
first heated up ~nd drawn out wi th a hammer until it was roughly 
blade shaped, and then cut off from the rest of the bar, a process 
known as 'mooding'. On a second heating, the joint was fashioned 
to which the handle would be fastened (the shoulder), and on a 
third heating the blade was smithed over, its shape corrected, and 
the makers name struck on. The blade would then be hardened and 
tempered - hardened by heating followed by quenching in a vat of 
liquid and oil, and then retempered or hammered to reduce the 
brittleness of the blade, and improve its durability and 
elasticity. In all these processes, experience was required to 
wield the hammer in such a way that, whilst economising on effort, 
the steel was made tensile and, furthermore, in estimating the 
temperature of the steel, which could be accurately assessed by 
36 
observing its colour changes. The forging of a razor blade was a 
particularly skilled trade, the steel needing to be unusually 
8 
brittle and of differing thicknesses at the back and edges of the 
blade. 
Grinders worked in mills or workshops known as 'wheels', which 
were di v ided into rooms called 'hulls'. At the back of each hull 
was a power shaft with revolving drums, which were connected to the 
spindles which carried the grindstones that they drove, by means of 
leather belts or 'bands'. At the front of the room, nearest to the 
light, were the coarsest sandstones, used 1n the preliminary 
grinding process, and behind them, the smaller smoothing and 
polishing wheels: a set of three such wheels was called a 'trough'. 
A gr inder would si t or lean over the revol v ing stone, press1ng 
against its sur face the blade to be ground. Gr inders of large 
blades sat astride the stone on a wooden saddle, supported by a 
wooden framework, which was anchored to the floor by heavy chains, 
as a precaution against the stone shat ter ing or 'bursting' • The 
stones ran in metal tanks or 'trows', which were set into the floor 
and contained water which kept the stone wet, thereby stopping the 
blade from overheating, and keeping down the dust. (See Fig 1 • ) 
However, the dust and water sludge, known as 'wheelswarf', covered 
the apparatus and the grinder. The first grinding process was that 
of the neck or boulster, on an especially hard, dry stone, followed 
by rough gr inding of the blade to form its con vexed shape. The 
blade was then smoothed and corrected on a finer, harder whitening 
stone, to remove any deviatons or marks left after rough grinding, 
and then passed on to be glazed on a small wooden wheel, tr immed 
wi th leather and emery grease. The blade would be gl ven a rough 
and fine~glazing to give it a smooth polish, and finally buffed to 
gi ve ita finished, high polish, on a wooden wheel covered wi th 
thick, soft leather, to which iron oxide or 'crocus' polish was 
applied. Balancing the wheel, dealing with the velocity and 
hazards of the stone, the dust and flying sparks, giving the blade 
a smooth surface and good cutting edge, made grinding an equally 
skilled, but more hazardous and injurious trade than forging. 
Finally, a cutler or hafter assembled and adjusted the various 
portions of the kni fe. As well as all the necessary parts of the 
knife, he needed oil, W1re, glue and basic tools: drills for 
boring, files, vices, glazes and buffs. The trade was complicated 
and di versi fied by the huge range of handle mater ials that were 
Fig.1 Grindstone for Work on Scissors, Pocket Knives and Razors. 
Source: J.B.Himsworth, p.64. 
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available, from basic wood or celluloid to lvory and mother-
of-pearl. To give a table knife a basic wooden handle, flat pieces 
of wood or 'scales' were riveted to the 'tang' (the end of the 
blade, fi t ted into the handle) by bor ing holes into the tang and 
wood, through which Wlre was passed, its stub being hammered flat 
on a small anvil or 'stiddy'. The wooden handle was then glazed and 
buffed. One of the many var iations on this process, was the 
hafting of knives in which the tang passed straight up the handle, 
and was fixed at its end. The trade of the spring knife cutler was 
considerably more complicated: the variety of styles and Slzes was 
greater and skill was required to ensure that the blades 'snapped' 
shut, that they did not rub against each other, and that they did 
not open or close too far and obscure the nail nick. 
E&ch of these processes were in themselves both skilled and 
labour intensive; collectively the number,complexity, diversity and 
expertise of the operations were enormous. In Abel Bywater's 
Sheffield Dialect of 1839, it was calculated that the making of a 
pen knife entailed 39 different processes. 37 Thus, whilst the 
handicraft nature of the trades was maintained, subdivision of 
processes was essential if quality and speed were to be assured. 
A further type of specialism was the distinction between high 
quality, expensive items, and lower quality commoner goods, a 
distinction which applied equally to the producers of the two 
di fferent classes of cutlery. The divisions between skilled and 
unskilled workmen, craftsmen and labourers, noble and ignoble 
artisans, were old and deep.38 
That production was so specialized and the goods often 
unique, that it was the craftsman with his individual skills, 
rather than major capital investment who remained the foundation of 
the industry, had a decisi ve effect on its industr ial structure, 
which in turn further accentuated the independence of the artisans 
and their belief and pride In their independent status. The 
operation by manufacturers of sel f-contained factories, where all 
workers were employed directly on the owners' products, had always 
been alien to these trades. Where a manufacturer owned the 
premises, some men would devote most of their time to his work, but 
most rented space by the week, and worked on orders from manufact-
urers allover the town, including the owner of the premlses. 
10 
In addi tion to these pr i vately owned works, there were the 'public 
wheels', the owners of which had nothing to do wi th the trades 
39 beyond the renting out of space and power to individual workers. 
Furthermore, scattered throughout the town and its environs, there 
were hundreds of small workshops, often in lean-to sheds, where 
outworkers worked up goods for a variety of manufacturers and 
40 
merchants. As capital requirements were so small - it takes only 
"one and fower pence to make a cutler,,41_ independent production 
was common and small master status the legi timate expectation. 
Advantages of such status were not so much financial or occupation-
al, as manual work was still necessary, and profits were small, but 
social: a small master was on the first rung of the ladder to large 
employer status, and even as a very small scale employer, he 
thereby obtained both moral and social dignity.42 The atmosphere 
of social mobility was heightened by the difficulties of making 
large fortunes before 1850, when mass-production was virtually non-
existent, entry so easy, and competi tion correspondingly severe. 
The "middle ranks" of the 1830s were described as being "nearer 
both to upper and lower. The trade here is, as it ought to be, 
republican and not oligarchic. I t is in the, town, and not in the 
hands of a few enormous capitalists.,,43 Considerable mutuality 
existed between masters and men, based on similar economIC and 
social exper iences, but also craft loyal ties and values. This 
society, already isolated from the outside world, was dominated by 
a sence of 'the craft' and 'the trade'. Few mmi]rants came in the 
44 17th and 18th centuries to broaden these inward-looking values, 
and the town remained clannish and imbued wi th the all pervasive 
culture of the independent craftsman. "The SIX townships of 
Sheffield were merely collections of hamlets which gradually merged 
45 in the course of urban growth", within which there was "an 
intense conservatism and parochialism, a distrust of 'outside' 
agencies, and a belief in self-reliance".46 
iii) Changes A ffected by the Ear ly 19th Century Increases In the 
Demand for Cutlery. 
As Sheffield's production of, and reputation for cutlery 
manufacture grew, as its raw material supplies were exploited and 
geographical isolation broken down, so it moved far in advance of 
rivals elsewhere in England. This was paralleled by the increasing 
11 
domination of Sheffield's economlC life by the cutlery trades. 47 
Approximately 2,000 men were employed in all the cutlery trades in 
1700, rising to 7 - 8,000 in 1800. 48 Accurate statistics which 
exist from 1821 illustrate the enormous growth in employment in the 
first part of the 19th century: 6,000 were employed in the cutlery 
trades (as narrowly defined) in 1821; by 1851, 11,000 were employ-
ed. 49 
Thus, the most marked feature of the responses of these trades 
to increased demand, was the preference for expansion of the labour 
force and the man~ipulation of the old structure and processes to 
increase producti v i ty and efficiency, instead of major technical 
changes or innovation. The use of steam power made little change 
to actual production techniques, and new machinery was accepted 
50 
and adopted only reluctantly. Fundamental to these changes was 
the openlng up of the labour market affected by the legislation of 
1814 which stated that "any person may carryon or work in the 
incorporation trades though not a freeman, and may have as many 
apprentices as he likes, and for such terms as he may think 
51 proper." Al though this coincided wi th the general abolition of 
the Elizabethan Status of Arti ficers, which enforced compulsory 
apprenticeships, in Sheffield it was the culmination of a power 
struggle wi th the Cutlers' Company. Whilst the Cutlers' Company 
theoretically represented all workers, its constitution allowed for 
its officers to nominate and elect their successors, thereby 
effectively excluding the rank and file and making it increasingly 
oligarchic. The larger merchants and factors, who dominated the 
Company, allowed restrictive regulations to lapse, and finally 
abolished them, despite the protests and outrage of the associat-
ions of freemen and journeymen. Whist it is possible to see 'this 
conflict as a clash of old and new economic moralities, guild 
restrictions versus free market economics, it does not necessarily 
follow that the industry was subject to an increasingly acute 
labour/capital polarization, in which traditional values and 
understandings became irrelevant and forgotten. Although evidence 
can be found which suggests increasing capi talization, the handi-
craft processes and mentality remained influential. 
It has been said that the early 19th century saw an lncrease 
ln the number of larger, more integrated firms at the expense of 
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the small scale, rented unit,52 which 1S seen as the emblem of 
handicra ft practices and values. However, such conclusions often 
rely too heavily on the use of trade directories, which give undue 
emphasis to the 'works' of the larger manufacturers, whilst under-
estimating the unquanti fied masses of outworkers who could not 
afford a directory entry. A more fundamental criticism of this 
v iew however, lies in the tradi tiona 1 organization of the large 
firms: huge quanti ties of goods were still obtained from out-
workers, whilst many inworkers were in reality, still semi-indepen-
ent contractors. In 1844, a commentator on the cutlery trades 
stated that "there are several modes of conducting the manufacture, 
but the factory system is not one of them .... there is no large 
building, under a central authority, in which a piece of steel goes 
in one door and comes out at another converted into knives, 
scissors and razors. Near ly all the items of cutlery made at 
Sheffield travel about the town several times before they are 
finished.,,54 Thus whilst partnerships increased markedly,55and 
compan1es boasted impressive premises, 56 at root their values and 
practices remained very much as before. Firms were proud to remain 
family businesses, and often accounted for their success in such 
57 
terms; no use was made of the joint stock legislation of the 
1850s and' 60s. 58 Most manufacturers continued to live at or near 
their places of business in the city centre, implying that they 
were still of only moderate means, and still integrally, pract-
ically involved in the business. 59 Similar ly, there appears to 
have been Ii t tIe interest or participation in the International 
Exhibi tions held abroad in the 1850s and '60s, symptomatic of a 
disregard for developments abroad and changing customer require-
60 
ments. 
However, the maintainance of a system which, although rooted 
1n the subsoil of handicraft enterprise, could be manipulated to 
d . 61 t accommodate considerable capitalist growth an expans1on, was no 
simply the resul t of narrow-minded, intransigent tradi tional ism, 
but to some extent, the product of sound economIC judgement. 
Exploiting the skills of a highly, almost uniquely skilled and able 
workforce, which had already obtained a reputation for the finest 
products, the quality of which newer competitors could never match, 
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was a sensible response to the increasing foreign competi tion of 
th · . d 62 lS perlo. Manufacturers benefitted from a system according to 
which men could be directly employed, laid off as trade expanded 
and contracted, allowing them to lncrease productive capacity 
without major capit~l investment. This was particularly important 
in these trades vttere business (especially that wi th Amer ica, which 
accounted for a third of all Sheffield's production by the late 
63 . . . 64 18th century ) was subject to such wlde fluctuatlons. Moreover, 
by extending and perfecting the division of labour within the 
existing handicraft system,65 a huge range of products could be 
obtained, with the marks of individuality and quality craftsmanship, 
which had become identified with the name of 'Sheffield'. 
The end of guild restrictions and the opening up of the labour 
market entailed considerable, even insurmountable difficulties for 
manufacturers who relied on their own, and Sheffield's reputation 
for fine goods. Once the number and level of expertise of both 
apprentices and independent producers was no longer stipulated or 
enforced, inadequately trained men who were capable of only low 
quali ty work, flooded the labour market. When trade slackened, 
such poorly skilled men were the first to be laid off and, out of 
desperation, often began independent production, making the 
shoddiest goods, and often undercutting the wages and prices of 
'respectable' workers and manufacturers. 66 Individuals were out-
manoevred and undercut by factors and merchants who bought up their 
work at the lowest possible prices, 
67 
manufacturers and workers. There was 
agaln undercutting other 
considerable agreement 
amongst both manufacturers and men that they were "not suffer ing 
simply from production exceeding a natural demand, an ev il which 
consequent embarrasments always correct; but from an undue product-
ion forcing a demand, at the expense of quality, to the permanent 
injury of both the manufacturers and the workforce.,,68 
For all of the workforce, their unusual status, as neither 
handicraft producer, nor simple wage earner, meant that they 
receive neither the total value of the work they produce, nor a set 
wage, but a gross sum from which numerous deductions were made for 
rent, power and wastage. 69 Payment was according to complicated 
and only spasmodically revised piece price lists, in which payment 
and deductions for the huge variety of different patterns, Slzes 
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shapes and processes in a particular cutlery branch were enumerat-
70 
ed. Changes in wage rates were calculated in terms of percentage 
Increases or decreases on these lists. Li v ing standards declined 
consistently from a high point in 1814 to 1850, wage rates falling 
siqnificantly beyond decreases in the cost of living. 71 
Simultaneously, the format of the working day was changing: an 
overstocked labour market, low wages and forced unemployment meant 
longer hours when work was available, and an end to tradi tional 
absenteeism and holiday-making. 72 Steam grinding wheels were not 
subject to the same seasonal availability of power as water driven 
wheels, and the resultant intensification of labour, in association 
with the specialization of grinding as a full-time occupation, in 
the town, created a marked increase in the incidence of bronchial 
lung disease known as grinder's asthma. 73 Furthermore, many 
workers were losing the trappings of the independent, educated 
artisanal status that they once held or aspired to. An increasing 
number could neither read nor write;74 children were being employ-
ed, often by their parents, from an ear ly age in the least skilled 
75 trades; cutlers were said to show apathy and disaffection towards 
religion, despite their former strong connections with local 
76 Dissenting sects; their poverty and irregularity of employment 
prevented many from depositing funds in saving banks. 77 Such 
characterization adds weight to the portrayal of cutlers as an 
increasingly proletar ianized group, being steadily expelled from 
the economIC and social haven of skilled artisan status. However, 
for a substantial and vocal section of the workforce, traditional 
skills, values and ideals were still alive and meaningful: attacks 
on their posi tion and cra ft techniques, and the spectacle of an 
increasingly degraded workforce beneath them, made them more aware 
of their skills and status, and the need to maintain them. 
Predictably, it was these men, who were still sufficiently 
numerous, skilled and confident, who dominated working-class 
responses to the changes of this period, and ensured the character-
istically traditional framework of policies and action. 
The status divisions between workers were based on a variety 
of factors. Some commentators have based their deliniat ions on 
production processes, marking out the better paid and more skilled 
trades of forger and grinder as an elite. Such a categorization 
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would however, amount to an unacceptably large 41% of cutlers being 
classified as an elite in 1851. 78 Moreover, the expenses of 
grinders' raw mater ials, as well as occupational hazards 
and illnesses which often curtailed employment, compensated for 
their higher net earnIngs. Alternative categorizations distinguish 
between the type of product being made: razor makers were generally 
bet ter paid, better skilled and more secure than fork makers. 
However, the most convincing indication of better earnings, status 
and skill was to be found in the quality of the product being 
produced, a view evidenced by the presence of large wage different-
79 ials in all the cutlery trades. In the sprIng knife trade In 
1840, a few men earnt 40/- per week, the majority 16 - 22/-, but 
some earnt as little as 12 - 16/- per week: "In the better and 
finer articles, some may earn 30s. 
. 1 1 ,,80 Th wages are exceSSIve yow. us, 
per week, but in general the 
concern for quali ty of work, 
status, independence and guild-inspired craft exclusiveness were to 
some extent heightened by the creation of a stratum of work and 
workers from which to defend them. The continued v i tali t y and 
validity of traditional concerns IS well-illustrated by the 
pr inciples and aims of the cra ft unions in this per iod who, by 
virtue of their continued power and conviction, were a further 
barrier to the demise of those same traditions. 
There was not initially a sharp divide in these trades between 
freemen who, having served their apprenticeship, paid a fee to the 
Cutlers' Company to set up as independent contractors, and the 
skilled journey-men whom they employed: depending on trade, workers 
d 1 d · . 81 Th were often employers an emp oye In successIve years. ese 
divisions between the two types of skilled men were further 
submerged with the increased inclusiveness of the freemen's 
associations, in their opposition to the merchant-factors of the 
Cutlers' Company, and attempts to re-enforce 
. 1 t· t· 82 regulations and general tradltiona res rIC Ions. 
fluctuations and attacks on customsry rates of 
apprenticeship 
With the trade 
the late 18th 
century, disputes became quite commonplace for the first time. One 
of the earliest strikes, in 1787, centered around the efforts of 
the table knife workers to stop the new practice of thirteen items 
83 being counted as a dozen, whilst In 1801, the first of many 
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strikes was held on the graduating principle. 84 These strikes 
were met by associations of employers and prosecutions under the 
Combination Acts. 8S However, the strength of the cutlers in 
buoyant trade, the absence of signi ficant foreign competi tion and 
sufficient deskilled labour to replace the striking craftsmen, is 
evidenced by the exceptionally high price lists obtained in 1814. 
A Sheffield Mercantile and Manufacturing Union was formed in 1814 
to combat these demands, which were believed to be "immoderate 
beyond all precedent," and there followed further prosecutions 
under the combination Acts,86 and wage reductions which accompanied 
the poorer trade and general fall in the cost of living after 1814. 
The responses of the workers to their declining standard of 
living and the combinations of employers, were hesitant and 
backward looking. They were mistrustful of larger-scale combination 
and continued to favour small societies, a separate one to represent 
each of the production processes involved in the manufacture of a 
particular type of cutlery (i.e. table knife forgers, grinders, and 
hafters societies). This attitude was believ2d to reflect "that 
sturdy independence and tenacious adherance to ancient customs and 
the characteristic self-sufficiency which has always distinguished 
their members individually.,,87 Despite their frequent insolvency 
88 
and inability to enforce their demands, their parochial craft 
sectionalism made them incapable of welding their interests in any 
broader alliance for any length of time. Although 
ations did take shape, these were short lived: 88 the 
various feder-
benefits of 
amalgamation were by no means obvious to the local unions, and were 
to remain so until the industrial militancy of 1911-13. 
The aims of these small societies were formed within the 
framework and terms of reference of the old Cutlers' Company 
regulations. They stressed restr icti ve practices, especially the 
strict application of apprenticeship rules, the importance of 
quality production and the rigorous application of trade marks, and 
the need for harmony and understanding between masters and men, 
based on these foregoing values. Respectable, upr ight behav iour 
t d .. t 90 d th was expected of ra e unlonlS s, an In many ways, ese men 
, 
shared more common values with reputable, principled manufacturers 
. t d 91 S . t· than with the unskilled members of theIr own ra es. OCle les 
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were anxlous to prevent changes which would blur the tradi tional 
distinctions between skilled and less skilled men, particularly the 
reduction of wage differentials. 92 They regretted the demise of 
the guild based unity which had once bound together masters and 
men, and saw in this change the cause of all the problems which 
afflicted the industry. The period of the effective operation of 
the Cutlers' Company's guild restrictions were ideal ised into an 
era of familic..-r, almost brotherly harmony and tranquility: "the 
respectable manufacturers regarded their workmen almost as families 
for which they considered it their duty to prov ide, and when 
reverses in trade occurred, used to stock up goods... and most 
reluctantly relinquish their workmen to the parish fund.,,93 
The continued desire for, and feasibility of joint regulation 
of the trades is illustrated by the implementation, albeit short-
Ii ved, of two plans to this effect in the 1820s. In 1820, a 
communi ty plan was drawn up by workmen, masters and poor law 
administrators, whereby a common fund was formed to provide for 
the unemployed in the trades, in exchange for the dissolution of the 
spring knife cutlers union, the poorest society, and efforts were 
made to return to the moderate 1810 price lists. It lasted only 
four months, failing as did later attempts at such community 
regulation because 'unrespectable' small masters and factors 
continued to undercut prices. 94 A similar plan of 1828, worked out 
by the journeymen cutlers, in conjunction with the Cutlers'Company 
and manufacturers, to regularize production and take it away from 
95 
small masters and factor-masters, failed for similar reasons. 
However, guild restr iction continued to be discussed and 
considered a vaguely viable option, because of the unity of 
interest which still linked many manufacturers and men; perhaps it 
was belatedly realized by manufacturers of high quality products, 
for whom the maintenance of Sheffield's reputation was crucial to 
their own commercial prospects, that the opening up of labour 
markets had entailed consequences far beyond their control or 
initial intentions and desires. There existed a general consensus 
between the 'honourable' sections of both employers and employed, 
based on common values which were largely the result of shared past 
experiences and broadly similar economic and social expectations 
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and understandings. A link, which was to colour and permeate 
understandings In the industry into the 20th century, was drawn 
between increased, unregulated competition, involving small masters 
In particular, and the decline In wages, profits, and, most 
importantly, standards of quality, which would result in the loss 
of Sheffield's reputation as the finest quality cutlery producer .96 
-fhe spl.~ing kni fe gr-inders epitomised the3e feelings: the end of 
guild regulation allowed the entry into the trades of many "needy 
adventurers, men wi thout capi tal or standing in society, and in 
many cases without principle," which meant that "immense quantities 
of the most worthless articles are thrown on to the market, which 
gradually undermines our character, both at home and abroad.,,97 
Thus, an examination of the ear ly history of the industry 
helps to clarify the form and reasons for the subsequent tenacity 
of tradi tional concerns and understandings, by explaining their 
original foundations and functions. 
than just a whim, but an economic 
Concern with quality was more 
necessity; the handicraft 
aptitude and skills of the local community were decisive in the 
continued existence and success of the cutlery trades in Sheffield. 
Hence the pride in skill and in the excellence of production, the 
hatred of unregulated competition and unskilled labour which 
threatened this production, the percei ved need for and reliance 
upon guild restrictions, are realized to be fundamental to the 
endur ing prosper i ty of these trades in this particular location. 
This in turn, helps to explain the nature of the ties, in terms of 
both understandings and economIC compulsion, which linked high 
grade producers, masters and men; In their abhorrence of the 
unregulated competi tion 0 f the 'disreputable' factors, merchants 
and small masters, and in their belief that such production would 
ruin Sheffield's reputation and, with it their own prosperity. 
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37. Abel Bywater,The Sheffield Dialect, 1839, Sheffield, pp.33-
4. His account of "i vvera thing ats dun to a pen kni fe throot 
furst tot last", proceeded as follows: 
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heast spring makker: 
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2nd. Then he draws tuther end aht an turns it, an's just as 
menna he'ats fort scale; wa then't blade gooas tot wheel tubbe 
grun an sich loik. 
1st. Nah, thah knots, we alis groind tang furst, fort mark to be 
struckn, but ivverra bodda dus'nt. 
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Then heast Cutlers wark al bit warst, bur 0 think 0 can 
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26 
points in?' 
Jooa Crocus: 'Wa mun 0 did'nt owt to loise for that bit; bur, 0 
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CHAPTER 2 RAW MATERIALS, MECHANIZATION AND NEW INVENTIONS. 
In the period under consideration, the Sheffield cutlery 
trades experienced few marked or rapid advances towards mechanized 
production, nor were there many widely adopted departures in the 
application of new raw mater ials, or In product design. The 
industry as a whole remained committed to the traditional principles 
and practice of high quality production which embodied the use of 
the best possible raw materials and the manual expertise of 
craftsmen. Even when new techniques were adopted, it was generally 
with reluctance and a vague sense of shame that Sheffield's 
valuable and hard won reputation for the finest cutlery was being 
sacrificed. Her trading reputation, associated with high quality, 
durable, specialised cutlery, was treated as sacrosanct by many 
manufacturers and men. Mechanization was associated wi th poor 
quality raw materials and even fraudulent trade marking practices; 
most manufacturers would have gladly abandoned the production of 
common cutlery by mechanized processes to foreign competi tors or 
) 
lesser producers in Sheffield, if the market would have allowed 
such a policy. The recurring conclusion was that Sheffield should 
exploit, as far as was possible, those assets which her competitors 
could not attain or imitate: an exceptionally skilled workforce, an 
ablilty to produce a huge diversity of specialized designs, and a 
trading name and reputation unequalled by any competi tor in both 
cutlery, or its major constituent, steel. 
The failure of the British manufacturer to appreciate the 
value of new technology and to install new machinery apace with his 
German and American competitors has been interpreted as important 
ev idence in arguments which ci te 'entrepreneur ial failure' as the 
major reason for the perceived loss of vitality In and even 
retardation of the British economy after 1870. Moreover, entrepre-
neurial inertia was believed to be the result of conditions 
seemingly epi tomised in Shefield: the drag of an 'ear ly start', 
complacency, and the general unresponsiveness of British society to 
change - "the force of tradition dies hard with the British people 
and this more than anything else seems to have influenced the 
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outlook and actions of British industrialists and their employees. 
So long as it was possible to make an honest penny, British 
entrepreneurs were content to jog along In the same old way, using 
the techniques and methods which their ancestors had introduced." 1 
However, whilst traditional considerations were undoubtedly 
important in shaping at ti tudes and policy in these trades, it is 
possible to demonstrate that these principles were frequently the 
resul t of careful reflection on market conditions and moreover, 
were quite rational economic choices, based on the recognition of 
the value of abundant cheap skilled labour, and a worldwide 
commercial reputation. Production had been founded on these 
pr inciples for centur ies, and was not, therefore, even if it had 
wanted to change, free to develop along the lines of its newer 
foreign competitors. Even if the skilled workforce and specialised 
production had been scra4Bd, Sheffield would have been forced to 
compete on equal terms and in the same markets as foreign compet-
i tors, whereas quali ty, craft production set Sheffield apart from 
her competitors. Moreover, it is possible to show that Sheffield's 
manufacturers did adopt new technology, but cautiously and when it 
suited their evaluation of their position and market conditions. 
1870-1889 
i) Mechanization and Product Design 
The first part of this period was notable for the absence of 
any significant application of mechanized production techniques to 
these trades. Al though steam power had concentrated production 
into factories in the city centre,2 it had little immediate impact 
on the actual processes of production - even in 1893 no operation 
was completely mechanized. 3 Although machines were available and 
widely used in Germany and America,4 their employment in Sheffield 
was generally both delayed and halting; even the transition to the 
steam hammer, debatably the real revolution facili tated by steam 
5 power, was a slow process. The stamping of table knife blades out 
of specially prepared sheets of steel, whilst it was introduced In 
6 . 7 1858, did not come into common usage untIl the 1880s. Machine 
. 8 
forging processes were developed for steel forks and spring knIves, 
but the method of 'flying'scissor blades from sheet steel, although 
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demonstrated in Sheffield by a French inventor In 
become firmly established until 1892. 9 Grinding 
1862, did not 
and 
processes underwent even less mechanization than forging. 10 
hafting 
Machine gr inding was introduced in the 1850s and was continually 
improved by Sheffield manufacturers and inventors, until by the mid-
1880s, reasonable quality blades could be produced at great speed. 11 
In the hafting processes, machinery was applied to the tedious 
process of filing bolsters, whilst power driven borers were four 
times faster and involved the application of much less force than 
h d b . 12 an orlng. 
Neither manufacturers nor workmen were particularly worried or 
abashed by the lack of mechanical advance in their industry; infact 
power driven production was firmly associated with poor quality raw 
mater ials, low ablili t y workmen, and dishonourable firms who, in 
producing shoddy goods, were sacrificing Sheffield's communal 
reputation to serve their own ends. The old and reputable houses 
continued to boast their reliance on traditional production 
techniques and associated with them, high grade raw materials and 
skilled workmen. Firms were anxious to state (and frequently 
overstate) their use of "the latest improved j machinery and appli-
ances",13 which allowed them tG conduct all operations on the most 
advanced lines, but they were ever more eager to stress that this 
was In conjunction with the employment of many craftsmen who 
perfected the finish of their cutlery. 
Whilst this reliance on traditional values and practices may 
have been partly the result of inertia and even the dogmatic 
confidence of the Sheffield industry, it seems that such assurance 
had a sound rational basis, and that the industry had a fair 
understanding 0 fits posi tion. The ci ty was fully aware of the 
mechanical advances being made in Germany and America and of the 
common, standardized goods that were being produced In ever 
expanding quantities. In these circumstances, it was arguably more 
rational for Sheffield to rely upon and to loudly expound the 
virtues of its historically and industrially unique attributes: the 
generations of exceptionally skilled craftsmen and the production 
of some of the best steel In the world. Fine steel and fine 
36 
craftsmen were both cheaper and more widely available here than 
anywhere else, enabling an enormous and 
quali t Y 'one 0 ff' goods to be produced to a 
diverse range of 
high standard and 
As c. K. Hartley 
top 
more 
has cheaply than anywhere else in the world. 
14 
argued, Br i tish neglect of new machinery techniques were often 
less associated wi th entrepreneurial apathy or failure, as wi th the 
abundance, cheapness, discipline and ability of skilled Br i tish 
workmen. Labour-saving machinery, when adopted abroad, was 
normally to compensate for a lack of skilled labour, and necessar-
ily resulted in the production of more standardized mass-produced 
goods. 
Furthermore, the best and most expensive cutlery still had an 
appearance significantly different from that of cheaper varieties, 
and whilst ever snobbery and prestige dictated a desire for the 
15 best goods, there would always be a market for the best cutlery. 
To a considerable extent the market made important demands of 
manufacturers, who were not free to change their modes of product-
ion entirely at their own will. Roseberg found that "Across the 
whole range of commodities, we find evidence that British consumers 
imposed their tastes on the producer which !3eriously constrained 
him with respect to the exploitation of machine technology. 
English observers often noted with some astonishment that American 
products were designed to accommodate not the consumer but the 
machine~16 High quality products had become almost synonymous with 
the trade mark 'Sheffield' and these were the type of goods which 
most consumers had come to expect from the city. 
This being the case, it seems that the Sheffield industry 
applied itsel f to the communication of its special assets to as 
wide an audience as possible, whilst also stressing the inability 
of competitors to match or imitate these advantages. The skill of 
the Sheffield cutler was often treated as if it had an imbred, 
almost mystical quality. One manufacturer contrasted a Sheffield 
craftman's ability to "feel" a blade, with the workings of the 
machines he had observed in America: By 'fingering' his blade, the 
Sheffield grinder "effects all those dainty touches and delicate 
gradations which no machine, nor no man uSIng a ~2chine can 
impart".17 Ruskin too, had a similar respectful admiration for the 
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Sheffield cutlers and the pride they took In their work: "Upon the 
maintenance of this pride, the maintenance of Sheffield's supremacy 
in the manufacture of cutlery largely depends. The best knives 
are, and always will be, made by hand, and the qualities which are 
necessary to this system are In Sheffield's hereditary. In 
dexterity of handling, rapidity of execution, perception of results 
and honest zeal, the Hallamshire forger and grinder are unapproach-
ed " .18 Such t f 'h d' t 't 1 a respec or ere l ary a ent was In marked 
contrast to attitudes In the American cutlery industry, where 
Sheffield craftsmen were felt to be too proud and concei ted. In 
America "the honour which he expects to receive belongs only to 
these who can make the machinery to do the work which before 
19 devoured the men". 
Until the 1890s at least, machinery was simply incapable of 
producing the quality of cutlery that most Sheffield manufacturers 
wanted to sell. However, they were willing to consider and apply 
new technology when it could be incorporated into their conception 
of how the industry should progress. Many manufacturers would 
freely use machines for "drilling, boring and other operations in 
which its uniformity and exactness made it superior to hand labour, 
but have far too much regard for the quality and reputation of 
their best goods to substi tute machine work In departments where 
the highest excellence can only be at tained by the employment of 
20 
the intelligent use of hand labour". 
Furthermore, many machines were still at an ear ly stage of 
development and were quite incapable of producing goods of a fine 
finish, as well as entailing such negati ve side effects as, for 
example, the creation of an excessive amount of dust.
21 
It has 
often been suggested that the 
machinery made it more sensible 
various problems with prototype 
for individual firms to delay 
. d t 22 Th purchase until the various 'bugs' had been lrone ou. e 
experiences of the Sheffield trades were with the production of 
small quanti ties of goods of a speci fic nature, often to the 
customer's order, which made the transi tion to mass production 
techniques and the loss of the ability to make minute speci fi-
cations, a difficult and painful process. 
As so often happened, a compromlse solution was developed, 
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whereby machines were used, but they were usually the inventions of 
the individual manufacturers, operated on their premises alone, and 
designed wi th highly detailed speci fications and hence a limi ted 
usage. The range of patterns and designs that most manufacturers 
continued to insist upon, and their rigorous indi v iduali t y and 
secrecy as producers, provided insufficient stimulus for engineers 
to design or manufacture machines, the demand for which would be 
too small to justify the cost of development. 23 Firms at the time 24 
and even present-day commentators stress that the fine adjustments 
and perfect finish required of the best cutlery can only be given 
by hand: "I f scissors are cut .... along the whole length of the 
blade, the final adjustment 1n their assembly needs a skilled 
putter together. Folding knives will only'walk and talk' that 1S 
the blades will only open easily and spring back into the centre of 
the knife with a click, if a cutler has seated each blade. Materials 
such as mother-of -pear 1 and 1 vory are not sui table for machine 
methods. The higher quality wares are likely to remain craftsmen's 
productions".25 
(l.~.;.r 
The expense of Bessemer and crucible Sft-eSI' steel, and of 
natural hafting materials, made them as yet unsuitable for manipul-
ation by machinery, and consequently a firm association developed 
in the minds of many 'respectable' manufacturers and men, that 
mechanization was synonymous wi th poor quality goods, and even 
false marking and the betrayal of trading reputations. The clear 
association between these factors is illustrated by a descr iption 
given by a trade unionist in 1886,of the table and butchers' knife 
trade, where there were four recognized systems of producing the 
blades: IIFirstly by hand, which 1S the system adopted by all 
respectable firms for their best goods, and in many instances the 
commoner quali ties; secondly forging by machine, commonly called 
"goffing"; thirdly, flying or stamping out of common Bessemer 
sheet steel, and fourthly the system of producing the blades from 
common pig iron" .26 The trade unionists in particular, felt that 
the whole concept of mechanization and its necessary consequences 
were a contradiction and subversion of all the values and techniques 
on which Sheffield's past and future prosperity were believed to be 
27 based. 
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Trade union opposi tion to new technology was intense and 
reasonably successful, albei t not the decisi ve force in the non-
implementation of new machinery that manufacturers often stated it 
to be. Although the power of the unions had been a strong influence 
28 In the 1840s, 50s and 60s, by the 1870s, trade union policy was 
little more than a supplementary reason, and arguably an excuse 
used by already unconv inced manufacturers, for the avoidance of 
machinery. The scornful contempt with which craftsmen treated the 
new inventions is illustrated in the names by which they referred 
to them: the new power glazers were called "werelegig polishers" 
whilst a "gobbed on" bolster referred to a 
soldered on, instead of being forged in its 
Whilst opposition was phrased in terms 
bolster which had been 
t · t 29 en Ire y. 
of concerns for quality 
and the maintenance of a trading reputation, these often disguised 
far more sel f -interested considerations. In strictly practical 
terms, mechanization "had the same effect as it had in most towns; 
it has tended to reduce wages, and has reduced wages, and always 
will" . 30 This was particular ly the case when manufacturers claimed 
that the cheaper production was new to them, and thus a market had 
to be 'forced' for it, which obliged the pay~ent and acceptance of 
31 lower wage rates. 
Wages were also reduced, as was the craftsman's status, by the 
subdivision of labour and deskilling which many realized to be the 
lI1avoidable consequence of mechanization. The creation of an 
unskilled and deskilled labour force was, in turn, seen as the 
starting point of sweating and excessive competition at the cheap 
end of the market. 32 
At a more abstract level, machinery, with its 'scientific' 
approach, contrasted sharply with the craftsman's traditional and 
almost folklorish understanding of his trade. The craft was passed 
from generation to generation; precise judgements by hand and eye 
took time and aptitude to perform to perfection. But mechanization 
struck heavy blows to the whole mystique of the craft, and on a 
practical level, often invol ved the curtailment of the workers' 
traditional discretionary powers, as production skills were taken 
out of their hands and placed with technicians. Only recently it 
was stated of cutlers that "As craftsmen, they have a great belief 
40 
In the value of practical exper ience as a way of acqtJ'lr Ing a 
knowledge of one's medium and a corresponding disbelief in the 
power of some young fellow in a lab to sit down and without any 
'know how' of the craft, work out answers to problems from abstract 
principles - principles which they, Ii fe-long craftsmen, cannot 
33 
understand" . As has been indicated, many manufacturers were at 
this stage prepared to acknowledge and to continue to use these 
skills instead of replacing them, often inadequately, by machines. 
However, perhaps as a result of the exalted position given to 
hand labour by most trade unionists, there was only a very slow 
realization that hand labour could be subdivided, degraded and 
sweated just as easily, if not more easily than under the impact of 
labour saving machinery. The sweating of hand labour infact became 
more intense as it came increasingly into competi tion wi th cheap 
mechanized production at the bottom end of the market. The very 
ease wi th which the cutlery trades could be made more productive 
through further subdi v isions of labour and subcontracting, thus 
guaranteeing a continued diversity of patterns and styles, without 
the expense of the purchase of machinery and expansion of premises, 
was a major reason why manufacturers found themselves able to 
34 
compete effectively without large-scale mechanization for so long. 
Further evidence of the awareness of Sheffield's cutlery 
manufacturers, and of their appreciation of market conditions, lie 
in the numerous instances of their willingness to implement new 
technology as and when they considered it to be prudent. Our ing 
the bi t ter and protracted str ike in the scissors trade in 1876, 
substantial steps were taken towards mechanization In order to 
t ' f th ' 35 d counteract the restrictive prac Ices 0 e unIons, an In 1886 
it was stated that the depression "has stimulated invention in 
labour saving appliances", and "has enabled us to keep up the gross 
volume of our trade .... the introduction of machinery has largely 
36 increased the productive power of some of our staple trades". 
Moreover, whilst few old-fashioned, prestigious firms would 
h h ' 37 th" d admit to the employment of muc mac lnery even In IS perlo, 
there were some newer firms which were much more ready to exploit 
the new technology. James Orabble and Co. were using machinery in 
all their production processes by 1862, although they were the only 
firm to do so in Sheffield at that time. 38 By 1889 Staniforth's 
41 
output of machine forged table blades had reached 7000 to 8000 
dozen per week and demand for them was so great that more new 
machinery was installed. 39 Another such firm was John McClory and 
Sons, who by 1888 were freely admitting to the production of cheap, 
but decent and attractively finished goods, and even chastised the 
" elitism of the old-established houses: A few years ago, partly 
owing to the apathy of the older firms, who in a great measure 
confined themselves to the manufacture of the more expensive 
classes of cutlery, the enormous trade in cheap and middle class 
. "40 goods seemed likely to fall into the hands of German rIvals. 
However, it seems that these firms who ventured into the world 
of machine-made cutlery were more recently established than the 
41 
well-known 'giants' like Rodgers and Wostenholms, anc were 
presumably more capable of coming to terms wi th lower quali ty 
production as they did not have the reputation and associated 
trading responsibilities of the older established houses. It 
appears that for many of the older firms, there was a great loss 
of prestige and status, almost a betrayal of their ancestral 
reputation, invol ved in producing and marketing common goods. As 
late as 1946 the Working Party Report on Cutlery still felt obliged 
to stress that it was quite possible to market lower quali ty 
42 
cutlery "without loss of prestige and self-respect". 
Concerns with quality, and the realization and exploitation of 
the value of Sheffield's trade mark and skilled craftsmen, were 
similar ly all-pervasive in at ti tudes towards product design and 
development. Considerable time and emphasis were placed on the 
design of additional features, or improvements to existing products, 
if these developments would enhance the quality, uniqueness or 
usefulness of the original product. Very rarely however, did these 
developments lead to the creation of a totally new form of product 
or design. From the mid-1850s, there was little change in the 
43 length and design of cutlery, and product development concentrated 
on minor adaptations, which overall, markedly improved the capabil-
ities, operation and quality of the goods, but did not alter their 
basic form. 4n Typical developments included a rotary penknife which 
kept its blades from the dust, 45 a blade for a sportsman's kni fe 
46 
which could take virtually any attachment; a method of fixing 
table kni fe blades to their ivory handles which prevented any 
U,.. ll\,': ~-' . • •• I • '-, ,-
I I rnA r· ''; 
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. 47 tl k d' tt t· b 48 d unscrewlng; case cu ery pac age ln a rac lve oxes, an fork 
49 guards. Such designs were eager ly patented by the inventing 
firm, and were considered to be a further sign of the firm's 
reputation for, and interest ln quality preclslon workmanship.50 
More substantial alterations of design, which involved 
considerable shi fts from traditional ways of producing or under-
standing a product, were undertaken with far more reluctance. In 
the same way that new machinery was often delayed, there usually 
ensued a long delay between the patenting of a new product and its 
commercial manufacture in Sheffield. There was no lack of inventive 
talent or foresight amongst so many skilled and dextrous craftsmen 
and practically minded manufacturers, but there appears to have 
been a reluctance and even inabi Ii ty to put ideas into practice. 
The hollow-ground razor for example, which became an extremely 
popular speciali ty of the cutlery producers of Hamburg was not 
manufactured in large quantities in Sheffield until the late 1870s, 
although it was patented by a Sheffielder in 1828,51 and advertised 
by a local firm in the I r is in 1842. 52 By the time production in 
Sheffield was attempted on a large-scale, it was a difficult 
struggle to win back sales from Hamburg, which had now acquired a 
reputation for the best hollow-ground razor - and a reputation was 
a crucial factor in the high-class cutlery trades. 
These delays and failures to keep ahead were commonly blamed 
on the resistance of the men, who were accused of opposition to all 
innovations. Their usual form of resistance was to demand what 
manufacturers claimed were excessive prlces for work on new 
products, and to charge 'extras' at exorbitant rates, both of which 
were completely out of proportion with the amount of work done. 
Manufacturers complained that even if the new pattern involved less 
work for the men, who should therefore be paid less, the men always 
demanded a higher price on principle. "The effect of this policy is 
not only to prevent the development of the trade, but to severely 
cripple it,;53 claimed a table knife manufacturer, who had "several 
new patterns by me, which I am confident would take well, if my men 
would only charge for them in proportion to the work that is in 
them, and so let me sell them at a reasonable figure; but they 
refuse to do so, and they remain ln my drawer, and we go on turning 
54 
out the old patterns". 
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I t is clear that workers did demand high pr Ices for new products, 
when they were able to 
diminished as the period 
that the unIons, even 
enforce their demands, 
55 progressed. However, 
In this ear 1 ier per iod 
but this ability 
it seems unlikely 
of comparatively 
greater strength, would have been capable of single handedly 
holding back developments if the manufacturers had been committed 
to their implementation. The men themselves were frequently the 
designers of new products and patterns, and claimed that being the 
inventor, they were the most competent judges of the amount of work 
and therefore payment involved in a new design. 56 The unions 
believed that new patterns were being used as a method of bringing 
down the pr ice 0 f labour; they would not be resisted if they 
. d d f· 57 C ft lIlt t t provi e a air wage. ra smen were genera y re uc an 0 
abandon their hard won skills for the new techniques which new 
products often involved. 58 They were accustomed to the old work, 
often the owners of all the necessary tools, and were reluctant to 
recommence the labor ious process of learning di fferent techniques 
in which, because of their advancing age, they believed it to be 
59 impossible to attain such high expertise and therefore wages. As 
few old hands would learn new techniques, there were fewer crafts-
men available to teach the new skills to the next generation. 
However, manufacturers also seemed to be qui te content to 
di versi fy along tr ied and tested lines, adding further variations 
to the already bewildering range of available patterns. By the 
late 19th century, the number of patterns and designs in all shapes 
and sizes was qui te astonishing and advanced Sheffield's re-
putation as a producer of small, detailed orders of precise almost 
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customer-made quality cutlery. 
ii) Raw Materials 
Attitudes towards the choice of raw materials illustrate a 
similar preoccupation with the production of reputable, high-
class goods and wi th the reluctance to make changes which con-
tradicted traditional understandings and the perceived reasons for 
success. The craftsmen mistrusted devices and materials which had 
not won the sanction of their own usage as well as that of many 
previous generations of artisans. For employers, financial 
pressures to introduce cheap raw mateials were probably mitigated 
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by the overwhelming importance of labour costs in the total costs 
of production. 61 Moreover, amongst the 'respectable' members of the 
trade, the per iod was marked by a growing concern over, and even 
disgust wi th a buy ing public which was increasingly unaware of, 
or unable to distinguish the different types of raw materials used 
In its cutlery, to such an extent that it seemed indifferent to 
the quality and durability of the cutlery that it purchased. 
F or the gr inders, the most signi ficant change of the per iod 
was the introduction of emery grinding wheels which replaced 
traditional grindstones and avoided many of the dangers to health 
and safety which were inherent in the use of the grindstones. 62 The 
emery grinding wheel was introduced into Sheffield in the 1880s by 
a local engineer, but it was slow to win acceptance amongst the 
grinders. The reason for its unpopular i t Y stemmed from the fact 
that the properties of the new wheel were so unlike those of old 
grindstones, that to use it involved a certain amount of relearning 
and adaptation. The emery wheel could not initially run in water 
and thus became very hot, sometimes causing the knife blade to heat 
up and lose its temper. However, the wheel was developed to enable 
it to run in water like grindstones, but unlike the latter, it 
retained a good 'cut' for 12 to 18 months. I t ran safely at 5,000 1 
per minute - a speed which made it unnecessary to exert as much 
pressure on the blade, thus making grinding lighter and quicker. 
Despite these advantages the wheels were adopted only slowly, 
partly because of the innate traditionalism of the grinders, and 
partly because of the expense of the emery wheels: £6 to £7 was a 
significant outlay for a grinder even if the manufacturer allowed 
payment in instalments. 63 
For the industry as a whole, the most influential developments 
In the uses of raw materials were in the field of hafting materials, 
where the rIsIng and eventually exorbitant pr ices of natural 
materials forced manufacturers to consider cheaper substitutes. 
The rise in the cost of ivory In the early 1870s inflated prices by 
30 to 100%,64 and although in 1874 they began to fall again,65 they 
t k 1875, 66 It f th t·t· of rose 0 new pea s In a resu 0 e compe 1 Ion an 
increasing number of foreign manufacturers for an ever decreasing 
supply at the major auctions. By 1881 further huge increases in 
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the prIce of hafting materials were once more forcing up the list 
67 prices of cutlery. The cost of Manilla shells rose from £160 to 
68 £240 per ton, in just ten months, whilst ivory had doubled In 
69 price between 1879 and 1883, until it was fetching £1,000 per ton. 
The largest cutlery manufacturers attempted to keep their prices 
down by combining ivory cutting, which was generally a separate 
industry, with their cutlery production,70 but it was an impossible 
task whilst an expanding market brought an ever diminishing supply 
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of Ivory. 
F aced wi th such circumstances manufacturers were forced to 
exper iment wi th and use var ious substitute mater ials. Celluloid 
was first used in the late 1860s, vulcanite, ebonite and xylonite 
were in wide usage. 72 Considerable quantities were used in the 
production of cheaper cutlery, the largest and most prestigious 
firms exper imenting wi th, and . . pIoneerIng its uses. They were 
presumably keen to make economies on that part of the tool which 
would not effect to its essential quality - its cutting edge, and 
thus, as far as possible, retain a reputation for a fine and 
durable blade, but at a reduced cost. Moreover, these makers were 
anxious to at tempt to under line the quali tati ve advantages of the 
new materials. 
Illustrating the readiness of the institutions of the trade to 
encourage and support inventive and new approaches and initiatives, 
the Cutlers' Companies of Sheffield and London held a joint 
exhibition in London in 1879, at which awards were gIven to firms 
for technical excellence and the implementation of new ideas in the 
trades. Winners included a firm who had developed the manufacture 
of celluloid fork handles which retained their appearance and 
durability in hot climates ~3a product obviously designed to appeal 
to the cheaper colonial market. Joseph Rodgers, the most prest-
IgIOUS firm in the trades, were at the forefront of these develop-
ments and were keen to broadcast their successes. By 1879 they 
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were manufacturing "ebonite secure handle table cutlery" in large 
quantities, and again stated their reasons in terms of concern for 
the quality of the product, and not its cost: it would neither 
crack, lose its finish, nor become loose, as bone and horn frequen-
tly did in hot climates, and it weighed much less. The cheapness 
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of these substances was stated almost as an afterthought, the firms 
being anxious to convince purchases that celluloid would "ere long 
become the recognised staple mater ial" and ivory would "no longer 
be regarded by any class as indispensable".75 
However, it remains debatable how far these companies were 
themsel ves convinced of this, and to what extent their customers 
were ready to believe them. There was still a large body of 
purchasers who would always want 1 vory, horn, bone or mother-
of - pear 1 handled cutlery, precisely because it was so expensive 
and an obvious sign of affluence and 'good taste'. Moreover, these 
were the consumers for whom many manufacturers and workers ln 
Sheffield were most ready and able to cater. I f traditional 
materials were really a thing of the past, why were noted manufact-
urers still so keen to advertise their presence and extensive 
purchases at the various quarterly ivory sales?76 Moreover, 
considerable time, effort and money were spent in finding more 
economical ways of using traditional hafting materials, but in such 
a way that the cutlery could still be marketed as 'the finest 
qua 1 i t Y '. 77 
However, the greatest controversy concernlng the use of newer, 
cheaper raw materials surrounded the types of steel used in the 
production of cutlery blades. The quality and durability of 
Sheffield blades were felt to be the major factor in the fame and 
continued prestige of the ci ty' s products. The use of cheaper 
steels, and particularly when these blades were falsely marked so 
as to imply that they were of a higher quality, was seen by many 
manufacturers and men as a dishonourable betrayal of Sheffield's 
commercial history and fame, and in cutting the links between the 
trade mark 'Sheffield' and high class goods, a policy that would 
fatally damage her future trade. I f enough cheap steel was used, 
Sheffield's trading reputation would become akin to that of 
Solingen or Conneticut, and as it was believed that foreign 
competitors could produce these goods far cheaper anyway, Sheffield 
would lose customers on two counts: those requiring the best goods 
would lose fai th in the 'Sheffield' trade mark, and those wanting 
low prices would still find it cheaper to buy elsewhere. Infact by 
1886, the use of poor steel and its false marking were frequently 
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cited as fundamental causes of the depression In the cutlery 
78 
trades. 
Inevitably, the craftsmen of the industry saw the use of cheap 
steel as an unavoidable consequence of the increased use of 
machinery, but were both despairing and indignant that the customer 
appeared to know and care so little about these distinctions. The 
whole question of the type of steel used by manufacturers thus 
became one of the touchstones of the attitudes that distinguished 
what were believed to be 'respectable' manufacturers from the 
'unrespectable'. As so often in this industry, commercial respect-
ability was closely associated with a respect for and adherence to 
time-honoured notions of trade etiquette, the values and practices 
which had made the industry great. 
The type of steel which produced the finest cutting edge was 
crucible steel. I t has recently been suggested -th8t the quenti ty 
of crucible steel made In Sheffield was still increasing right 
until the end of the century: over 100,000 tons were turned out per 
year. 79 Although the fast growing tool and crinoline trades 
consumed a substantial amount of this output, the cutlery trades 
remained an important outlet for steel-makers, absorbing "a much 
greater quantity of steel than is generally supposed.,,80 
Increased production did not however, appear to reduce the 
cost of this expensive metal. This was partly because the crucible 
steel makers remained very much a part of the old, small-scale 
steel making world, with cautious, conservative ways and the 
physical constraints of cramped central locations,81 far removed 
from the wor ld of the new bulk steel makers. Their conservatism 
may have been to some extent associated with their close relation-
ship wi th the cutlery housed they served. Marsh Brothers, for 
example, "remained a family firm, relying as they had been want to 
do on their own capi tal only; they were too deeply interested In 
the small, old-fashioned cutlery and special steel trade to plunge 
into the unchartered sea of bulk-steel with its new science and new 
,,82 
outlook. 
Technical and cost cut ting developments which were affecting 
this industry were largely ignored in Sheffield, mainly because the 
purchasers believed that established methods produced the finest 
48 
steel - hence the unpopularity of the Siemens Furnace in Sheffield~3 
Small, speciality steel makers survived because the tool and 
cutlery manufacturers with whom they traded were prepared to bear 
the expense of speciality steels, often produced according to their 
own specifications. 84 The largest, celebrated cutlery firms placed 
such emphasis of the standard of their steel, that they considered 
it worthwhile to produce it for themselves. Joseph Rodgers decided 
on their own steel production in 1887, and went to considerable 
1 th t h . t 85 H th t d t eng s 0 purc ase Sl es. owever, ey s resse hat the 
reasons for this policy of "obtaining control of th? whole process 
of manufacture" were to maintain the principles of the company 
motto - quality first~6 The reputation of a quality steel manu fact-
urlng firm could be made or broken by the approval or disapproval 
of its cutlery producing customers. 87 For example, John Vessey and 
Sons were former cutlery manufacturers who realised the market 
potential for speciality steels in an industry that cared so much 
about quality and detailed speci fications. They became producers 
of "steels specially sui table for the manufacture of all kinds of 
cutlery, especially pen and pocket kni ves, ~urgical instruments, 
I 
razors, scissors .... butchers knives and cutlery of every descr ip-
t . ,,88 lone 
Even cutlery manufacturers who operated on too small a scale 
to contemplate their own steel production,frequently stressed the 
superior qualities of the steel they bought and used. This policy 
of linking the notions of the best quali ty steel wi th the best 
quality cutlery and then constantly reiterating the connection to 
the buying public was aguably a conscious and sensible strategy on 
the part of the Sheffield cutlery manufacturers. It further helped 
Sheffield, as the famous home of quali ty steels, to retain the 
'quali ty gap' that separated her from her foreign rivals. Thus, 
Camille Pag~, the noted cutlery specialist could still affirm in 
1896 that Sheffield cutlery had "une reputation montre'e qu' ils 
devait surtout ~ la qualit~ superieure des aciers qu'ils emploien~~ 
However, with the development of a growlng market for medium 
to low priced goods, and of machinery for manipulating lower 
quality steel, the manufacture of cutlery which used Bessemer steel 
became increasingly common in Sheffi~d. Nevertheless the consensus 
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opinion of the trade, in public at any rate, was that such product-
ion was somewhat disreputable and discreditable, and that it would 
do very little for the reputation or the pocket of the individual 
manufacturers or the Sheffield trades as a whole. The stamping of 
cheap blades wi th indications of a higher quality was treated, 
agaIn in public, as a cardinal SIn and betrayal of everything for 
which the Sheffield trades believed themselves to stand. 
The use of Bessemer steels was thus inextricably linked to the 
scandalous and distasteful wor Id of false marking and fraudulent 
commercial practices. In an industry noted for and constantly 
rei terating its concern for quality, the use of Bessemer steel, 
correctly or falsely marked, was inevitably a cause for wide-
ranging comment and criticism, all of which damaged the reputation 
that the trades so desparately wanted to uphold. The whole Issue 
developed into a scandal of national proportions,90 with The Times 
reporting that hal f of Sheffield's cutlery was infact 
91 Bessemer steel, allegations which were corroborated 
Ironmonger~2 Whilst notable manufacturers did their 
. t t f' d . th . d t 93 th reIns a e con 1 ence In e In us ry, e problem 
made from 
by The 
utmost to 
was that 
section of manufacturers who felt no loyalty to these traditional 
values and In their 'sel fishness', jeopardized the credibili ty of 
the majority. 
To the leaders of the local craft unIons, the use of Bessemer 
steel was an almost sacr ilegious betrayal of all the principles 
they held dear. Such practices, especially when combined wi th 
fraudulent marking were believed to be the maIn cause of the 
depressed state of the trade, but also the decline in their wages 
and status, as skilled workmanship was both unnecessary and 
unachievable on poor quali ty steel. They quoted the American 
consul in Sheffield who had publicly stated that the thousands of 
tons of Bessemer steel which were sold by Sheffield cutlery 
manu facturers as crucible steel every year wo-uld "v":'ry speedily 
destroy all confidence in Sheffield steel, and render abortive the 
enterprise of our manufacturers and skill of our workmen, for it IS 
useless to put good workmanship upon bad materials.,,94 Even if a 
fine finish had been needed for a Bessemer blade, it was far more 
di fficul t for the cre: ftsm2n to harden 8hd sharpen this type of 
steel. 95 
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Thus, such poorer quality raw materials like, and at the same time 
closely related to mechanized production techniques, could- not be 
separated from fears of deskilling and the decline of craft 
techniques. 
1889-1914 
i) Mechanization and Product Design 
This second period was marked by a far more concerted and large 
scale application of new machinery, techniques and raw materials. 
As the effectiveness of machinery increased and it became possible 
to produce a standardized, neat, middle quality item which 
foreign competitors were both manufacturing and selling ln large 
quanti ties to the expanding lower quality market - resistance to 
new developments became less judicious. Moreover, labour shortages 
at home, and the growing realization amongst trade unionists that 
working at factory based machines could ensure much better pay and 
conditions than sweated handicraft outwork, ensured that both 
employers and employed were more ready to consider change. 
However, mechanization and innovation in these trades never 
amounted to anything approaching a wholesale transformation. 
Conventional practices and values were never discarded and changes 
were more ln the nature of variations, initiated only with great 
caution: the old system was modified and adapted but never abandoned. 
The reasons for this were threefold: mentally and psychologically, 
traditional values and understandings had sunk such deep roots; the 
old system still contained considerable commercial vitality; and 
finally, it coexisted qui te easily and efficiently side by side 
with newer developments. 
The larger-scale conversion to mechanized techniques of 
production ln Sheffield came with the successful development of 
such machines by competi tors, and their use to capture the ever 
expanding low to medium quality market. German and American 
manufacturers had become particular ly proficient wi th razor and 
SClssor making machinery, which had reached a high level of 
perfection by the 1890s. 96 By the early 1900s, Sheffield cutlery 
firms were importing such quantities of German stamped scissor and 
razor blades, and finishing them ln their own workshops, that a 
Remscheid firm established itself ln Sheffield in 1902, to serve 
this market. 97 
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Production of the blanks was completely mechanized; they were neat 
and well- finished, and stamped out at a rate of 1,000 per day, 
whilst two men could only hand forge five to six dozen in the same 
time. 98 By 1913, the Cutlers' Company was threatening to prosecute 
(under the Merchandise Marks Act) anyone who used imported German 
blanks In goods which they marked 'Sheffield', action which 
necessitated the establishment of another German firm in Sheffield~9 
many manufacturers were said to prefer such products, finding them 
"super ior in finish and neatness to local products , which enabled 
the finishing process to be performed with less expenditure of time 
100 
and labour". Increasingly, the assumption that mechanized 
techniques could only produce poor quality cutlery, was being 
publicly questioned. The challenge thrown down by the razor 
gr inders in 1894 to machine forged and flied producers, to manu-
101 facture a similarly high quality blade, was taken up with gusto, 
but until the end of this period, arguments continued to rage about 
h . t f th t t f tl d t· 102 Sh . Id t e merl s 0 e wo sys ems or cu ery pro uc Ion. effIe 
manufacturers patented razor and scissor grinding machinery in the 
1880s which possessed the additional virtue of making a neater 
bl d h · h . d 1 f" h' 103 H 1 th a e w IC requIure ess InIS Ing. owever, as a ways, e 
machinery did not approach the levels of perfection which manufact-
urers required for best quality cutlery: the best razor blades, and 
the edges of the blades of cheaper razors were still hand-ground by 
104 
craftsmen, and it was not until 1910-15 that the heaviest razors 
could be machine ground, or the 'shoulders' cut in by machine. 105 
The production of razor blanks by hydraulic presses, did not make 
significant advances in Sheffield until after 1903,106 whilst 
machine table blade grinding only became widespread In Sheffield 
after 1911 107 and machine table and pocket blade forging not until 
19141•08 
Thus mechanized production, whilst it was making str ides in 
Sheffield was still both delayed and halting In its adoption, 
certainly In comparison with America or Germany. It was not until 
1905 that it could be declared that "There is no doubt that the 
machine age has now been entered upon. After years of experimenting 
and the expenditure of large sums of money, the stamped blade has 
been brought to such perfection that of some patterns they are 
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almost if not quite equal to the forged article.,,109 
However, such reports must be treated wi th caution. "They 
persistently exaggerate the importance of invention, so that even 
in the most resolutely handicraft sectors of production, it often 
seems - on the evidence of single instances - that mechanization is 
about to take off. The trade reports from Sheffield In The 
Ironmonger, for instance, are filled with trials of machinery in 
the late 1860s and 1870s, yet the Sheffield trades remained 
overwhelmingly handicraft right down to 1914.,,110 
Accompany ing these improvements in available machinery, and 
equally, if not more important in convincing manufacturers, and 
pushing them towards their adoption, was evidence that the market 
for cheap and medium standard cutlery was large, expanding and very 
lucrati ve, whilst that for high quali ty expensi ve goods was not 
experiencing anything like the same expansion. The demand for 
cheap, standardized goods for the colonies was increasing as)during 
the 'Great Depression', was the demand amongst the Br i tish working 
classes for a similarly standard, affordable item. 111 Thus, from 
the 1890s, it IS possible to discern a gradual change of emphasis: 
the realization that Sheffield's industry could not surv i ve, let 
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alone thrive on expensive production alone; and concurrently, 
attempts to reconcile cheaper production with it, and its produc-
ers previously ignominious reputation. 
However, whilst lower quality production was now publicly 
eli vulged by most leading manufacturers, for many it was still 
accompanied by an obv ious sense of unease. That a firm also 
manufactured handmade, top class goods was usually mentioned in 
the same breath as discussion of their standard products, and these 
latter, and their purchasers, were treated somewhat condescendingly 
d t .. 1 113 Th t d . 1 t h· t an pa ronlzlng y. e ra itlona uneasiness a aVlng 0 
participate in such trade was reaffirmed by a trades unionist In 
114 1892 : "Makers of the best cutlery are ashamed at the present 
state of things, but they are so often induced to deal in these 
common class of goods because they are ordered along wi th their 
better quality. Except for that, some would not deal in that common 
quality." I t was frequently and emphatically stressed that two 
different markets were in existence, and that cheap goods were not 
directed at the discerning American or European buyer; they were 
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only intended for "the tastes and pockets of the ever growing 
populations of distant lands, at the present in course of develop-
til 115 men . 
Nevertheless, Sheffield's manufacturers, unlike their American 
counterparts, never really adapted themselves to the ever lncreas-
ing demand from the developed nations for a well-finished 'throw-
away' item like the American safety razor: 116 durability and 
lasting quality were standards too deeply ingrained In most 
Sheffield producers, to allow the easy adoption of this type of 
production. Thus in 1911, the Cutlers' Company was still finding 
it necessary to remind its members that "low quality goods are 
demanded in commerce". 117 However, it too was still disgruntled 
that this had to be the case; that so many consumers either could 
not, or worse still, would not pay the prlce for a superlor 
article: "needless to say, the Company would be glad to see all 
Sheffield goods of the best possible quality, but it must be born 
in mind that low priced goods are needed, and that the standard of 
quality of low priced goods could not possibly be higher than that 
the material should be the best which can be afforded at the price 
consumers are willing to pay."118 
Compounding these pressures towards increased mechanization 
were those affecting the supply of labour within Sheffield itself: 
manufacturers cited union mil itancy, intransigence and traditional 
practices as important in inducing them to introduce machines to 
reduce the men's bargaining power by replacing their skills. In 
the 1890s it was claimed that unions not only prevented the 
introduction of machines,119 but combined this, in periods of good 
trade, with other restrictive practices which, In limiting the 
number of men in the trade, ensured their retention of a powerful 
bargaining position. 
Dur ing the boom condi tions at the turn of the century, The 
Times published a vitriolic attack on the cutlery unions in which 
it descr ibed these supposedly deliberate policies in which they 
persisted, despi te the fact that trade was flooding away to more 
efficient, reliable, mechanized competitors. 120 Furthermore, 
whilst there was acknowledged to be much less time and work 
involved in the production and finishing of machine made cutlery, 
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the unions attempted to maintain the same rates as they earned on 
hand forged goods. The Times concluded that the only solution was 
"a greater resort to machinery, for the purpose both of securing 
more freedom and overcoming the restriction on labour difficulty ... 
every fresh trouble that arises is regarded as offering a further 
incentive to the invention or the adoption of machines which can be 
worked by more or less unskilled labour.,,121 
However, the issue was considerably 
circular than this view would suggest. 
more complicated 
F or whilst unions 
and 
may 
occasionally, at certain boom periods and in certain branches of 
the trade, have been sufficiently powerful to stop the introduction 
of machinery, they were generally far too weak and ineffective to 
successfully implement such a policy. Rather, successful resist-
ance was largely dependent upon the prior existence of a labour 
shortage in a branch of the tr2de,; which in turn was normally the 
result of the displacement of labour which accompanied an earlier 
implementation of mechanized production. Labour saving devices 
reduced the skills and status of craftsmen who sometimes left the 
trade themselves, and often refused to apprentice their sons to it. 
Thus, the position of the skilled craftsman grew stronger when good 
trade brought general labour shortages, especially when Sheffield 
was still attempting to maintain a reputation based on the work of 
such artisans. 
Overall however, manufacturers and their journals appear to 
have exaggerated and overreacted to the supposed power of unIons as 
a factor In forcing them to adopt machinery. It is of course 
possible that this was a preconceived policy which prov ided an 
excuse and motive for their introduction of machines and 'common' 
production, which appeared worthier and less blatent contraventions 
of traditional values, than admitting that it was done for profit 
motives alone. 
The machine forging of SCIssor blanks, introduced into 
Sheffield on a large scale by the 1890s, was publicised not so 
much as a profit guided manoeuvre, as much as a defensive action to 
ensure a regular supply, which would not be dependent on "the 
capr ice 0 f the workmen" whose nonchalant at ti tude to their work 
caused manufacturers to declare that "the world will not wait until 
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it pleases the SClssor forgers of Sheffield to do their work.,,122 
Similarly, machine table blade grinding was said to have been given 
a great boost in 1913 by "the fear of trouble with the grinders.,,123 
Razor forgers were blamed for the difficulties encountered In 
introducing machinery to this trade in the 1890s, particularly In 
their refusal to- "abate one jot from the statement price, although· 
there might not be one quarter of the work to do".124 The issue was 
as clear to The I ronmonger as it was to The Times: machinery was 
introduced mainly because of the "many customs and rules of the 
trade unions, which have worked more harm to the hands they are 
professedly intended to benefit, than tyrannical and greedy 
employers, high tariffs and foreign competition combined. The 
genius who originally drafted the rule forbidding the artisan to 
take more than one apprentice, and him only if a son, displayed as 
much wise foresight as the poor Ludddi tes and other machinery 
125 
wreckers." 
However, this oplnlon was vigorously denied by various trade 
unions, for example the razor forgers who claimed, with some 
justi fication, that men had left the trade as a result of the 
shortage of work which had accompanied t~e importation into 
Sheffield of German razor blanks, leaving insufficient men to cope 
with a sudden boom in demand. 126 
Labour shortages which did force manufacturers to consider a 
mechanized alternative were general rather than selective or skill 
orientated, as was plainly illustrated In the unusually busy 
periods of the turn of the century and 1911-13. The chronic labour 
shortages in these periods were not the result of deliberate trade 
\ 
union policy as much as the fall in demand for labour following the 
McKinley Tar iff and the development of machine techniques which 
resulted in a surplus of labour competing for a declining amount of 
work, and the low pay and conditions associated with such circum-
stances. Thus, when trade improved, many cutlers deserted the 
industry for openings which arose in alternative Sheffield indust-
ries, most of which, by 1900, offered "better paid and more 
127 
congenial employment." than the cutlery trades. Whenever 
possible, young men left the industry, 
elsewhere. 128 However, the resultant 
and sons 
worsenlng 
were apprenticed 
labour shortages 
56 
necessit2ted the further use of machinery for the prompt execution 
d th 1911 13 b 129 S h· of or ers In e - oom. ome mac Ines were introduced 
wi th the express intention of employ ing semi-skilled, preferably 
juvenile labour in the place of skilled adults. Of Peachers patent 
grinding machine it was stated that "a youth of average intelli-
gence can feed machines which will grind 2,000 blades a day," 130 
whilst another manufacturer installed machinery because it required 
"labour of only moderate skill ... work that you could train any 
steady, at tenti ve man taken straight from the street to do in a 
b . f . d ,,131 very rle perlo . 
Union resistance to mechanization was therefore still firmly 
linked with efforts to resist deskilling, but it IS doubtful 
whether their power and practices were as instrumental as manu fact-
urers sometimes suggested. Moreover, some trade unionists seemed 
increasingly aware that mechanized production could infact entail 
considerably better opportunities for workers than those endured by 
sweated, manual, domestic workers. Robert Holmshaw, in his report 
to the Mosely Industrial Commission in 1903, was aware that the 
extensive mechanization of American cutlery factories allowed 
greater productivity without commensurate effort on the part of the 
workers. Thus," labour sav ing appliances and up-to-date machines 
are welcomed by the men because, whilst lightening the work, they 
do not mean the reduction of wages.,,132 Machines brought better 
working conditions and more sophisticated management which cut out 
the time lost by the men in fetching and carry ing work from the 
133 
various workshops. Similarly, the delegation of trade unionists 
which v isi ted Solingen on 1907, whilst cr i tical of the limi ted 
skills of the German cutlers, were impressed by the advantages and 
improvements which mechanization necessi tated: "The workshops of 
Solingen and their methods of production are eaSIer than those 
employed by the Sheffield cutler, and .... they are able to produce 
134 
more quickly by their methods than by ours." 
However,it would still be a mistake to exaggerate the extent 
of the transi tion to mechanized production, and an even greater 
mistake to generalize about it, and overestimate the extent to 
which changes were welcomed by masters and men. A variety of 
sources indicate the continued dominance of handicraft methods with 
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-In the trades. Foreign observers were particular ly surpr ised by 
the survival of what they considered to be antiquated methods,135 
whilst The lronmonger continued to be a constant critic of what it 
perceived to be the apathy and economic backwardness of the 
Sheffield cutlery trades. A typical cr i ticism struck deep at the 
roots of the conservatism and leve of tradition which made it 
di fficul t for manufacturers to adapt to new circumstances: "I t IS 
impossible for an outsider to come in contact with any considerable 
number of persons engaged in the production of cutlery and kindred 
goods in that city without noting the strong spirit of aversion to 
change which runs through it, and explains why knives and tools of 
today are pretty much the same design as those 0 f twenty or more 
years ago. To make matters worse, the absence of change for so long 
a time, has created in many minds that fatal idea that ... no 
further improvement of any practical value IS possible .•. it is 
impossible to get any novel ideas ... turned into practical account, 
inasmuch as the workmen, unless their daily bread depends upon it, 
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cannot be induced to forge new pat terns. " Even A. J. Hobson, a 
leading Sheffield manufacturer and exponent of the virtues and 
values of mechanization, still complained in 1907 that the issue 
was "a very difficult problem to solve; it will not be solved in 
five years, or in ten years or perhaps in twenty years for many 
137 branches." Practical descriptions of the cutlery production 
processes also convey a picture of an industry with an essentially 
handicraft base, dependent upon craftsmen who possessed the 
necessary "a pti tude, skill and delicacy of touch which are the 
t f t d . " 138 ou come 0 na ure an experIence. 
The same sentiments were never far from the minds of the most 
renowned, prestigious cutlery houses, who loathed the compromise 
and loss of reputation invol ved in association wi th common prod-
139 
ucts. Most of the long standing prejudices concerning common 
goods had never been overcome. When the Canadian Manufacturers 
Association, on a visit to Sheffield, mocked the primitive tech-
niques used in the cutlery trades, the response of the Sheffield 
Chamber of Commerce br istled wi th the tradi tional values and the 
continued confidence placed in them. The Chamber wondered "whether 
the critics had ever tried shaving themselves with a wholly machine 
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-made razor, or using a pocket-knife with stamped instead of hand-
forged blades. If they had, they might not be so surprised at the 
retention of human skill and knowledge ln preference to mere 
mechanism ln the production of articles of such close personal 
utility they left the cutlery works of Sheffield with a fair 
supply of the real article ... and it is hoped that they will learn 
to appreciate the value of quality.,,140 
Moreover, it seems that there continued to be considerable 
sense in perpetuating Sheffield's production and equally her lmage 
as a producer of high quali ty cutlery. Foreign tari ffs which 
mounted consistently throughout this per iod always excluded low 
value, common cutlery to a far greater extent than the high quality 
products which the domestic industry was incapable of producing. 141 
Sheffield continued to be virtually the only manufacturer in the 
world of certain hand~ade specialities, such as shear steel 
carving forks, for which there was a good demand right up until the 
142 1930s. Many of the most successful Sheffield cutlery houses 
still maintained that their prosperi ty was the result of their 
continued allegiance to the high quality, largely handmade 
production, on which their reputation had been built. 143 'Artistry' 
) 
in production was emphasised by both masters and men as another 
facet of Sheffield's wares that helped to maintain her reputation 
and which could not be imi tated by competi tors. Mechanization, 
which stifled decorative and diverse patterns, could well put paid 
144 to this unique and respected aspect of the trade. 
A reputation , a standard of quality automatically associated 
with a trade mark, was believed by many Sheffield manufacturers to 
be all-important. This was the reason given by many for the ease 
with which machinery had been adopted in Germany, where there were 
no traditions of high quality, 'one off' production by old, small-
scale manufacturers. "The Germans, as a rule, always appear to aim 
at 'big business', and lay themselves out to produce economically 
any pattern which promises to sell in large quantities. They have 
no use for oddments and the wasteful attention to orders for 'i 
145 dozens of no.413', the curse of many a Sheffield manufacturer." 
I t was believed that the Germans could afford to use large-scale 
component manufacturers and produce standard common cutlery because 
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they had no such traditions of and for quality: "The German's, 
coming from the cast metal, had a demand in quantities for simple 
patterns and they have made an improvement by stamping; if we had 
taken up stamping at an ear ly stage we should have made a depre-
ciation in our goods, and not so well have satisfied our customer~~6 
This then, was firmly associated with the continued importance of 
market demands and expectations of the Sheffield cutlery trade. A 
huge range of good, specialised products was still expected by the 
consumer, and catered for by the large firms who continued to 
147 invent and patent ever more complicated, inessential products. 
Moreover, many purchasers who could have been bulk buyers and 
consequently helped to create conditions favourable to mechaniz-
ation - particularly the army and navy - where themselves often 
conservative adherents to old, obsolete, highly individualistic 
patterns, for which it was pointless to use machinery because "when 
an order is obtained, it means new dies, tools and so forth, which 
may never be needed aga1n, as there 1S little continuity 1n 
t k ,,148 governmen wor . 
Thus, for reasons of both customary psychological preferences, 
but also for rational econom1C reasons concern1ng the nature of 
their market, many manufacturers found large-scale mechanization 
and the production of 'long runs' of goods unfeasible. A scissor 
stamping machine, for example, would need to make 8 to 900 dozen 
pairs of the same SC1ssors 1n order to work economically, but this 
could be two years supply of a typical Sheffield pattern, which 
would chronically overstock the firm. 149 Thus the productivity and 
economy of the machine would be seriously hindered by the constant 
need to change dies and make adjustments to the machine. 150 
Manufacturers therefore, continued to subscribe to the old comprom-
ise solution of inventing their own specialist machinery, suited to 
their own particular production and often jealously guarded as a 
trade secret. 151 
ii) Raw Materials 
Although the period after 1890 witnessed significant advances 
In the development and application of the raw materials used in the 
cutlery trades, these recei ved a predictably cautious and suspic-
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ious response from both manufacturers and men. The psychological 
link between, and attachment to 'the finest raw materials', 'hand 
craftsmanship' and commericial respectability remained as strong as 
152 
ever. T he best known firms continued to publicise the fact that 
there was no difference in the standard of the steel used for their 
high and common quality cutlery, and that economies stemmed solely 
from the type of hafting material used: natural or imitation. 153 
This, it was stressed by implication, was in sharp contrast to less 
154 
reputable firms and foreign producers. 
A number of Sheffield steel firms continued to manufacture 
special requirement cutlery steels, produced in small quanti ties, 
and often to individual requirements. 155 The local interest in this 
subject is illustrated by the discussion held by the Sheffield 
Technical School Metallurgical Society In 1892, which debated 
"\~hich is the best mater ial for table blades: crucible cast or 
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shear steel?" The use of commoner steel was not even countenanc-
ed. Moreover, the opinion still prevailed that to produce the 
finest cutlery, di fferent speci fications of steel were necessary 
for the various descriptions of cutlery. "Cutlery steel is treated 
in so many di fferent ways, that it is simply impossible to get a 
steel suitable for all kinds of work. One man wants a steel to weld 
on to an iron tang. Another wants a soft steel, to punch, free from 
seams, and to harden well ... one cutler wants a kni fe to carry a 
rough cutting edge; another requires a smooth cutting edge,,157 
Although it was recognised that prIce had become a major 
factor in determining the type of steel used, it was still unquest-
ionably agreed that shear steel should be used whenever possible. 
William Wardley, representing the working forgers, epi tomized the 
opinion of these craftsmen when he stated that the durability and 
quality of a shear steel knife made it a much better buy, In the 
long term, and "manu facturers should not go in for competi tion so 
k 1 f t . 1 . d II 158 Th 1· k een y, so ar as raw ma erIa s IS concerne . e In was 
explicit between the quality of steel, the ability of the craftsman, 
and the reputation of the firm: "whilst hand forging is in the 
interest of the steel and improves it, goffing deteriorates its 
quality ... nineteen out of every twenty blades made under a goff 
hammer are made out of common raw material, manufacturers having 
more sense than to put their best qualities under the goff, because 
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of course, the resul ts would be against them." 159 In the course 0 f 
the discussion, some of the extremely antiquated production 
techniques of the most famous houses, and their belief in trad-
i tional practices to ensure the best resul ts were plainly illus-
trated: some firms still kept their shear steel bars for six to 
eight months before rolling them, as this was said to ensure a 
better quality blade. 160 
The actual mode of production of the best quali ty steel had 
changed remarkably little from its earliest inception,161 until the 
revolutionary developments of 1912-13 which disrupted virtually 
every possible traditional understanding and principle. Harry 
Brearley, working In Firth's steel laboratories, discovered a 
formula for the production of stain resistant steel, which although 
originally intended for rifle barrels, he realised had significant 
potential for cutlery production. 162 Samples of the new steel were 
worked into knives by two local cutlery firms, but both were 
. d d d· . . 163 0 f· . d th t th t I unlmpresse an lsmlSSl ve. ne lrm sal a e s ee was 
"unsui ted for cutlery steel: it is too hard to work and is almost 
impossible to gr ind, and the polished sur face lS dirty and a bad 
u164 
colour. Firth's reached a similar conclusion, believing that 
stain I essness was in any case, "not so great a v irtue in cutlery, 
165 
which of necessity must be cleaned after each use." Brearley 
claimed that the first cutler asked to make up knives from the 
166 
steel had replied "Bloody likely, it would be contrary to nature". 
I ts unpopular i t Y wi th the cutlers stemmed from their inabili t y to 
treat the steel like ordinary steels: it had to be goffed by 
machine, and would not react easily to ordinary hardening and 
temper ing techniques; it clogged the sur faces of the gr indstones 
and was confused wi th carbon steel in the production processes. 
Thus "neither the structure nor the compostion of the metal gave the 
resul ts for which for generations the forgers and gr inders manip-
ulating the older shear and carbon steels had 100ked.,,167Impossibly 
demanding tests were set up for the knives of the new steel, and 
varlOUS rumours were spread which claimed that a cut from a 
168 
stainless steel knife was highly poisonous and dangerous. These 
prejudices, combined with dislocation caused by the First World War 
caused signi ficant delays in the introduction of the new steel. 
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However, In July 1914 Brear ley did manage to find a cutlery 
manager at Mosley's who was willing to attempt further tests. 
Although initially unsuccessful, because they refused the inventor's 
adv ice on how to treat the new steel, this firm did obtain good 
" results and were praised by Brearley: They looked well ahead; they 
did not expect too much of the steel; they realised that some 
improvements in appliances and skill in handling them were possible, 
and the excellent knives they produced justified their optimism,,~69 
Further movements towards a more scientific and strictly 
technical approach to cutlery production at the end of this per iod 
were evidenced by developments ln the scientific testing and 
analysis of the properties of various steels and the cutlery made 
from them, using such techniques as chemical analysis, hea t and 
1 · d . 170 Th t h th d coo lng curves an mlcroscopes. a suc me 0 s were gaining 
acceptance illustrate the steady departure from the traditional 
'rule of thumb' techniques. Although alien to the world of cutlery 
producers, such developments were hard to ignore because they aimed 
at the manufacture of even more predictably high quality steel and 
cutlery, objectives which had always been so dear to the industry. 
The extention of the application of artificial hafting 
mater ials met wi th far less concern or opposi tion This was 
partly because their use had now been sanctioned by time, partly 
because ivory prices continued to soar,171 but also because the 
handle did not effect the essential cutting quality of the cutlery. 
172 1896 was the busiest year yet for xylonite and celluloid dealers, 
and as prices escalated, new types of xylonite were produced which 
were near perfect imitations of natural materials. 173 By 1905 
Sheffield cutlery houses were using more imitation hafting material 
than real,174 but the sheer demand pushed up celluloid prices by 10 
to 20% between 1906 and 1907. 175 By 1913, the price of natural 
materials was so exorbitant that they had been almost displaced by 
substitutes, with only the very finest and most expensive cutlery 
176 
still incorporating real ivory pearl or horn. However, the 
acceptance of this change by the industry would not have involved 
too great an abandonment of its principles. Natural materials had 
become quite simply too expensive, whilst imitation had become so 
fine that they were a perfectably acceptable choice which no longer 
involved the stigma of price cutting cheapness. 
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Throughout this per iod, raw mater ials and the way In which they 
were crafted, remained a focal area of concern and debate within 
the Sheffield trades. The developments in the availability and 
application of new materials and techniques were, in themselves, 
rarely devastatingly new or revolutionary departures. Nevertheless, 
attitudes within the industry to such changes were extremely 
cautious. Whilst there was a general awareness and appreciation of 
developments, they were only adopted when they had been sufficiently 
tried and tested and most importantly, when they were understood to 
be compatible with the commercial strategy and reputation which the 
industry had created, and was attempting to maintain for itself. 
There was considerable sympathy and common ground between the 
older, more reputable manufacturers, who constituted 'the voice' of 
the trades, and the craftsmen who spoke for the skilled workers and 
craft unions. Both appreciated the unique quality and reputation 
of She field 's craftsmen and steel, and the fame of a trademark 
built on these attributes. Unique quality and diversity of product-
ion marked Sheffield out from all its competitors. Undoubtedly 
this reliance upon customary practices to ensure traditional 
quality, immersed sections of the trade in a kind of psychological 
inertia and narrow-mindedness. This resulted In certain inabilities 
to appreciate changing conditions demand In particular 
which made them disparaging and condemnatory of those who 'stooped' 
to common production, and embarrassed when they themselves finally 
felt the need to participate in that market. 
Overall however, it lS possible to see their actions as 
moderately flexible within a given framework which was essentially 
commercially rational. Even for those that decided, ei ther openly 
or clandestinely, to attempt some common production and reduce 
their prices, the ease with which this industry could be adapted to 
cost reductions through division of labour and subcontracting, made 
the purchase of machinery even less of an inevitability. 
Thus, by 1914, the industry had moved a cons iderable way 
towards the acceptance and implementation of new raw materials and 
techniques. However, this was done by compromlse and cautious 
adaption which meant that the touchstone of these trades - commer-
cial respectability and a reputation for the finest goods 
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remained intact, and continued to colour all new departures. The 
Sheffield industry thus managed to retain its prestigious and 
exceptional links with the past, which whilst suiting the temper-
ament of its practi tioners, also enabled it to continue to mark 
itself out from competitors, retaining a well-known niche and name 
of its own. 
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Chapter 3 Trade Patterns and Their Contemporary Evaluation 
Opinions of both employers and workers concerning the 
decline in wor Id trade and severe depressions of this per iod, 
differed widely with the circumstances: sometimes the problem was 
felt to rest with false marking, at other times with tariffs or 
exceSSIve wage rates. Most attention and debate was directed 
towards short-term problems on the demand side. These were 
usually outside the direct realms of the trades themselves, and 
thus avoided structural or marketing faults within the industry -
faul ts or problems which necessi tated action by the industry. 
Al though towards the end of the per iod there was discussion of 
the importance of mechanized production and advertising campaigns, 
such criticism often came from people outside the city and 
industry, whilst manufacturers who voiced and practised such 
novel ideas were often branded as 'unrespectable', traitors to 
the principles which had made Sheffield great. 
This chapter is not an attempt to apply hindsight to judge 
or analyse 'entrepreneurial failure' In the field of exports, but 
endeavours to understand the reasoning and prior i ties of those 
involved in the industry. Why were they obsessed with seemingly 
peripheral and dated issues, yet unable to tackle even the idea 
of faults and problems within their own procedures and beliefs? 
There appear to be broadly two reasons for this: the acute 
sectionalism of the industry In terms of both products and 
markets, which in reducing the occasions of like exper Iences, 
inhibited the ability to think and act in terms of large-scale, 
common causes; and secondly and more importantly, the continued 
adherence to traditional values and practices - particularly the 
value of quality, which made it difficult to accept, let alone 
embrace, new ideas. There was considerable economic rationality 
in the policy of far reaching product di fferentation, special-
ization and quality production, which quite successfully insulat-
ed the firms who marketed such products, from the competition of 
mass- produced German and American goods. However, such a 
strategy necessar ily 1 imi ted hor izons and made it di ff icul t to 
branch out into a wider market, whilst inevitably also concent-
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rating too much attention OR demand conditions, rather than the 
factors wi thin the firm which had brought about such a high 
f . 1· t· 1 degree 0 specla lza Ion. 
2 Trade Patterns and Levels 
The small amount of information available on the sales of 
cutlery to the domestic market, renders difficult any estimation 
of the relati ve importance of home and foreign demand to the 
Sheffield cutlery trades. Less attention was directed to 
domestic demand because this market was considerably more stable, 
easier to satisfy with a traditional high quality item, and more 
accessible to the personal sales techniques of the cutlery 
houses. Moreover, the domestic demand, although it accounted for 
approximately half the value of the U.K. 's cutlery sales in 1907~ 
was generally smaller than this. It assumed more importance as 
the overall values of foreign sales dropped, and in the years 
when this demand was particularly slack, as in 1899-1901. As it 
was the export market on which at tent ion was focused, in which 
changes in demand and selling techniques were demanded, and in 
/ 
which greatest sales and profits could be achieved, emphasis will 
be placed on the supply of that market In this section. 
Statistically, exports of cutlery have to be treated 
separately before and after 1898, as before this date they were 
incorporated wi th exports of hardware, whereas after 1898 they 
were treated independently. Before 1898, exports fluctuated 
remarkably widely. They peaked in the all-time boom year of 
1872, when export sales reached £5,000,000, and again in 1882 and 
1889 wi th exports of £4,100,000 and £3,180,000 (see graph 2). 
Troughs occured in 1879 and 1886 when only £300,000 and £280,000 
of cutlery were exported, falling even lower to £180,000 in 1894, 
with little improvement on that situation by 1898. 4 Despite the 
amplitude of variation, the overall trend was towards a signif-
icant decline in the value of exports after the boom of 1872-
4. This tendency was confirmed by manufacturers who gave 
evidence before the Royal Commission on the Depression in Trade 
5 
and Industry of 1886. 
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Cutlery exports, when classified independently, equalled 
only a quarter of the value of previously indistinct hardware and 
cutlery totals (see graph 3). From a low point of only £56,000 
of exports in 1898, trade improved fairly steadily, apart from 
sharp lapses in 1906 and 1908, and then increased sharply to 
reach £880,000 in 1912. 
In the first part of this period, the most important market 
for cutlery was America, but Amer ican demand was particularly 
prone to sharp fluctuation (see tables 4 & 5). The peaks in 
exports to this market came in 1872 (£350.000) and 1882 (£250,000), 
whilst troughs were in 1876 (£125,000), and 1885 (£150,000). 
Also vitally important, but similarly unstable, was the Australian 
demand for hardware and cutlery (see table 5). Next in importance 
came the S. American and Indian markets, which imported between 
£250,000 and £450,000 of cutlery and tools from the U.K. annually. 
In the early 1870s, Germany too had been a large importer of 
British cutlery, but as her own production increased, her imports 
declined accordingly. Finally Canada, Russia, Holland, France 
and Br i tish South A fr ica (see graph 4) were all quite large 
importers. However, in all the above mentioned markets, with the 
exceptions of British India and Australia, the value of cutlery 
and hardware exported from Britain declined considerably from its 
peak of the early 1870s. Similarly, virtually all markets 
exper ienced peaks and troughs of demand wi thin a year of each 
other: peaks in 1872-3, 1880-2, and 1888-9; troughs in 1878-
9 and 1885-6. 6 
In the second part of this period, Australia was, by a 
significant margin, Sheffield's best market for cutlery, although 
as In the earlier period, its annual imports continued to 
fluctuate enormously: between £110,000 and £170,000. Australian 
demand peaked in the same years as general demand for cutlery 
peaked (see graphs 4 & 11), in 1891,1896,1900,1907, and 1912. 
Its troughs were similarly experienced when cutlery exports 
generally slumped: in 1894, 1898, 1904, and 1908. America by 
this period, had ceased to be a top ranking importer of Sheffield's 
cutlery, and by 1912, was importing a lesser value 
than Canada, S. Amer ica, Br i tish India, S. A fr ica or Germany (see 
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graphs 4 & 8) • Canada and S.America were, by the end of this 
period, very lucrative markets, importing between £55,000 and 
£120,000 of cutlery annually (see graphs 4 & 9), as were British 
S.Africa and India. Germany imported a stable, but small amount 
of cutlery until 1909, after which time her imports increased 
suddenly, to reach £65,000 by 1912. France, Holland and Russia 
all imported under £10,000 of cutlery a year from the U.K. (see 
graph 4). 
Imports of cutlery into the U.K. rose sharply between 1903 
and 1907, from £30,000 to £150,000, (see graph 7), but after this 
date remained very stable. 
Seasonal Trends in Trade 
Seasonal trends, although they could be disrupted and 
completely al tered by cyclical booms and slumps, remained an 
important, and fairly accurately predictable feature of the 
cutlery trades, as they had been for as long as anyone could 
remember. This seasonali ty, combined with the inconsistency of 
demand from one year to the next, was a signi ficant factor in 
dissuading manufacturers from adopting mechanized, 
production. 
factory 
Trade in January was usually quite poor, unless the orders 
from the prev ious Christmas had been so large that trade was 
carr ied over into the New Year, or unless there was a general 
upturn in trade which caused retailers to buy in stocks. 
However, both these circumstances became gradually rarer as the 
Christmas season became better organized and began earlier; and 
as changes In fashion became more pronounced, thus making 
retailers less willing to build up stocks of what could very 
quickly become outmoded designs. Letter orders would begin to 
arrive In January and travellers would normally start their 
journeys at the end of this month. Trade was sometimes hampered 
however, by severe weather conditions, which made the transport-
ation of goods difficult, and discouraged people from shopping. 
The second quarter of the year was normally busier than the 
first, as trade picked up, until the lull which occurred between 
the summer and winter seasons, in May and June. In anticipation 
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of the breaks, work would increase markedly before the Easter and 
Whi tsuntide holidays, the lengths of which would depend on the 
state of trade. In busy periods, holidays would be reduced to a 
minimum and summer and winter stock taking would be similar ly 
shortened, although the men would compensate by taking unofficial 
breaks, particularly when the weather was fine. When trade was 
slack, manufacturers would take advantage of the breaks to close 
their works for as long a period as possible, and use up stocks. 
Summer holidays, until the early 1900s were taken over a long 
period, as the policy of shutting down the works whilst all 
employees took their vacations at the same time, did not become 
general practice until after 1905. Before this, holidays would 
drag on indefinitely, extended In an impromptu fashion, when 
trade and the weather were good. It was widely acknowledged that 
throughout most of this period, the men did not really settle 
down to their work again, until after the break for the Doncaster 
Race meeting of early September. There continued to be a 
traditional observance of all time-honoured festivals, which were 
slow to die out. These included the normal breaks for Christmas, 
Easter and Whitsuntide, but also hal f a days holiday on Shrove 
Tuesday and the same on traditional, although no longer signifi-
7 
cant quarter rent days. 
When trade was reasonable, no time of the year In the 
cutlery trades was ever completely slack, largely because of the 
huge var iet y of markets which were served. From March, for 
example, Indian and Chinese demand fell off, as their hot weather 
season approached, but orders increased from British and contin-
ental holiday resorts, and from the liner companies. Similar ly, 
just as the important American demand fluctuated widely from year 
to year, so it fluctuated throughout the year: business generally 
peaked In the quarter which ended in September, whilst the 
troughs, although harder to predict, usually came in the quarter 
which ended in March (see graph 6). The ampli tude of var iation in 
this market was greatest in the ear ly 1870s when the annual 
demand was at its highest: some quarter periods would see 
exports of £80 - 90,000, whilst in others American imports would 
reach only £20 - 30,000. These variations declined markedly as 
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the total value of cutlery exports from Sheffield to America 
fell. 
The industry was normally slack In September, but picked up 
in October, as the Chr istmas season began in earnest. In the 
earlier part of this period, the Christmas season still began 
very late, often as late as the end of November, making work 
intense in the month before Christmas. However, the trad-
i tional exertion of 'cal f', 'cow' and 'bull' weeks, (being the 
last three weeks of mounting and excessive exertion before 
Christmas) was already outmoded at the beginning of this period, 
as factory legislation in particular, put paid to such ritualised 
8 
overwork. Inproved and speedier communications, increased 
factory production and rapidly changing styles, were all stimuli 
which necessitated an earlier start to the Christmas season, as 
orders were placed earlier, until what had at one time been the 
busiest weeks of the year, often became the slackest ones as 
orders were completed and dispatched for sale well before 
Christmas. November and December were virtually always the 
busiest months of the year: a good Christmas season could 
dramatically improve the trade levels of an otherwise slack year. 
Chr istmas holidays, like all other holidays, were dependent on 
the state of trade, and could be extended from a week to a month. 
The Attitudes of the Industry Towards its World Trade 
In the earlier part of this period, foreign competition was 
not seen, or at any rate admitted, to be a serious problem. In 
1885, whilst the Master Cutler recognised the increasing German 
competition (facilitated as he understood it, by the longer 
hours, greater frugali ty and lower wages of German cutlers) in 
neutral markets, this was not seen as any great threat: Sheffield 
was confidently believed to be able to hold its own. 9 Interest-
ingly, it was the smaller and less prestigious houses who at 
this stage were most ready to acknowledge the intensity of 
foreign competi tion wi th its successful use of mechanized forms 
of production. 10 In the home market, foreign competition was 
never likely to assume large proportions, mainly because of the 
1 1 distictive style of Engish cutlery. By the 1890s severe 
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competi tion In neutral markets was more readily acknowledged. 
Many manufacturers realized that they had been "too apt to sneer 
at our German competi tors" ,12 as they, and the Amer icans turned 
out increasing quanti ties of cheap, stylish, well-finished and 
packaged cutlery. 
after the 1890s, 
However, German competition declined sharply 
as their prices increased. Sheffielders 
generally were unwilling to discuss foreign competi tion wi thout 
dismissing the issue in terms of the value and applicability of 
cheap mechanized production - a subject on which many, 
in public, still expressed firmly antipathetic views. 13 
normally left to outsiders to raise the issue. 14 Many 
at least 
It was 
producers 
continued to adhere to the policy of maximum possible product 
differentiation, "designed to exploit the marginal differences in 
quality, and by creating the impression that the differences were 
greater than they were in reality, many British firms were able 
to serve a degree of oligopoly power." 15 They relied upon the 
ingrained preferences of some consumers for products which 
possessed the actual and social V8] ue of 'craftsmanship'. Such 
producers were shielded from and felt to be less threatened by foreign 
production of cheaper mass produced items. Even when firms did 
produce cheaper items, they still at tempted to give them the 
market advantage of their trade mark and that of 'Sheffield~16 
Throughout this period, whenever foreign competition was 
discussed, it was rarely dissociated from the issues of tariffs 
and the fraudulent use of Sheffield trade marks, which therefore 
phrased the problem in traditional terms of quality and reput-
ation, whilst also removing the onus of action from Sheffield's 
manufacturers. Both tariffs and false marking were seen by the 
Sheffield industry as unjust changes to the old rules of the 
game, which in shutting out or imitating Sheffield goods, merely 
acknowledged their superiority and the impossibility of their 
b d Ot" 17 F " eing matched under fair and normal trading con I Ions. oreign 
competition was therefore, nften defused as an issue which 
reflected American and German trading ability, or the nature of 
market demands. Moreover, once seen In these terms, little 
could be done apart from bemoaning the injustice of politicians 
and the commercial dishonesty of some traders: nothing more 
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searching or introspective was fel t to be necessary. To some 
extent, such attitudes reflected the inability, or at least 
unwillingness of Sheffield manufacturers to come to terms wi th 
the fact that the market for expensi ve, quali ty goods was no 
longer as buoyant as it had been, and that many consumers now 
wanted a cheaper item which competitors were now ready to supply. 
Their inertia could also have been a reflection of the practical 
di fficul ties invol ved in at tempts to switch from specialized to 
more general, common production. 
Tariffs had important consequences ln terms of both long and 
short term trade flows. A huge increase in demand would take 
place immediately before a hostile tariff, as retailers stocked 
up with goods whilst the price remained low; but this would be 
followed by a commensurate fall in exports until retailers were 
forced to selectively restock, albeit at a far reduced level. 
Most significant was the American Mckinley Tariff of 1890, 
which replaced ad valorem duties with much higher specific ones 
of between 100 and 200%. As with virtually every tariff of this 
period, it excluded cheap and medium quali ty cutlery which the 
now protected domestic industry could produce, but was far more 
lenient on the higher quality, specialized cutlery which its own 
18 producers could not at tempt to manufacture. The purpose of the 
act was recognised to be "to crush out as far as possible all 
importation" ,19 and indeed, the boom that preceded the act was 
never repeated, as importation of all but the finest and most 
specialized items ceased. 20 Thus, Sheffield cutlery was believed 
to be beaten not on its own mer i ts, but shut out wi thout a 
chance,21 a fact particular ly galling to firms which had made 
considerable efforts to research a market, and manufacture 
accordingly.22 Sheffield manufacturers, through the Chamber of 
Commerce, paid considerable attention to the details of new 
tari ffs, and went to much, though usually unsuccessful, trouble 
to have them revised. 23 
Problems were not, however, limited to the actual closing of 
a formerly lucrative market: the anticipation of a change would 
also dislocate trade. Exports to Canada slumped before the 
reduction of the tar iff in 1898, whilst the expectations of a 
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significant reduction in the Mckinley tariff, although unfounded, 
also dislocated trade. Moreover, growing uncertainty, as tariff 
24 barriers were erected allover the world, created increasingly 
25 severe bouts of panic and despondency amongst manufacturers, and 
despair that even those markets which remained open were often 
obstructed by biased customs pfficials. 26 However, whilst high 
quality cutlery was generally exempted from such duties, it was 
further useful valid ammuni tion to those manufacturers and men 
who regarded such goods as the only type that Sheffield should be 
manufacturing anyway. A correspondent in the Sheffield Independent, 
realising that the proposed French tariff of 1881 would wipe out 
Sheffield's exports of cheap cutlery, still fel t that "i t would 
be no great evil, as Sheffield would then have a chance of 
regaining her name for turning out cutlery that would stand the 
test of any inspection, and for which the consumer abroad would 
27 be glad to pay well". 
The practical results of the debate on tarfffs were, however, 
minimal. They produced a limi ted impetus to find and exploit 
some fresh markets (see forward), but more often the result was 
poli tical debate. This, although heated, detracted attention 
from the internal problems of the Sheffield trades, and was never 
about to result in the implementation of any practical policy. 
The Free Trade versus Protection debate was the crucial 
trade issue affecting manufacturers at two stages in this period: 
in the late 1870s and 1880s and the early 1900s, the same 
periods, broadly, in which the debate was a central national 
Issue. In the 1870s, this was sparked off by the discourse 
between the local Liberal M. P., A. J. Mundella, and steel maker 
Frederick Brittain,28 but it seems that most cutlery manufacturers 
and workers remained firm adherents to Free Trade principles. 
Charles Belk, a former Master Cutler and a Conservative, believed 
that Protection, in increasing the costs of imported commodities, 
would Increase the prlce of British exports, and remained 
commercially, as well as morally wrong, as well as politically 
. d' t 29 F T d" t hI' lnexpe len . ree ra e was an ever presen e p In pros-
perity, our sheet anchor in times of deep depression".30 Other 
cutlery manufacturers were similar ly fearful that Br i tish 
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protection would simply lead to more retaliatory duties which, in 
increasing the costs of imported raw mater ials, particularly" 
Swedish bar iron and hafting materials, would cripple the cutlery 
31 
trades. 
When the question of tariffs reemerged to occupy the centre 
of the trade debate agaIn In the 1900s the cutlery industry 
remained a supporter of Free Trade principles. A.J.Hobson, 
Sheffield's most prominent cutlery manufacturer, was also the 
ci ty' s leading exponent of Free Trade, and al though a staunch 
32 Unionist, defended it on Liberal plat forms, and in the local 
and national Chambers of Commerce. 33 He, like the influential 
local Liberal Free Trade pamphleteer of the per iod, Freder ick 
Callis, continued to believe that the cutlery trades were too 
dependent on imported raw mater ials to risk the imposition of 
retaliatory duties. 34 The trade union leadership expressed 
, 'I ' t' 35 b t h 1 SImI ar convlc Ions, u suc po itical and moral commit ments 
were not condusi ve to the re-evaluation of Sheffield's inter-
national competitiveness. 
Similarly outraged, but vague and unconstructive in practical 
terms, were the atti tudes of the Sheffield trades to fraudulent 
marking of cutlery, which although a relatively mInor and 
peripheral problem, was blown up out of all proportion because 
of its association with traditional values of quality, commercial 
honesty, and a trading reputation. 
The main practices involved In false marking were the 
stamping of cutlery wi th the names of reputable houses, or the 
name 'Sheffieldj by dishonest traders in Sheffield or abroad; the 
stamping of poor quali ty blades wi th the false indications of 
quali ty, such as 'warranted shear steel', or 'cast Steel' on 
Bessemer or pIg Iron blades; and the marking of machine made 
goods as 'hand made'. Originally, it was believed that these 
were practices only stooped to by German competitors, but in the 
1880s a storm arose, as the extent of the frauds within Sheffield 
became known. 
Trade and merchandise marks had, SInce the beginnings of the 
cutlery trades in Sheffield, been crucial in the establishment of 
reputations and their identification with quality; their super-
v ision had become a v i tal feature 0 f the work of the Cutlers' 
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36 Company. After 1801, trade marks were explicitly recognised as 
the property of their owner,37 and with the Increase In trade 
wi th non-English speaking lands, became an ever more important 
t f 1 . t 38 "h b indica or 0 qua I y. Thus they ad een employed from the 
dawn of the industry as the guarentor of quality and the proof of 
authorship ... to the consumer it has become the main evidence of 
quality, the criterion on which he must place implicit reliance, 
since only technical expertness could enable him to distinguish 
39 
one grade from another". Moreover, the very name 'Sheffield' 
had become simiar ly associated with high quali ty products, and 
was seen by many manufacturers and most men, as a collecti ve 
asset, the protection of which should be communal and crucial. 
As early as 1870, sections of the manufacturing communi ty 
were taking an interest in, and steps to prevent the sale of 
German goods with 'pirated' Sheffield trade marks, and the 
Chamber of Commerce played an important role in the framing of 
the 1872 Customs Consolidation Act. 40 The status of the Cutler~ 
Company in this regard, was elevated considerable in 1875, when 
it was made the official trade mark registration authority for 
41 Hallamshire, a level of autonomy afforded to no other centre. 
Furthermore, in 1883, its trade mark jurisdiction was extended to 
cover other items of Iron or steel, wi th or without a cutting 
42 
edge. Such authority helped these official institutions of the 
trades to reinforce their status, moral and practical, as symbols 
and upholders of all that was commercially reputable and honour-
able, whilst generally increasing the attention given to the 
Issue of trade marking. 
Thus, the revelations that Sheffield manufacturers, and 
moreover, formerly esteemed members of the same Cutlers' Company, 
were participating in commercially dishonest practices, and 
trading away Sheffield's communal reputation for their own 
profi t, were all the more shocking. The whole issue clear 1 y 
illustrates the split that was developing between those manufact-
urers and men, broadly classified by contemporaries as 'respect-
able' producers, who continued to defend and act according to 
traditional commercial values and morality, particularly in their 
concern for the value of a trading reputation based on the sale 
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of a consistently fine, specialized product; and those who, 
although sometimes wealthy and notable manufacturers, were ready 
and able to disregard such traditional specialization, in favour 
of more 'modern' ideas on how to sell, and make profits. To the 
former, Sheffield could only rely on high quali ty speciali tes 
which were still her monopoly, and for this, a reputation and 
trade mark were vital. The latter however, were anxious to 
at tempt to use their old reputations and that of Sheffield, to 
assist their efforts to sell a wider range of products to broader 
markets. Ei ther way, it seems unlikely that fraudulent marking 
had nearly as significant an effect (potentially or actually) on 
export levels, as the Sheffield debate implied. For, whilst a 
commercial reputation was still, no doubt, very important, its 
protection had to be linked to efforts to sell the name, to 
advertising, research and marketing generally, all of which were 
overshadowed and neglected, as the false marking per se, dominated 
the whole scope of the debate. Many manufacturers, and even more 
trade unionists, seemed to believe that once fraudulent marking 
was stamped out, and She ffield' s name reassociated with commer-
cial honesty and the finest goods, nothing more would need to be 
done, and orders would once more flood into the city. 
Attention was drawn to frauds within Sheffield by the trade 
43 
unions and the S.F.T.C. as early as the 1860s. In the 1880s 
the S. F . T . C. launched a campaign against the use by Sheffield 
firms of falsely marked, low grade steels in cutlery, reporting 
its findings to the Cutlers' Company, and concluding that such 
practices would soon make Sheffield's mark "a misnomer".44 
Manufacturers had been aware, since at least the 1870s, that some 
of their number had been importing cheap machine made German 
goods, but stamping and reselling them with their own mark, thus 
enabling such a manufacturer to "undersell such of his ri vals as 
conducted their business in an upright manner, and to realize a 
large, though dishonourable profit".45 
However, perhaps because of the culpability of some of its 
members, the Cutlers' Company would do nothing about the alleg-
ations. It replied, with some justification, that the men were 
uSlng the issue as yet another line in their at tack on 2ne! 
86 
resistance to mechanized production. 46 Because of the threats it 
was believed to represent to the livelihood and status of their 
craftsmen, the issue of fraudulent quality marks by some Sheffield 
firms, became the focal concern of the trade unions in the 18ffOs. 
For some reputable firms too, these frauds, along with the 
illegal use of their trade marks by 'unrespectable' competitors, 
were central trading concerns. To these men and manufacturers, 
the maintenance of commercial and public respect for and faith in 
Sheffield's products was perceived as vital, and the whole 
fraudulent marks scandal was used as a kind of advertising 
campaign to reaffirm public knowledge of and taste for Sheffield's 
uniquely high quality cutlery.47 
F or others however, this issue was side-stepped, as they 
found it more comfortable to focus on the fraudulent practices of 
foreign traders. This was the policy adopted by the Cutlers' 
Company, which insisted that it had no authority to stop domestic 
contraventions of quality marks. 48 But manufacturers and men did 
expect it to remedy the abuses, partly because it had previously 
boasted its powers so widely, and partly because of what were 
perceived to be its traditional guild-like regulatory powers: the 
folklorish, vague "ancient practices" that were so often evoked. 44 
Its inactivity was believed by many to be proof of the Company's 
loss or abandonment of its respectable status, largely through the 
entry' of too many "middle men and traders", 50 instead of, as 
prev iousl), 1 imi t ing its membership to bona fide manu facturers . 
Thus in the words of one cr i tic, "the Cutlers' Company have been 
more In favour of encouraging [false marking], because the 
Cutlers' Company was composed of the very people which were doing 
"t" 51 1 • 
To a national audience, the Company attempted desparately to 
play down the whole scandal which, it was claimed, contained its 
own cure:"a maker who attaches his name to rubbish is certain soon 
to reap his reward and to drive the trade into the hands of those 
who try to build a reputation by supplying honest work; and if he 
fails to attach his name, he indirectly produces the same result, 
by driving the consumer gradually to take only those marks that 
52 t t" are well-known as being indications of good quality". At en Ion 
87 
was firmly focussed on frauds by foreign manufacturers, and the 
patient and long standing efforts of the Cutlers' Company to 
53 
combat these. The practice of such frauds amongst Sheffield 
manufacturers was said to be very rare, and was dismissed wi th 
moral outrage. I t was "simply suicidal and analagous to the 
injury done by a man to his nearest fr iend, and from every 
possible point of view to be the worst and most to be depreciated 
kind of marking". 54 In fact, the Company freely admi t ted that 
they were attempting to draw a veil over the problem, as its very 
discussion, and the lack of confidence that it would inspire would 
further harm Sheffield's trading reputation. 55 
However, the trade un1ons, some manufacturers and the local 
Liberal press, in the form of allegations made in the Sheffield 
56 Independent, made sure that the issue was explored, and kept at 
the forefront of debate locally and even nationally.57 Discontent 
was orchestrated at large meetings fronted by prominent trade 
unionists: They directed their anger at the hypocr i tes in the 
Cutlers' Company who blamed foreign competition for the trade 
depression and for the losses of jobs and earnings, when their 
own dishonesty and search for illegal profit were the real cause. 
The Company was helping to rob Sheffield of its hard won reput-
tation; it was no longer the "custodian of the fair name of 
Sheffield" .58 Again and again, the change in commercial morali ty 
was put down to the changing character of the manufacturers. "In 
past times, Sheffield took pride in turning out good articles. 
They were content wi th less profi ts than manufacturers of the 
present day. Under any circumstances they used to pride them-
selves on having a good name, and when they died •• if they did not 
have a few thousands to gl ve to their children, they seemed to 
take special care that they left an unblemished reputation. 
(Cheers). But of late a change had come, and we had in our midst 
unscrupulous manufacturers and merchants who were not unwilling to 
59 
damage our good name in order to make a fortune for themselves". 
The S. F . T . C. succeeded 1n forcing the creat ion 0 faT own 
Council committee to look into the issue, but they were indignant 
that the Board of Trade considered the problem too local and 
t R 1 c oo 60 Th I I ott specialized to warran a oya omm1SS1on. e oca comm1 ee, 
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whilst it minimised them, still found the allegation which had 
been made In the Sheffield Independent, to be largely accurate, 
but the Town Council still rejected its report, for political 
61 
reasons. The S. F . T . C . was fur ious, and pointed out, as it had 
always done, the partiality of many manufacturers who were 
implicated In the scandal, and who were also members of, and 
protected by powerful local institutions: "if the Cutlers' Company 
... had failed to obtain evidence to prove statements admitted from 
their own ranks, it was scarely to be expected that the Council 
would meet with full satisfaction".62 
As the scandal became increasingly politicized, the Sheffield 
Telegraph supported the Cutlers' Company and local Conservative 
interests, whilst the Sheffield Independent continued to back the 
Liberal cause, the S.F.T.C., and 'respectable' manufacturers. The 
debate became another forum for discussion of the Free Trade 
versus Protection argument. Typically, a leader from the Sheffield 
Independent of 13.2 1886, announced that the revelations should be 
received "with indignation by those working men who loudly 
acclairred that Free Trade is the root of the scantiness of their 
work, now find that the chief advocates of import duties are the 
very men who are misusing the manufactures of foreigners to defame 
Sheffield's good name, to rob her sons of employment, and to 
strike a mortal blow to her future prosperity. Those who rail 
loudest at the competition of foreign manufacturers are themselves 
the largest buyers of them". The Chamber of Commerce was accused 
of "fast consti tuting i tsel f into a small protectionist coter ie, 
making itself a refuge for all sorts of exploded economic heresies 
and imi tating the example of Nero, who fiddled whilst Rome 
burned". The local significance and politicization of the issue lS 
also illustrated by its domin8tion of the municipal elections of 
November 1886: the landslide Liberal victories indicate the 
allegiances of most Sheffielders. 63 
The Cutlers' Company railed at the unions, citing their 
uncooperativeness as the problem which had forced many manufact-
64 
urers to buy cheap German goods. However, false marking was 
treated by many as a sufficient reason in itself for the depression 
and the shortage of work then being experienced~5 It was an easy 
89 
concept to understand and apply, accordant with time-honoured 
notions and understandings. There was said to be "no wonder that 
our colonies are buying in fer ior but honest goods from other 
countries to our 10ss ... Bad trade, as we all know, is the result 
66 
of want of confidence in each other". 
As so often happened at di fficul t periods In these trades, 
'the past' with its honesty and fairness was glorified by many 
employers and men as a blissful period, in sharp contrast to the 
67 immorality and imminent collapse of the present. W.Nixon 
typified this view: "In those days, we had good steel and other 
mater ials to make up into kni ves . Masters were content to give 
fair wages and be satisfied with reasonable profits; but in these 
'fast days' when men want to make as much money in five years as 
their fathers did in a life time, other means have been found to 
obtain that object".68 
Sheffield's cutlery manufacturers were clearly divided on 
this issue, but there was no hard and fast pattern to the divide, 
such as old-established firms versus new firms, or large versus 
small. Both sides included wealthy and notable producers, it 
being freely acknowledged that a number of "big knobs" were 
involved in fraudulent practice. 69 Evidently some manufacturers 
wanted to use the celebrated trade marks that they and Sheffield 
had earned, in order to sell their lower quality goods as well. 
This was the aspect that particularly enraged the trade unIon 
officials: a firm could build up a market and reputation for its 
goods and trade mark, based upon a high quality, hand forged item, 
but once orders began to mount up, a cheaper, poorer item could be 
substituted but the trade mark retained, and the public thus 
d . d 70 ecelve . The Cutlers' Company however, continued to concen-
trate on the role of foreign fraudulent marking. Infact the 
disagreement between the two parties became so intense that two 
deputations had to be sent to the Board of Trade in February 1887, 
one representing the Cutlers' ComJ=Eny and the Chamber of Commerce, 
the other representing the working men. The former demanded 
legislation and an inquiry, the latter a more far reaching Royal 
Commission. 71 In typically parochial and insular fashion, because 
the problem was so vi tall y important to them, both sides were 
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disappointed when their gr levances were left to be satisi fied by 
the more general and widely applicable 1887 Merchandise Marks Acf~ 
Lord Stanley, the President of the Board of Trade, was dismissive: 
in his opinion their complaints could be easily incorporated into 
the new Act, the formulation of which was still underway. Their 
grievances would not, and could not be treated as a unique case: 
"We have to use language which will be applicable not to one 
section of the trade, but to the trade of the community at large,,?3 
Nevertheless, members of the Cutlers' Company, the Chamber of 
Commerce and the S.F.T.C., gave detailed evidence on the practi-
cali tes and problems of merchandise marking before the Select 
74 75 Committees on the Merchandise Marks Acts of 1887 and 1890, and 
in so far as they affected Sheffield, these Acts were largely 
based on the evidence of Sheffield's witnesses. The 1890 Act 
prohibi ted all 
B 't' 76 and rl aln, 
goods 
if no 
with a 
country 
misleading mark from entry into 
of manufacture was stated on the 
goods, it was taken to be that of the port from which they were 
77 
sent. 
After this pronounced friction, there ensued a long period of 
considerable harmony and joint action between the S.F.T.C. and the 
employers' organizations. This was partly the result of the 
numerous problems which were found to exist with the new (as with 
all prev ious) legislation, which meant that it was necessary to 
hold talks and plan al ternati ve strategies, In an at tempt to 
improve it. To a greater extent however, this cooperation was the 
result of the continued prominence that the S.F. T .C. gave to the 
lssue, combined wi th its strong and enduring commi tment to the 
procedures of conciliation and arbitration, for which purpose the 
common ground provided by trade marking was a perfect trial 
78 ground. The S. F . T . C . was a leading exponent of the need for 
boards of conciliation In each centre of industry, a major 
function of which would be to keep a watchful eye on the implemen-
tation of merchandise mark legislation. The Chamber of Commerce 
replied quite positively to this, and a number of joint meetings 
were held in 1887-8. However, it was always the men's delegates 
who made the most practicable and constructive criticisms, and the 
suggestions which formed the resolutions finally adopted and 
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forwarded to the Board of Trade. These resolutions were, more-
over, along very much the same lines as those which the government 
would finally adopt many years later. They placed particular 
emphasis upon the enforcement of the Act abroad and In the 
colonies, on the need to stamp all goods with a place of origin 
or a national mark, and most important to the effectiveness of the 
legislation, that "these prosecutions, conducted as they are, on 
behal f of the communi ty, should be undertaken at the expense of 
the government, by a public officer appointed for that purpose".79 
Pressure was continually exerted on the government to hand over 
the power of prosecution to the Public Prosecutor, but to no 
avail. 80 Instead the Cutlers' Company and Chamber of Commerce 
cooperated in paying for and undertaking the expensive prosecutions 
of foreign firms who infringed trade mark regulations,81 supplem-
enting the numerous actions undertaken by varIOUS prestigious 
82 Sheffield firms against manufacturers in Sheffield and abroad. 
Despite all its frequently cited faults, the legislation was 
still hailed as a major event in Sheffield, and central to the 
prosperity of the trades. I t was believed to have a strong 
deterrent effect, reaffirmed by the stoppage ,by customs officials, 
k t th f · t· th f' t t· 83 of 110,000 pac ages wi hin e Irs SIX mon SOl S opera Ion. 
The good trade of the ear ly 1890s, particularly in the scissor 
trade, which had suffered especially badly from the competition of 
fraudulently marked German scissors, was believed by many 
t f t 1 . 1 t· 84 Sheffielders to be the resul 0 recen egIs a Ion. 
Al though considerable emphasis was placed by all parties on 
the importance of false marks to Sheffield's trade, the issue 
continued, until the end of this period, to be seen from conflict-
ing perspecti ves. The Cutlers' Company and Chamber of Commerce 
persisted In gIvIng far greater consideration to the use of 
Sheffield's trade marks by foreigners. 85 The trade unions 
however, continued to pursue the issue of false indications of 
quality which, as the use of machinery was perfected and extended, 
came increasingly to mean the stamping of machine made blades with 
marks impl y ing manufacture by hand. To them, the problem was 
related to the very structure of the trades, whereby many large 
and respected firms could have their goods made 'out' by independ-
ent, and increasingly, poor calibre workmen, whose work was 
92 
nonetheless stamped with the firm's prestigious mark. Thus, 
although it caused deep divisions and arguments amongst the men~6 
the union leadership advocated the stamping of each blade not 
only with the mark of the merchant, but also the actual manufact-
urer of the blade, in order that the public would know exactly 
who had made it. 
The manufacturers' associations however, pressed on wi th 
their own policies, and In 1899 the Cutlers' Company launched a 
fund for "the protection of the name of Sheffield abroad".84 They 
appealed to the local public for donations with which to help to 
finance the costly prosecutions of foreign trades who used 
Sheffield marks. Vigorous appeals were made to local duty, pride 
and responsiblity, and large sums quickly flowed In, cutlery 
firms being amongst the most generous subscribers. 88 Working 
class organizations however, remained deepl y sceptical: it· was 
felt that Sheffield's manufacturers had encouraged the frauds in 
the first place when they had imported cheap German goods in the 
1870s, and in many case still did,89 and when they had failed to 
react to the allegations pressed upon them by the S.F.T.C. in the 
1880s. 90 The doubts expressed in 1906 were; the same as those 
voiced In the 1880s: many manufacturers could not be trusted to 
uphold Sheffield's trading reputation, "No one was doing more to 
hurt the good name of Sheffield than the Sheffield manufacturers" 
and "i t was no wonder the Cutlers' Company did nothing, for the 
members were manufacturing goods as disreputable themselves. In 
fact, they were actually getting their supplies from the very men 
91 they were asked to prosecute". 
By the end of the per iod, false marking was once more the 
major issue that obsessed the Sheffield cutlery trades. Comment-
ing in 1912, the Sheffield Independent stated that "the ev il of 
false marking by competitors is now, as ever, one of the greatest 
stumbling blocks in [Sheffield's) commercial progress, a far more 
. 92 dangerous handicap for example, than hostile tarIffs". Whilst 
the Chamber of Commerce pressed their national association, which 
in turn pressed the government, unsuccessfully, to undertake and 
t · 93. t pay for proceedings under merchandise marks legisla lon, I 
was the Cutlers' Company who this time established a "Sheffielc' 
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Defence Fund" In 1910. £10,000 was donated by local firms and 
individuals, a fact which W3S believed to indicate "a great 
advance in the public spirit of the people of Sheffield, and 
points to a further realization of the valuable trading asset 
which the name of our city undoubtedly is".94 Although the 
Master Cutler who 
manufacturer,95 its 
inaugurated the scheme 
subscribers included a 
f · 11 k' . t· 96 lrms, as we as war men s aSSOCla lons. 
was not a cutlery 
number of cutlery 
The money dona ted 
helped in the prosecution of firms as far afield as Germany, 
Egypt and Russia. 97 
However, the avowed interest of the fund was to watch over 
Sheffield's interests, and to prosecute "unscrupulous manufact-
urers or merchants who do not hesitate to make use upon foreign 
made goods, the name of 'Sheffield' ~98 This objective would have 
invol ved the prosecution of Company members, several of whom 
imported and stamped German goods. The Company was thus placed 
in an awkward and embarrasing position. Although in 1913 it sent 
out a circular to 230 Sheffield cutlery firms, warning them that 
to import German blades and mark them 'Sheffield made' would 
them likely to prosecution under the Merchandise Marks render 
Act,99 it was once again the representatives of the men, particu-
larly W.F.Wardley, who were consistently bringing this issue 
100 forward and forcing the Company to act. The Company however, 
would do little more than clarify what constituted a rraud under 
the 1887 Act, and issue public warnings to that effect. 101 With 
regard to false indications of quali ty, the 'real' issue as far 
as the men were concerned, the Company would and could do little 
beyond restating the fact that "the only method of prosecution in 
such cases is for selling goods under false pretences, and ... to 
establish a case of this sort, there must be produced some person 
or persons who have been misled by such false pretences to 
102 purchase the goods". 
The unions remained dissatisfied with this 'whitewashing' of 
the problem and chose to highlight the di fficul ties and frauds 
involved, by concentrating on the supply of falsely marked, poor 
quality goods to the government. During the Boer War and after, 
it was asserted, even by many manufacturers, that the low prIces 
paid by the government for its contract work, made them unwilling 
.. 
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to compete for it, especially since the standard of goods 
required could not always be produced for the price that was 
being given. 103 The rumbling debate came to a head In 1900-1 
when accusations of unpatriotism, as well as the making of 
excessive profits, unscrupulousness and dishonesty, were levelled 
at the men who sweated the cutlers and harmed the soldiers by 
selling goods which, al though marked according to the standard 
stipulated in the government contract, were In reality poor 
quality rubbish. 104 The S.F.T.C.'s concern reached such a level 
that a delegation was sent to the Board of Trade to inform those 
responsible for government orders, of the frauds that were being 
commi t ted and the consequent damage to the Ii velihood of the 
105 
workers. 
The same allegations were made by the men who appeared 
before the 1908 Fair Wages Committee. The best firms would not 
touch government work, much of which was made from poor quality 
Bessemer steel. 106 The men continued to plead not only in the 
name of commercial morali ty and honour, but also for the "fair 
manufacturers who pay a good pr ice for ordinary work", but who 
were "cut out of a contract because another emmployer is unscrup-
107 
ulous". 
The accusations reached a bitter climax when, In 1913, the 
razor forgers' union, led by its secretary, Henry Reaney, took the 
firm of Thomas Turner and Co. (whose head was the influencial ex-
Master Cutler and ex-Lord Mayor, A. J. Hobson) to court fot' what 
they believed to be an evasion of the Merchandise Marks Act. The 
supposed evasion concerned the loose usage of the words 'hand 
108 forged' on what were really machine made razors. The case, 
which was finally decided before Leeds Assizes, hinged on the 
amount of hand work which was necessary to constitute the 
definition 'hand forged'. It was lost by the union, when sample 
blades, supplies by the firm, were shown to contain considerable 
h d f . 109 an orglng. 
The dispute however, lingered on when Charles Hobson accused 
the firm of supplying samples to the court which were of a higher 
quality than those supplied to the War Office, and was sued by 
. 110 Thomas Turner and Co. for Ilbel. Hobson received the unanlmous 
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support of the cutlery unions, and the S.F.T.C. which throughout 
1913, and until the outbreak of war, were engaged in discussions 
with the Cutlers' Company and the Cutlery Council, in an attempt 
to find an acceptable definition of 'hand forged' .111 The men 
believed that the loose defini tion of 'hand forging' which had 
been established in the court case, could be applied to virtually 
any blade which had been "tapped wi th a hammer", and would 
inevitable result in the loss of Sheffield's trade in such 'hand 
forged' goods to America and Germany who would inundate markets 
with them. 112 
Thus, throughout this period, whilst there had been different 
emphases and disagreements over its precise relevance, the issue 
of fraudulent trade marks had continued to be considered as an 
issue of pr imary importance by all concerned. The debate and 
undertakings that it provoked were far greater than those caused 
by any other issues which were considered to affect trade. This 
tended to emphasize and cement Sheffield's isolation from 
national commercial debates. This unusual sense of priorities, 
often seemed antiquated and irrelevant to national onlookers, who 
did not share such values and understandings. The preoccupation 
.-
'-lith "The good name of Sheffield" was still evident in the 195b~~ 
as was the concern of working cutlers, who criticised the 
complacency of the large firms whose existence they believed was 
114 
threatened by "unorthodox traders, street vendors and so on". 
Moreover, when, in 1986, the government revoked legislation 
requiring non-branded goods to carry a country of origin mark, 
and thus allowed goods to be marked 'Sheffield' wi thout any 
indication that they had been imported, The Star reiterated the 
same old fears: 1\ anyone will be able to cash In on our hard 
fought-for and much-valued reputation, a reputation built on 
b k ,,115 merit ... what a windfall for the wideboys and fast- uc s.. -
the 'unrespectable traders' of the 1980s. 
Closely associated with the importance attached to quality 
and merchandise marks, was the widely held belief amongst many 
members of the Sheffield trades, that trade would be ruined 
unless markets were firmly classified according to the 
quality of items they required, and thereafter they were to be 
96 
supplied with nothing below the standard to which they had become 
116 
accustomed. The Ironmonger was a particular vocal exponent of 
the belief that Sheffield was losing trade because the quality 
of the work which it turned out was simply not as good as 
, J 117 Th' 'd d t prevIousy. IS In uce he buyers of high quality 
cutlery, particularly the Americans, to purchase elsewhere; 
infact this had started with the influx of poor quality Sheffield 
cutlery which had flooded into America between 1862 and 1865. 118 
Attitudes towards the decline of the once enormous (both 
materially and psychologically) American demand,are symptomatic 
of the way in which Sheffield manufacturers estimated and treated 
such problems. On the eve of its Civil War, America imported 90% 
119 
of its cutlery from the U. K. , and several notable She ffield 
houses owed their fame and prosperity to this demand. 120 The 
demand in the boom of the early 1870s was enormous: Rodgers were 
sending ten tons of cutlery to America in the last week of that 
121 year. Even in the later 1870s and 1880s, infact until the 
imposition of the ~1ckinley tariff, some firms continued to supply 
large quantities of goods to America. 122 This market had important 
psychological value in this per iod: it could set the tone of 
I f 'd ,,123 genera con I ence or pessImIsm. 
However, whenever problems with this market were voiced, 
extraneous difficulties, about which the Sheffield traders could 
do very little, were always given priority. In 1887 for example, 
the causes of the decline in trade were summed up in the following 
124 
order: "1st., and chiefly, a prohibitive tariff" (and this was 
before Mckinley). 2nd., the depression in the trade, 3rd. the 
policy of manufacturers and workmen in not adapting themselves to 
the requirments of their customers; 4th. the aversion of Sheffield 
workmen to the use of machinery; 5th. the higher wages paid in 
Sheffield for labour; 6th. the presence of skilled, Sheffield 
workmen in America. Whilst internal faults were recognised, the 
onus of these was placed on the workmen (see below). Moreover, 
these difficulties were subordinated to those of tariffs and the 
general decline in demand. The Mckinley tar iff was there fore, 
wi th much justi fication, seen as the death knell to Amer ican 
trade, "simply monstrous".125 J.D.Wing, one of Wostenholm's 
directors, sent to survey the situation in America in 1890, sent 
97 
back the following account: 126 "As I progress, I am becoming 
convinced that a cmtinuance of the high tariff will be a permanent 
loss of a large portion of our pocket kni fe trade and not a 
little of our fine knife trade. The Americans make a knife which 
is apparently good enough for the average American. Appeals by 
strongly interested parties to both his patriotism and his pocket 
are not unlikely to succeed, and so our rise or fall largely 
depends on tariff revision. With a smaller place, smaller staff 
and smaller expenses we could doubtless keep on indefinately, but 
to resume the roaring 1883s, we must be less heavily weighed by 
the customs house on this side .•. l remember this district 
distinctly in 1876 without a single American pocket knife and 
though there were plenty of cheap English ones, Rodgers and we 
had preeminence. Rodgers is gone, and we surv i ve only as a 
tottering wreck, while American goods load the shelves in almost 
every store". 
However, many large firms continued to convince themselves, 
In the run up to the tariff, that trade could be maintained by 
concentration on the finest goods. In 1890, Chr istopher Johnson 
informed their American agents that "We do not know how the 
proposed tariff is likely to affect your operations but we have 
always been led to believe that the Americans will have best 
English goods, no matter what the price may be".127 
Although some importation of finest goods did continue, most 
firms finally resigned themsel ves to the prohibi ti ve nature of 
the tariff, and found other markets. By 1860 there were said to 
be only six Sheffield firms who were still dependent on the 
Amer ican market. 128 By 1907, the average duty on cutlery 
imported into America was 64%, pocket cutlery paying 78%, razors 
129 55%, and table cutlery 50%. Although other markets were 
found, the sheer size and lucrativeness of the American market 
was never forgotten, a contrast reminder of better times. It had 
been "a big market, the biggest in the world. Such orders as come 
130" 
from the U.S. cannot be expected from any other part of the glooe. 
Thus, the cutlery trades gave undue emphasis to the demand 
side of their trading difficulties. Similarly illustrative of 
this approach was their concern with a whole range of short term 
and relatively superficial, short-sighted political reasons for 
98 
the decline in trade. Favourite explanations cited in local trade 
reports throughout this period included European wars 131 and 
especially the Eastern Question,132 financial crises in America~33 
or problems with the exchange rates,134 gen~ral elections at home 
A ' 135 d d th ' th or In merIca, an even ea s In e Royal Family which 
136 quietened the London social scene. The depressed state of 
British agriculture, and especially poor harvests or bad weather 
in the harvest season, caused fears and panic. 137 Even after 
1900, the demand from the agr icul tural areas was treated as 
138 
crucial to the prosperity of the trades. Sometimes the most 
obscure sociological details were adduced to account for a 
decline in trade: in 1905, the decline in the demand for SCIssors 
was said to be caused by ladies "devoting so much time to 
mastering golf and other outdoor sports", thus "they have neither 
the time nor the inclination for sewIng, embroidery work and 
old fashioned feminine occupations, and so cases of scissors and 
139 
similar wares have not been needed". 
Whilst socio-political circumstances could, no doubt, playa 
signi ficant role ~the bankruptcy of Joseph Fenton in 1880, for 
example, was caused by the bad trade which accompanied the 
political strife in Ireland, the firms most important market~~ it 
seems certain that far too much attention was lavished on such 
peripheral problems. 
In contrast when it came to assessIng trade In terms of 
internal dynamics of the cutlery trades, to the identi fication 
and correction of prbblems within their own structure or approach 
which were causing them to lose control of markets, debate was 
far more muted. 
Problems within the industry, which were detrimental to its 
trading position, were believed by manufacturers to lie with the 
intransigence and militancy of the men. They had forced up wages 
141 'k 142 
and prices in the 1870s, and had conducted ruinous strI es 
which had forced trade into the hands of compet i tors. They had 
143 
refused to put in regular hours when trade was good, and had 
144 
restricted the supply of labour. The American press, describ-
Ing the Sheffield cutlers who went to work in America in thF? 
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1870s, were keen contr ibutors to this disparaging portrai t: the 
cutlers were "an ignorant, obstinate sel fish lot of fellows, and 
it is a great mistake to import them to the U.S. as they will 
take the first pretext to strike".145 Sheffield manufacturers 
were very quick to contrast the mili tancy and supposedly high 
earnings and standard of Ii ving of their men, wi th the frugal; 
disciplined American and German workforces, whose long hours and 
low pay were often ci ted as a major reason for the increased 
competitiveness of their goods ln the international market. 146 
However, at other times, when it suited their approach, manufac-
turers were equally ready to complain that it was the influx of 
skilled, Sheffield workmen into America which accounted for the 
Americans' successes in producing a higher quality item. 147 
But, if trouble wi th the workforce, combined with the 
frequently ci ted problems caused by the expense of tradi tional 
t . 1 148 . t t . t Id b t d t t raw ma erla s were so lmpor an ,1 wou e expec e ha the 
large scale introduction of labour and material saving machinery, 
would have been the obvious solution. However, whilst much 
machinery was introduced and efforts made to produce cheaper 
149 goods, this was embarked upon only with considerable reluctance. 
Most firms were anxious not to betray, or at least not to be seen 
to betray, their high quality reputations. 150 Moreover, many 
continued to prefer to rely, as they had always done, on the 
supplyof one market or geographical area,151 whilst the greater 
stabili ty ln the demand for high class cutlery made it more 
attractive and assured. 152 However, it appears to have been 
gradually realized, that in order to assure constant trade, it 
was necessary to produce either a mixture of higher and commoner 
qualities of cutlery, or to attempt to sell to as large a variety 
of markets as possible, or both. One of the most str iking 
features of these trades was their enormous sectionalism, and the 
instability of the many markets which they served: only rarely 
did a major it Y of cutlery firms exper ience similar condi tions. 
Demand from di fferent nations veered widely (see before). Home 
demand sometimes far surpassed continental and colonial demand, 
153 
and sometimes vice versa; trade often varied according to the 
type of cutlery produced, although table knife manufacturers were 
100 
generally better employed throughout the period than pen and 
pocket knife manufacturers. 154 Thus, in the large firms, 
different conditions were often experienced in different depart-
ments within the same week. In one well-known firm, the pocket 
kni fe department exper ienced its busiest and slackest times in 
October 1901 and in 1906 respectively, whilst the table kni fe 
department suffered its slackest period in living recollection In 
February 1905, but by November was fully employed again. 155 In 
the same way, the ten or so firms who were becoming increasingly 
specialized producers of government contracts, were affected by 
156 different trade patterns to other producers. 
Gradually, the larger and more prestigious firms came to 
experience considerably better and steadier trade than the 
smaller firms who were 'squeezed out' by those firms who developed 
more varied markets and contracts. They could normally grant 
credit and tide themselves over the bad times,157 as contracts 
enabled them to demand, and succeed in obtaining, higher prices 
to cover their costs in inflationary per iods. 158 By 1907, it was 
widely recognised that a diversification of markets was crucial: 
The Ironmonger remarked that "makers of cutlery in Sheffield, are 
realizing ... probably more so than they have ever done so before, 
the unwisdom of placing the whole of ones eggs In a single 
basket. Those relying on the home market have suffered a long 
and severe spell of depression, which gI ves no indication of 
paSSIng away, whereas the foreign and colonial demand is qui te 
brisk. The result is that those firms who have business connect-
Ions with Canada, Australia, Russia,S.America etc. are doing very 
159 
well but the remainder find it difficult to cover expenses". 
Similar ly, in November 1907, it was reported that "The cutlery 
industry is like the curate's egg, good in parts. Some firms are 
160 fairly busy, whilst others seem slack". 
This sectionalism and diversity of experience must have been 
an important factor behind the di fficul ties and even inabil ties 
of these trades to identi fy or analyse wide reaching, broad 
causes of trade patterns. Whilst ever there were some firms, 
some products, some markets or some qualities which were prosper-
lng, it was easier to avoid such considerations and pass off 
01 
difficulties as the result of merely short term considerations. 
If a diversified, constant, busy trade was to be maintained, 
de3pite the collapse of such traditional markets as America, it 
became vital to grasp commercial possibilities allover the 
world, and this required a quite detailed and up-to-date knowledge 
of commercial requirements. The major firms prided themsel ves 
upon, and were quick to brag of their extensive trading connect-
ions, allover the world,161 whilst notable manufacturers boasted 
of their world-wide, fact-finding missions. 162 However, In 
practical terms, few firms had overseas offices: only the oldest 
and most prestigious manufacturers. There was little increase In 
the number of firms who used these, or in fact, in the number of 
overseas offices themselves, after the early 1880s. 163 Joseph 
Rodgers, for example, had offices In London, New York, Montreal 
and Toronto in 1871, but had given up their offices in Calcutta, 
Bombay and Havana, because they found it to be both easier and 
164 
cheaper to conduct their business through agents. 
In many ways, the Sheffield cutlery manufacturers would 
appear to conform with the stereotype image of the late Victorian 
entrepreneurs' marketing abili ty: unable, unready or unsui ted to 
push his goods abroad. Consular reports were extemely cr i tical 
of the performance of the British firm, as, until recently, have 
been the judgements of historians. Aldcroft found that "I f 
Britain was behind the times In techniques and methods of 
production, she was even further behind the times in her selling 
methods".165 She was "committed to selling traditional goods in 
tradi tional markets", 166 and unwilling to study customer needs, 
to adopt metric weights and measures, to speak foreign languages 
and quote prices in foreign currency, to offer adequate credi t 
facilities, and to send out knowledgeable sales representatives. 
Unl ike German and American firms, the Br i tish placed too much 
167 
reliance on the merchanting system. The same opinions were 
expressed by D. Landes, who could have been discussing Sheffield 
cutlery houses in particular when he stated that "the Briish 
manufacturer was notorious for his indi fference to style, his 
conservatism in the face of new techniques, his reluctance to 
abandon the individuality of tradition for the conformity 
102 
implici t in mass production". 168 The Br i tish firm has been 
especially criticised for relying, as Sheffield houses did, on 
the merchanting system, which in separating selling and production 
processes, placed communication barriers between the producer and 
the customer, which as well as hindering the free flow of 
information concerning customer requirements, loosened the 
manufacturers' control of the situation. 169 
Undoubtedly, there were huge problems with the system which 
was adopted. Letter books were full of complaints from agents 
and customers, grumbling about delays In the supplying of goods, 
of ships sinking, of wrong orders being sent, of kni ves being 
incorrectly marked. 170 Trade reports from both sides of the 
Atlantic claimed that the use of middlemen pushed up the prices 
of goods, whilst foreign agencies, it was claimed, would never 
sell goods as successfully as the firm's own practical represent-
t . 171 a lves. 
The problems however, were not as easy to solve as the 
critics implied, particularly when business fluctuated as widely 
as it did in these trades: keeping large and available stocks was 
an ever more dubious policy, when demand was constantly threat-
172 
ened by wars, tafiffs and exchange rates. Moreover, the 
possible objections to generalised cr i ticisms are mani fold, not 
least their over reliance on consular reports, which by their 
t . t . t 1 . t . 1 173 M na ure, and In all co un rles, were ex reme y crl lca . ore 
precisely, it can be seen that there were numerous advantages to 
be gained from the system adopted by Sheffield firms, and that 
businesses were anxious to develop and aware of foreign markets 
and the methods of exploiting them. 
The large cutlery houses had long established and acti ve 
agents In various nations, who were normally prohibited from 
taking similar goods from rival firms. They would be encouraged 
to 'push' the goods by a rate of commission of 5 to 1 m~, and 
could always be dropped in favour of more effecti ve agents if 
d · 1 174 M 11 they failed to market the goo s vIgorous y. oreover, as we 
as branch offices, some firms used travelling salesmen and 
periodic visits by company officials to market their goods, and 
175 to check up on their agents. Communications with agents were 
103 
often both regular and detailed. 176 Some firms like Wostenholms , 
were obviously aware of the need for the most direct possible 
means of communications, when in the 1890s, they attempted, 
despi te Amer ican anger, to cut the Amer ican 'jobbers' out of 
transactions, and deal directly with their largest American 
177 
customers. They recognised that "The tendency of the modern .-
day is decidedly towards reducing the distance between manufact-
urer and customer, and perhaps we are somewhat behind the times 
in not placing facilities in the way of bringing this about" 178 
However, most Sheffield firms, because of their small scale, 
and their highly specialized range of products, would always 
179 
experIence problems in selling their goods abroad. They had 
made their contacts and reputations, by personal selling, as when 
George Wostenholm made trips to America in the 1840s. 180 In the 
small easily manageable domestic market, goods were still sold by 
means of reliable travellers, who toured a certain area every 
year, village by village, coming to know the various traders, and 
their circumstances intimately.181 Such sales techniques were 
necessary for the highly specialized and di fferentiated Br i tish 
products, the sale of which required continual personal represen-
tation in the market. 182 
Given the need to market the special qualities of ~heffield's 
cutlery as personally as possible, it is hardly surprising that 
manufacturers should concentrate on colonial demand to replace 
that of Amer ica, from the 1890s onwards. In this policy, they 
183 
appear to have experienced considerable success. This was not 
simply because colonial markets were I soft options' to which 
British manufacturers retreated in the face of foreign competit-
ion,184 but because of the cultural links and values which made 
Sheffield I s products and sale:J techniques most acceptable. As 
Page stated, "Les colonies ainsi formees, permet tent de trouver 
facilement de bons represent ants , conaissant bien la langue et 
les coutumes du pays ou ils se sont fixees de leurs compatriotes, 
forment Ie premi~re noyau de la client~le qUI reclame les 
185 produits de la mere patrie." 
Moreover, it appears that Sheffield firms were, at least in 
the latter part of this period, quite well informed about 
opportunitites and demand in far off corners of the world. This 
104 
was however, through the pressure and efforts of Sheffield's 
commercial community generally, rather than the efforts of 
individual firms. Howard Vincent, Sheffield's energetic Conserv-
ative M.P. and Fair Trade campaigner, went to considerable pains 
to locate and obtain samples of cutlery from areas where an 
exploi table market was believed to exist, which the Chamber of 
Commerce duly advertised and exhibited. Manufacturers seem to 
h b I d d t t th ' 'd 186 ave een s ow an unrea y 0 ac upon IS gUI ance. The 
Chamber of Commerce was also extremely active In organising 
lectures by a variety of commercial attache's, on the trade 
prospects In the lands wi th which they were acquainted. Again, 
the tangible results seem to have amounted to little. 187 The 
Board of Trade Jounal continued to rei terate, year after year, 
that a huge trade could be done in certain types of cutlery, with 
certain markets, for example China, Turkey and Canada, but the 
repetition would imply that such demand was never catered for. 188 
Even the Cutlers' Feast became a major commercial occaSIon, 
where varIOUS influential British, foreign and colonial personages 
were invited for their commercial knowledge and contacts. 
British ministers were amongst the most frequent and sought after 
guests, because of their power over government contracts, which 
were so important to the heavy Sheffield trades, and to a lesser 
189 
extent, the cutlery trades. Diplomats were qui te frequent 
at tenders, as were foreign notables, wi th particular emphasis 
given to those who had contacts with those markets where Sheffield 
190 
already already had a foothold. The tradition continued that 
the chief guest would stay at the house of the Master Cutler. 
Thus Kitchener stayed with A.J.Hobson in 1902, when "the social-
izing that went on formed a basis for making contacts which would 
later be used to form business links".191 George Howson's guests 
In 1893, included General Roberts of Kandahar, the Duke of 
192 
Norfolk, Admiral Field and the American ambassador, whilst 
Maurice Rodgers' principal guest was the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, Michael Hicks Beach. 193 
The Chamber of Commerce Cof which cutlery manufacturers 
formed a signi ficant part) consistently passed resolutions in 
favour of a full adaptation of the metric system of weights and 
105 
194 
measures, as early as 1870, and were favour of more 
detailed trade returns: they were the main force behind the Board 
of Trade's separation of hardware and cutlery export returns In 
1898. 195 The Chamber also insisted upon the importance 
foreign language tui tion for travellers and manufacturers, 
of 
and 
196 
subscribed to the University language school. 
However, cutlery manufacturers, when left to their own 
dev ices and ini tiati ve, do not appear to have been so forward-
looking or enterprising. They were, for example, apathetic about 
enter ing International Exhibitions when this invol ved too much 
effort. In 1851, in London, there were 39 exhibitors from the 
Sheffield cutlery trades, and 66 in 1862, but only twelve in 1855 
when the exhibition was held in Paris, and only one at Vienna in 
1873. 197 Entrants to remoter exhibitions were very few, despi te 
the continual encouragement and even chastisement of the Secretary 
of the British Commission, who frequently wrote to the Chamber of 
Commerce with instructions to make firms exhibit. 198 The Chamber 
placed advertigments in the press and gave the exhibitions 
considerable publicity,199 but to no avail. In 1872, for 
example, it was "observed wi th regret, that Sheffield, notwi th-
standing the efforts of the Chamber of Commerce, appears likely 
to be unrepresented at the [Vienn2) Exhibition".200 Similarly in 
1873, the Sheffield Independent's trade reporter remarked that "a 
dozen leading firms who I could name have shirked their duty and 
remained at home ... England wi th all her pretence of enterpr ise 
and manufactur ing super ior i ty, should be represented at this-
the greatest International Exhibition which has ever yet been 
held and the one calculated to throw immeasurable fresh 
201 
channels open to her commmerce". In refusing to enter, firms 
were declining an opportunity to observe what foreign competitors 
were producing, and what type and style of goods were required in 
far-off markets. Suggested reasons for their non-participation 
included apathy on the part of firms who were resting on the 
laurels of their reputation, to fears that their ideas and 
. d b t . t 202 M t . t designs would be cople y compe I ors. ore per lnen 
reasons may have been the small scale and relati vely 1 imi ted 
finances of many cutlery houses, and moreover, their belief in 
106 
high quality product specialization, which was an attempt to 
cushion themselves from the competing mass produced wares 
exhibi ted at such events. Whilst it may have been a false and 
idealistic perception of reali ty, some Sheffield firms, still 
reliant upon their reputations and quality products, perhaps felt 
that they had insulated themsel ves sufficiently to decline the 
need to participate in such events. Certainly enthusiasm waned 
f th " th Itt f th" " d 203 ur er In e a er par 0 IS per lQ, despi te the efforts 
of the Br i tish Commissioner to drum up enthusiasm by invol v ing 
the S.F.l.C. in their organization committees. 204 
A further indication of the tradi tional confidence In and 
dependence upon the ablili ty of a high quali ty reputation to sell 
i tsel f, was the indi fference displayed by Sheffield firms to 
advertising, the art of which American cutlery manufacturers were 
successfully exploiting with great energy. King C.Gillette, 
believed that "the whole success of this business depends on 
advertising".205 The accuracy of this belief was demonstrated by 
the success of his safety razor, which required a vigorous 
advertising campaign in order to teach Americans to treat their 
Id d " bl 206 o razors as Isposa e. 
Sheffield traders, despite their pride in the name 'Sheffield', 
and their ~ute awareness of the value of commercial reputations, 
were slow to advertise their names. Whilst some impressi ve 
salesrooms, following In Rodgers' example, were eventually 
erected,207 adverts were generally limited to discreet testimon-
ials of quality208 and not aggressive attempts using foreign 
" 1 ff t decll"ne. 209 E "1926 the Journa s to open up trade or 0 se ven In 
Chamber of Commerce still felt it necessary to gIve a course of 
lectures an "Salesmanship", realising that "we do rely too much 
210 
on the quality of our products to sell themselves". 
Similarly, there IS considerable evidence which suggests 
a reluctance on the part of cutlery manufacturers to adopt 
procedures, and styles of cutlery which would have won for them a 
wider and more enthusiastic body of consumers. Whilst German 
houses frequently gave free quotes in local currencies, Sheffield 
firms still sent their price lists allover the world in pounds, 
211 d shillings and pence. Little effort appears to have been ma e 
107 
to communicate In foreign languages. In October 1877, the 
prestigious firm of Christopher Johnson was still informing 
German customers that "as your English is very good, we hope 
that you will wr i te to us in that language, because we do not 
understand German, and we know very little French".212 The Board 
of Trade frequently stressed that if such markets as Brazil and 
Russia were to be exploited, thoroughly competent representativ2s, 
both practical, and fluent In the native languages would be 
213 
needed. Even local trade reporters criticised the enduring but 
oblivious practice of cutlery houses who "send catalogues to the 
continent, giving dimensions in inches, and prices in £.s.d., and 
devote a good deal of their space to tea-pots and toast-racks. 
Now continental people eat no toast and drink little tea".214 
The French consul In Sheffield was similarly critical of its 
manufacturers, who produced 9m~ of their catalogues in English 
215 
and had very few representatives who were fluent in two languages. 
Bad and unstylish packaging was another criticism which 
Sheffield manufacturers were slow to rectify. As early as 1858, 
Marsh Bros. were being informed by their agent in New York that 
"Everybody In the trade nearly, now puts up spring cutlery In 
boxes, and so far as I could ascertain, without extra charge. On 
the shelves, our goods in bundles, beside those of other people 
in boxes (making neat square bales) with handsome black gold and 
green labels, do certainly look ... very 'old fogyish,,,.216 
However, Marsh Bros. did at least remedy this: later catalogues 
show samples of a variety of attractive labels which they had 
217 
adopted. 
With regard to styles of their cutlery, Sheffield manufact-
urers were subjected to much criticism over their unreadiness to 
abandon their old pat terns and sty les of products which had 
traditionally sold very well. Firms were widely and constantly 
cr i ticised in the local press, particular ly by the Sheffield 
Independent's American trade correspondent, 'The Yorkshireman', 
who was presumably an ex-Sheffield manufacturer living in New 
York. He painted a picture of acute entrepreneur ial apathy: 
Amer ican retailers were said to have "sent pat terns to England 
from time to time, but they appear to be indisposed to change 
from old styles, until we have given up any idea of anything new 
108 
218 from that country". To no avail the correspondent entreated 
Sheffield manufacturers to visit and study the 1876 Philadelphia 
h 'b't' 219 h d . t d t ex 1 1 lon. e eprecla e he display sent by Brookes and 
Crookes, which although "beautiful in design and workmanship" was 
"selected wi th so Ii t tIe judgement in regard to the reqirements 
of this market, that on the whole, little attention will be gIven 
to this branch of the trade".220 Nevertheless, Brookes and 
Crookes were still boasting at the Calcutta Exhibition of 1884 
that their gold medal had been won with items taken entirely from 
stock - no new goods had been made at all. 221 The Times was 
similarly critical of Sheffield manufacturers' tendency "to 
manufacture what he has always been in the habit of doing, and to 
sell to the colonies what he can sell at home; whilst the 
American studies the market ... adapts himself to the circumstances 
by the hour".222 
Undoubtedly the Chamber of Commerce was aware of the 
inclination of firms to "obstinately adhere 
and ... old finish", 123 but such an assessment 
to ... old styles 
undervalued the 
responsiveness of Sheffield manufacturers to the demands of the 
market which they bel ieved themselves best able to serve. New 
styles and patterns were s~tout and adopted: the Bowie knife, 
which conquered America between the 1830s and 1850s, was a 
224 Sheffield adapt ion to American demand; Marsh Bros. were 
225 
constantly researching the American market in the 1860s; and 
Wostenholms, throughout the 1890s were receiving advice from 
their American agents, on the styles of goods which could be most 
226 
successfully marketed in that country. 
I t is questionable how far, wi thin the values, targets and 
structural framework that was set for and by many Sheffield 
firms, changes could or oujlt to have been implemented. The small, 
special ized businesses, wi th their quali ty wares and reputat ion 
for such, found it extremely difficult to adapt themselves to the 
idea of, and to compete with the mass produced cheap German and 
American goods. Moreover, in their willingness to make small 
quantities of speciality goods, which often carried individual 
features and marks requested by the customer, SheffiFld fir:-:1s 
showed themsel'/es to be enl?rgetic and willing to c2ter for a 
109 
particular demand. Blanket cr i ticism of failures to produce 
227 
neatly packaged, uni form and standardized goods, pay insufficient 
attention to the impossibility of combining such mass production 
features wi th the 'one off I market Sheffield served. And this 
market, although the subject of far less comment and discussion, 
was still stable, viable and an obvious choice for Sheffield 
firms. In an article critical of the entrepreneurial zeal of 
Sheffield producers, The Times nonetheless evidenced this 
distinction: "In their natural wants, Europeans are essentially 
Conservatives, Americans and colonials are distinctly progressive. 
An Englishman likes to use a thing because he is accustomed to 
it; an American or colonial loves a novelty because it is new".228 
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Chapter 4 Industrial Structure 
Until recently, the surv i val of outwork and hand labour has 
been treated as a pre-industr ial remnant, an inev i tably doomed 
deviation from the real direction of 19th century industrialization, 
which was towards factory-based, mechanized production. 1 The 
Sheffield cutlery trades however, demonstrate the continued 
rationality and economic viability of outwork, as well as its 
possible coexistence, and even symbiotic relationship with factory 
production. Large firms coexisted with and even used middlemen and 
merchants, as well as a plethora of independent producers and 
outworkers. This relationship was reflected ln the mixture of 
industrial premlses - self-contained factory units, public and 
private tenements, workshops and domestic manufacture. Most firms, 
even the largest and most prestigious, continued to be qui te 
small, family concerns, with a limi ted capi tal base, producing a 
range of specialized goods, and reliant to some extent, on the hand 
labour of independent producers. 
This structure was partly the result of, and certain ly 
facilitated by the original form of the industry and the deeply 
felt and accepted beliefs and perceptions which resulted from it . 
The success and reputation of the trades had been, and was still 
believed by many, to be dependent on their handicraft base and the 
quality, specialized production that this permitted. Gi ven these 
understandings and perceived pr ior i ties, as well as the actual 
structure that emerged, of small scale works, full of independently 
minded contractors, ln which the installation of large-scale, 
mechanized plant was often physically impossible, it was more 
rational to move within the existing, preferred structure. 
The system brought some disadvantages to manufacturers, 
particular ly the more reputable ones: quali ty and deadlines were 
harder to predict and control; excessive competition, price cutting 
and overproduction were rife. However, the balance of convenience 
remained firmly with the coexistence of factory and outwork, 
mechanized and hand production. The success of this structure was 
reliant upon a ready supply of cheap labour. This was made 
available partly by the traditional ease of entry into the industry 
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of marginal, small producers, and partly by more modern factors of 
foreign competition and the competition of basic mechanized 
processes. Moreover, the actual production processes involved in 
cutlery manufacture were extremely open to effective economies 
through the progressively more minute subdivision of labour. The 
workers had tradi tionally endorsed this structure because of the 
independence and opportuni ties to 'raise themsel ves' and exercise 
specialist skills which it had once offered, and to a very small 
minor i ty, continued to offer. Increasingly however, they became 
victims of a system of which they had once approved, whilst their 
weaknesses compounded the advantages of the system to manufacturers. 
Oversupply of labour and independent production impeded trade 
unionism and practices that restricted entry, which in turn allowed 
the admission of more cheap labour and further overproduction. 
Central to demand and market factors in these trades were the 
minute special isms available from Sheffield firms, and the fluct-
uating (in terms of cyclic31 and seasonal patterns) nature of 
demand, both of which made it unwise to invest ln large, mechanized 
plant which would produce unsui table goods and be underused for 
considerable periods. Even the largest firms who did manufacture 
many of their own goods by machine, using their own workmen, had 
these products finished and glven a more 'one-off' style by 
outworkers, and coped with above-average demand by giving more work 
out. Moreover, for an industry so concerned with its tradi tions, 
and at root quite conservative, mechanization and a wholesale 
swi tch to factory production, involved too great a psychological, 
as well as economic upheaval "I t involved exchanging well-
established and familiar routines for new and untried methods, 
either with a brand new workforce or with an old one determined to 
protect their jobs. ,,2 Thus, whilst old-established understandings 
and practices had been largely responsible for the maintainance of 
basically handicraft production, and, in many ways, represented a 
line of least resistance for manufacturers, this did not stop the 
compromise structure which emerged from being both effective and 
productive. 
Throughout this period, the large-scale, self-contained 
cutlery factory remained an exception in Sheffield. Not only did 
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the large firms coexist with the complicated maze of outworking, 
independent producers, but in themselves they retained many 
features which marked them off from more 'modern' factory-based 
industry. 
In 1887 there were 3J11 0 factories and 1,,243 workshops In 
on of the several Sheffield, "most of them for the carrying 
3 branches of the cutlery trades", but these 'factories' included 
4 1804 rooms, each "occupied in most cases by several persons". In 
1896 there were still 170 tenement factories with 2,900 occupiers, 
with very little change on this figure by 1914. 5 Furthermore, this 
excluded the workers, whose number was unknown, in the underworld 
of small domestic workshops where no power was employed. The 
average size of the work uni t was then, very small:, the 11970 
workers enumerated in the 1901 census were employed In ~732 
average of five males and one female establishments, giving an 
employed in each,6 whilst by 1913, the average number of adult 
7 
males per establishment appears to have fallen even lower. Even 
the largest firms, 38 of whom were scheduled by the 1912 Commission 
of Inquiry into the Application of National Health Insurance to 
Outworkers, employed 2153 outworkers, but only 203 of these worked 
for just one firm. 8 The continued importance of outwork was also 
illustrated by the £224,000 gross value of cutlery produced by 
outworkers in 1907,9 whilst workshops and factories which rented 
all, or part of their power, still accounted for 25% of all output, 
10 
and 35% of the total workforce in that year. 
At the largest firms, full-time inworkers would be employed on 
the premises, but a number of outworkers (the exact number depended 
on the state of trade) were also engaged: a typical firm had half 
. 11 
of its work done "out" in "small places" by outworkers In 1867. 
The steadiest and best men would be kept as inworkers, yet in 1912 
no firms employed only inworkers, but many still employed only 
12 
outworkers. 
Wi thin large 'works' owned by reputable firms, many inworkers 
were not under the direct control of the firm, but rent pay ing, 
independent contractors to whom firms supplied room and power -
often, rent was even paid by inworkers who were the direct 
employees of such firms. 13 Usually men would furnish tools and 
125 
materials, selling their goods to, and buying their materials from 
any manufacturer or merchant. Occasionally, the owner of the 
premises would supply materials and buy the finished products, 
deducting sums from the rent and power, and then paying accordingl~. 
Even in 1907, it was still common practice for large manufacturers 
who employed their own grinders, to allow the men to bring in the 
work of other manufacturers when trade was slack, partly to help 
15 their men to earn a sufficent wage to pay the rent. These were 
owned ei ther by large manufacturers and rented out only to their 
own men (private wheels), or to a combination of their own men and 
some independent contractors (semi-private wheels) or by a company 
who rented out space to individual grinders and took no interest In 
the wheel beyond the appointment of an overseer who would act as an 
agent and collect the rents, and an engine tender. Even in private 
wheels where it was established that the relationship between owner 
and worker was that of master and servant, workers could still take 
in other work when trade was slack, al though the owner always 
retained first calIon the man's time. 16 The number of wheels 
increased enormously over the earlier part of this period, from 132 
steam driven and 32 water driven in 186517 to 12 water wheels and 
3-400 steam grinding wheels in 1889. 18 This growth can be accounted 
for not only by the increase in the use of steam-powered machinery 
but also the fact that steam grinding wheels were good speculative 
investments, owned sometimes by individuals, and sometimes by 
l OOt d 0 19 ImI e companIes. 
Forgers, hafters and cutlers were also increasingly employed 
in factories and tenements were power was supplied, although 
amongst the poorest workers, for example the Wads ley spr ingkni fe 
o 20 
cutlers, the proportion working in domestic workshops Increased. 
In many factories, grinders, cutlers and forgers, as well as 
members of totally di ferent trades, could all be found working 
under the same roof. In a public grinding wheel in 1907 it was 
possible to find "a scissor manufacturer, a fluter, an Ivory 
worker, a spr ing kni fe cutler, a heavy gr inder, a light gr inder, a 
file manufacturer, and so on; you may have fifty different trades 
21 
going on at one time in one particular wheel". 
In 1912, it was still very difficult to categorize or define a 
'fO ,22 lrm 
designate 
The larger 
themselves 
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firms were not 
'manufacturers' . 
the only enterprises to 
Merchants who did not 
superv ise any production of their own, but merely bou'ght goods over 
the counter and stamped them with their mark (as did some large 
firms) were sometimes called 'manufacturers,;3 as were the notorious 
small manufacturers or 'little mesters' who were either small scale 
producers, or merchants, or both, but virtually always poor 
themselves. 24 Differing regarding oplnlons the status of the 
little master reflected the actual diversity In his possible 
position and role. Some held that the title implied that his 
enterpr ise should invol ve him in a certain amount of commercial 
° k d 1 ° b ° 1 ° t ° 25 S to h r IS s an la 1 1 les. ome lmes e was an actual workmen 
himself, obtaining orders from larger factors, merchants or 
manufacturers, and then employ ing a few men to help him in the 
execution of these orders. 26 He would be paid by the piece, but 
27 
would generally pay his men a datal wage. He would pay for the 
rent of the trough or side, for the tools and power.28 and it was 
often held that to quali fy for 'little mester' status, he had to 
b hot 1 d k th dOth ° tot 29 o tain lS own ma eria s, an ma e up e goo s In elr en Ire y. 
He would take out orders from factors, merchants or large firms and 
30 take them back to the same when complete. Occasionally, he would 
sell work to the highest bidder. 31 Thus In many ways, he was an 
outworker who took greater financial risks, and employed datal 
32 
workers, sometimes up to eight, in good trade. Some little 
masters however, were more akin to small merchants, in that they 
purchased 
33 
selves. 
goods from outworkers, and did not manufacture them-
The 'working' little master was always more common than 
the 'factor ' Ii t tIe master; in the view of one factory inspector, 
34 
the little master was not "a middllemen" but "a workman", forced 
by circumstances to 'sweat' those who worked for him. 
Outworkers who rented a trough or side, or if they were 
extremely poor, or purely manual workers, worked In their own 
homes,35 would obtain work from Ii t tIe masters, factors, or from 
36 to large firms, for which they would be paid by the piece. Some Imes 
even these workers would employ others beneath them, but usually 
only members of their own family - particularly women and children?7 
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Throughout this period, there was little change in this basic 
partnership of a small number of merchant-manufacturers at the top, 
and assorted lesser middlemen and producers pro v iding the I ink 
between the top and the mass of 'independent' wage earners. The 
posi tion of the middleman was particular ly flexible, merging from 
an entrepreneurial manufacturer, employer or independent producer 
himsel f, to a manager buying for and from other people, to some-
thing between the two, as the circumstances demanded and his 
expertise allowed. 38 Trade unionists increasingly drew a distinct-
ion between 'respectable' Ii t tIe masters who worked for themselves 
and took risks, and those who simply superintended and did not work 
themselves, and were closely associated with sweating. 39 Even In 
1947, this partnership of large manufacturers, middlemen and 
independent workers was still the rule, and, it was believed, would 
continue to dominate the industrial structure whilst ever suitable 
premIses existed: "The opportuni ty to rent room and power on cheap 
terms, ei ther in a tenented factory, or in the premises of some 
large firm, IS the basic explanation for the persistence and 
40 
widespread occUr!· ence of this tiny uni t in the making of cutlery". 
However, after 1900, commentators increasingly stressed that 
the trades were moving towards a more 'normal' industrial structure 
as the little masters were bought up, and expansion and mergers 
created more large-scale firms. This was partly the result of 
factory legislation which resulted In the extinction of many older 
41 tenements, -but also the increasing domination of the market by 
larg2 firms which were taking complete control of their own 
production. Reports of the largest firms buying up small masters 
to act as the direct foremen and managers of their premises were 
common,42 whi Is t in 1907, Samuel Osborn's T QltoJer Whee 1 shut down 
through lack of demand for the hulls. 43 
Certainly, there was an expansion in the number of large works 
wi th extensive premlses over this per iod. By the 1890s, most 
notable firms had large works with prestigious showrooms, despi te 
the initial reluctance to build these. 44 Although it was rarely 
stated what proportion of a workforce were still outworkers, total 
workforce did Increase enormously: Rodgers employed 2POO by 1897, 
producing a huge weekly output,45 whilst Wostenholms e~ployed 650 
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in 1900~6 Harrison Bros. and Howson, who had moved to extended 
premises in 1900, employed 600 in 1910,46 Walker and Hall employed 
2,000 in 1914,48 whilst smaller firms such as Sellars and Newtons, 
employed 100 and 400 workers respectively in 1897. 49 Premises which 
were often rented, were quite large: Wostenholm's Washington works 
50 
covered 5424 square yards. Smaller works such as Haywood's 
Glamorgan works and Hides in Hollis Croft covered 1~40 square yards 
and 600 square yard;1 respecti vely. Many firms extended their 
premIses in the boom of the early 1890s,52 or In the period 1900-
1910. 53 Whilst a typical works could look impressive-the Glamorgan 
works for example had four storys with warehouses, offices, work-
shops, - floors were divided into 20 to 30 separate rooms, many of 
which were let out to independent contractors. 54 
The scale of business was also extended as large firms increas-
ed the number and range of their products, by taking over smaller 
businesses. 55 It became increasingly common to produce both cutlery 
and electroplate: in 1907 cutlery factories and workshops were 
56 producing £189,000 of electroplate per year as "These industr ies 
which were formerly regarded as entirely distinct are now commonly 
united under the same management".57 Some firms were diversifying 
58 their production to cover files and tools, whilst others were 
abandoning their traditionally staple cutlery outputs to concentrate 
on the presumably more lucrative heavier branches. 59 Other firms 
were producing an enormous variety of heavy and lighter metal goods 
by the 1900s. Needham Veall and Tyzack's range in 1879 was bewild-
ering, extending from the production of every variety of cutlery and 
electroplate, to steel converting and manufacturing, iron founding, 
60 
wire, tool and machine manufacture. 
Another sign of modernization and concentration of capital can 
be seen in the growing assets of the largest firms, their conversion 
into limited liability concerns, and the high dividends received by 
their shareholders. Joseph Rodgers was the first company to take up 
limited liability, In 1871, and maintained a very lucrative 12 to 
17% dividend on shares throughout most of this period. 61 Wostenholms 
transferred to limited liability in 1875, with a capital of £100,000 
62 divided into 4,000 shares of £25 each. Until the 1880s, profits 
were 5-10% up on normal dividends, but the slump in American trade 
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in the mid-1880s meant that the reserve fund had to be called on , 
and with the McKinley tariff, dividends fell by half. 63 However, 
the success of the firm is indicated by the fact that when it was 
sold to the new limited company it was worth £70,000, the plant 
tools and stock being valued at £30,000, the goodwill and patent 
. ht t £20,000. 64 Wh N dh V 11 d rIg s a en ee am ea an Tyzack became a limited 
company in 1897, its capital was £60,000, 65 whilst Mappin and Webb 
which became a limi ted company in 1908 had profi ts of £54,000 by 
1913 and capital of £750,000. 66 
Nevertheless, such firms were neither typical of the industry 
as a whole, nor were they as 'modern' as they appeared. Small scale 
specialist concerns were still very common: appendix 2 illustrates 
that the vast majority of firms continued to produce just one type 
of cutlery, whilst less than ten firms produced a wide var iet y of 
different types of cutlery. Most firms were still the occupiers of 
small, unimposing premIses: a stranger visiting Brookes and Crookes 
Atlantic works In 1882 would "search in vain for a block of build-
Ings wi th an imposing elevation, wi th extensive showrooms filled 
with magnificent and costly goods or with anything in the shape Df 
display" .67 Between 1880 and 1901 most firms occupied premises wi th 
ratable values of under £150 p. a., whilst nOne had a value of over 
£1,500. 68 Survival rates were lower in the 1870-80 boom period, 
when the total number of firms was larger, but they increased 
after this date, so that 63% of firms survived 1880-1901, being the 
sustainers of the class of large firms. Very few firms were newly 
69 
established as large, but worked they way up from a small scale. 
Most firms continued to have a very limited capital and credit base. 
Of the 29 firms for which details of bankruptcies were given 1857-
93, 17 had assets of £1,000 or less,70 whilst many had extremely 
small capital bases. 71 Even those firms that took out limited 
72 liability were small in number, and, moreover, preferred the 
cautious 2nd hesitant step of private limited liability. This 
status was legally recognised in 1907 and allowed companies to 
retain their original management and privacy of the past, but also 
limited further growth and entrepreneurial stimulus to the extent of 
the named shareholders ?3Evsn firms which did become limi ted 
liability concerns were anxious to stress, on every possible 
occaSIon, the continuity of their present state of affairs with the 
130 
past. Family control of the business was especially important and 
proudly boasted74- this was rarely changed even when a firm became a 
°t d 1° bOlOt 75 liml e la 1 1 Y company. 
However, if such firms were neither typical of the industrial 
structure, nor progressive or sel f -contained, it is nevertheless 
possible to demonstrate that this structure and these features were 
often maintained for rational economIC reasons. The continued 
coexistence and viability of a combination of manual and mechanized, 
factory and domestic production was feasible and profitable for two 
main reasons: firstly, markets and demand were specialized, the 
abili ty to sell resting on marginal di fferentiations of 'one off I 
products; secondly, labour was both skilled and abundant, production 
processes being capable of extensive subdivision, allowing the 
production of specialized goods at relatively low prices. The 
targeting of such a high quality market can be seen as a rational 
choice. 76 Similarly,the techniques used to cheapen production 
whilst retaining its skilled, handicraft content, were equally 
resourceful and successful. Nevertheless, these two features 
the preferred market and the preferred production techniques -
can also be seen to stem from the continued domination of the 
industry, In practical and psychological terms, of traditional 
handicraft practices and their resultant ethos. 
Demand and markets have been seen as the crucial factor In 
determining the survival of outwork. When, as in the cutlery 
trades, overall demand was not increasing and was subject to wide 
fluctuations and market uncertainties, and, at the same time, was 
for finished consumer goods in which specialization, di versi ty and 
originality were major selling points, investment in large, mechan-
ized factories was a questionable policy.77Sheffieldls manufacturers 
marketed an enormous rar~e of cutlery, the diversity of which 
it would have been qui te impossible to produce by machine. When 
relatively small quantities of specialized goods were being produced, 
outworkers were used as I feeders I, to supply lines on which firms 
could not find full employment for their inworkers. 79 Some products 
80 
were so specialized that they were only manufactured by outworkers, 
whilst large firms frequently made agreements with small specialist 
81 
producers, to supply them with certain classes of goods. Thus work 
131 
was taken in and brought out, making the whole of the centre of 
Sheffield, with its outworkers, teams, merchants and manufacturers, 
like one huge factory, "drawn together by the complex interdepend-
82 
ence of skills and products" which assured the necessary versatility 
of product and skill. 
Outworkers were also used by the large firms to cope with the 
seasonal and cyclical fluctuations in demand which affected these 
trades. It was considered pointless to invest in plant and mach-
inery, to pay overheads and fixed charges, when a sudden upturn in 
demand could be handled by simply widening the circle of outworkers 
to whom work was given out. 83 Whilst a 'stint' was fixed for 
inworkers, according to which enough hours work were assured to gIve 
a minimum living wage, with outworkers, there was no such ~unwritten 
compulsion,,:84 they were merely dispensed with. Thus in 1907, there 
was still "a rather strong feeling amongst employers that on the 
whole the provision of factories does not pay and that it is better 
to depend on employing outworkers if you can get them. You have no 
responsiblity to find them employment in bad times, and generally 
the system is increasing in Sheffield that instead of keeping stock 
and running it up in bad times In order to keep your workers 
together, you only employ men when it pays you to employ them".85 
Hence the huge and constant changes in the Slze of the factory-
86 based workforce, which expanded and contracted as trade demanded. 
Equally important to the viability of the system which operated 
In Sheffield, was the nature of the workforce: its skills and 
ability to produce a whole range of specialized products; but also 
the openness of its handicraft skills to subdivision, subcontracting 
and general cost reduction. Central to the effectiveness of this 
system of production was an oversupply of labour and competition for 
work, which pulled down piece-rates, and the ability of employers to 
make use of this si tuation. The success of the Sheffield trades 
was still largely dependent on the abilities and quickness of the 
individual worker, and therefore considerable entrepreneurial energy 
was devoted to exacting the maximum advantage from the workers 
skills~7 
It is possible to locate the origins and persistence of this 
oversupply of independent workers, In traditional practices and 
132 
values, which had and to some extent still did dominate the industry. 
Time and time again, observers noted the i~en~t outlook of the 
cutlery workers, their will to use their often specialist skills in 
independent production, an ideology assisted by the continued 
practical ease of entry into such production. Whilst the likelihood 
of a worker ' raising' himsel f to employer standing and associated 
weal th and status diminished to become virtually non-existent, the 
belief In such an 'open' system which allowed potential upward 
mobili ty, was slower to die. Most of the famous companies had 
88 
started as one man concerns: "men have made fortunes and got good 
positions in it, and others think that they can do the same; hence 
we have a large number of people in a trade which requires, In some 
instances, very little capital, trying to earn a living".89 
Whilst ever the industry remained a basically handicraft trade, 
h t · I . bl 90 btl suc op Ions were a ways POSSI e, u a 1 were agreed that such 
independence and freedom, both actual and potential, had profound 
effects on the character of the workforce. "Very informal habi ts 
were formed, and a set of traditions handed down which it is easy to 
see arose entirely out of the peculiar circumstances under which 
they worked. To this cause we must attribute the freedom from 
restraint which is so characteristic a feature of the Sheffield 
cutlery worker today. It is this love of freedom which makes him 
tolerate the practices which are the despair of those who wish to 
see his lot improved". 91 Men were "ambi tious" , "independent" , 
anxious "to get on in the wor ld" ,92 unwilling to work under one 
master: "the cutler and grinder in Sheffield is a man who considers 
himself entirely independent of any man employing him, no matter 
what may be the relationship between them. A man is his own master 
in the sense at least that he claims the privilege of coming to work 
. " 93 II and going away again exactly as it suits his convenIence; every 
man regards himself not as an employee, but as a master on his own 
94 
account". 
Some men were still inspired by this ideal and achieved some 
success, but for the majority independent production was undertaken 
In times of economIC depression, when normal supplies of work 
ceased, often in order to pay workshop rents, "in fact, the entry of 
133 
workers into independent production was as likely to ,represent 
downward mobility as it was a move up the economic or social scale~~ 
I t was undertaken to prevent things from getting any worse. Thus, 
"every broken down cutler sets up in them [tenements] on his own 
account, and gets work from any master who will give it him to do. 
The worker works on his own account as a master in every sense of 
the word, but he is simply an under contractor, subject to wretched 
96 
conditions often". 
Such independent producers often attempted to lncrease their 
profits by employing 'teams' of sub-employees, or by sub-letting the 
work to further small producers. Whether they worked themselves, or 
'sweated' others to make a profit, became the focal point of the 
long-lasting and often heated debate which centred on the 'respect-
ibility/0r otherwise of these small masters, and their exact role is 
II ' d ' d d' t' 97 Th 11 t pu lng own pr lces an con 1 lons. ere were sma mas ers who 
took work from the large manufacturers, who were very much like any 
other workmen, "he is simply a poor man, one of the ordinary skilled 
98 
workmen". They did not sweat others, but by their own skills and 
99 industry could feasibly 'rise' from their present status. They 
sometimes employed datal journeymen or helpers if the trade was 
'double handed', to whom they paid a lower piece wage, but the wage 
ratios were tradi tionally established and the system fel t to be 
100 
wholly acceptable. However, there was also the class of small 
master who "decided not to work himself, but wants to live upon the 
work of somebody else, who does not himself work, but simply 
super intends; he gets orders and sees that they are executed but 
does not do the handicrafting himself often; he employs a few men, 
women, boys and gir Is to execute the work; 
beds of sweating ln Sheffield. 101 These men 
, 't 'It d spol'lers" 1 02 who employed unlonlS s as ra e 
and these are the hot 
we're seen by trade 
'teams' of up to 30 
boys, men and women, usual 1 y di v ided into groups 0 f six, who were 
put to highly subdivided, specialized tasks which would be completed 
both quickly and easily. The teams received datal wages, whilst the 
103 
team master rewarded himself with piece rates. The unions 
vehemently opposed this system which was linked with the increasing 
subcontracting and subdivision of work in these trades. Particular-
ly unpopular were the small masters who merely picked up work from 
134 
warehouses and sublet it again, at a considerably lower rate than 
that which they were receiving from the warehouse. Some unionists 
even suspected an agreement between the small masters and warehouse 
managers, whereby profi ts from the second subletting of the work, 
were divided between them. 104 Furthermore, the payment of the teams 
by datal rates, whilst the master received a piece rate, meant that 
it was In the master's financial interest to speed the team up, 
although the men would receive nothing for their extra work. The 
team leader could therefore, get abetter profi t out of his men 
than the head of a large firm, because he knew best how to 'hustle' 
them: "He knows exactly what they can do, and he sees he gets it 
d ,,105 one . 
However, the most important profit-maximising mechanism, was 
the implementation of an extensive subdivision of labour within the 
team. This subdivision was central to the lowering of wages and 
therefore prices, which kept the whole system viable, and has been 
106 
seen as "the primary axis of 19th century growth" in the Sheffield 
trades. Once the basic processes of cutlery production were 
107 
completed by machine, using largely unskilled labour, work could 
be finished by the army of subcontractors and deskilled teams. This 
allowed the production of the neccessary variety of products and 
styles at a relatively low cost. 
As ear ly as 1878 this subdivision was extremely advanced, and 
108 described as "very fully carried out in the cutlery trades". 
Trade unionists bemoaned the fact that so few men could now produce 
an item of cutlery from start to finish: "Some of the older manufac-
turers, the fathers of the present race, often prided themselves 
that they could go into the shop and go through the whole process of 
producing every portion of an article themselves, put it together, 
and turn it out complete; but that kind of thing to a large extent 
109 has passed away". The skills of the traditional craftsmen passed 
almost into folklore as "the work done by the ancient Hallamshire 
110 
cutler is now divided amongst quite a multitude of hands". 
111 
Traditional subdivisions were gradually but enormously extended, 
until labour became increasingly deskilled, capable of producing 
only one very specific item, by a specialized process, which usually 
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involved rudimentary mechanized techniques. 112 Increasing mechani-
zation however, entailed more subdivided manual work for the 
completion of finishing processes, thus cementing the link between 
and coexistence of mechanized and manual production, factory and 
domestic based labour. 113 Whilst the team leader would usually 
complete the most skilled and di fficul t work, he handed out the 
. t k t h' t 114 . . easler as SOlS earn, an lncreaslng number of whom were boys 
115 
and women - low pay category workers. Furthermore, the system was 
self-perpetuating: subcontracting, in reducing the overall level of 
skill in the industry, made teams even more necessary, to replace 
116 the disappearing talents of the 'all round' craftsman. As sub~ 
divided labour was cheaper, there became less and less work for the 
craftsmen, who, when trade was bad, were forced to work at sub-
divided tasks too. 117 Thus, even the most skilled workmen were 
increasingly capable of performing only specialized tasks, albeit to 
a high standard. 118 
The cost effectiveness of the subdivision of labour was 
reflected in the wage rates available in the industry: although they 
were generally quite static over this period, the disparity between 
the top and bottom levels available in a particular craft, reflected 
levels of skill, whilst those crafts in which subdivision was 
119 further extended, were the worse remunerated. 
In the manipulation and exploitation of this system, most 
at tent ion was focused on the role of the factor In dr i v ing hard 
bargains and pulling down the wage rates, largely because he was a 
target on which 'respectable' manufacturers and workers would agree 
in their attacks. During the clamour and debate which surrounded 
the visit of the Select Committee on the Sweating System to Sheffield 
in ear ly 1889, the full extent of the awful conditions In the 
cutlery trades were revealed. Some men worked over 60 hours per 
week for wages under 14 shillings; investigations revealed a "deeper 
depth" of "degrading and debasing,,120 conditions than many had 
imagined or chosen to acknowledge. 
At the beginning of this period, the factor was believed to be 
at the heart of the problem for "the Ii t tIe master is always at the 
121 ·t mercy of the factor". Factors, knowing the financial insecurl y 
of small masters in periods of poor trade, could barter them down. 
136 
or refuse to accept goods at a previously accepted pr ice, forcing 
these small masters to reduce prices, to "cut each others throats~~2 
which entailed the reduction of their men's wages. Thus, "When work 
is taken in and more asked for, you are informed that there are no 
orders, but you can call again the next day. The next day, work is 
again refused, on the plea that there is not an order in the place, 
and that other sweaters are getting them done for less. The outworker 
is allowed to go away empty-handed, and with much indi fference on 
the part of the sweater, the mechanic is led to understand that he 
can call again or not, just as he likes. On again presenting himself 
for work, the same answer is given, but if he:: the outworker) cares to 
take three gross at 1s. per gross less, he can have them as stock. 
In the meantime, the outworker has applied to other sweaters with no 
good result; the outworker, pressed for rent and household necess-
i ties goes back to the warehouse and takes the knives at the 
reduction".123 After a few weeks, the whole sweating and price 
reducing process would be resumed. 
Some firms, particularly the large houses, claimed to loath 
this system, in which price-cutting developed a momentum of its own, 
creating competition which forced even large manufacturers to bring 
down their pr ices and wage rates. 
itated a similar decline in quality 
Such reduction usually necess-
. 124 
and sometimes in profIts. 
Thus, it was claimed that "The team system is to a certain extent 
forced on manufacturers. I am averse to the team system but I cannot 
entirely do without it. The reason for that is that if you are not 
willing to employ a team yourself, someone has an outworker who does 
employ a team, and he is able to undersell you, therefore you are 
driven to a team, whether you want it or not, because if you refuse 
to avail yourself of the cheaper system of producing goods, you will 
125 loose the trade". This undercutting was particularly acute 
large firms became the only concerns to depression, when 
statement wages, until they too were forced to reduce wages 
In a 
pay 
and 
. 126 prIces. Thus it sometimes happened that an unusual alliance of 
respectable large manufacturers and trade unions was formed, to 
combat the competition of small masters and factors, with the large 
firms using the unions to enforce an equalization and standardization 
. 1 t d 127 of wage rates before wage incre8s~ could be Imp emen e . 
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Moreover, there were certainly smaller-scale disadvantages for 
manufacturers, inherent In this system of production. Deadlines 
were harder to guarantee, whilst the embezzlement and theft of 
materials and finished items was common. Workers signed false 
names, or absconded wi th goods which they had taken out; managers 
even at the lagest firms, falsified work, pay and order books. 128 
More ser iously, on the few occasions (which were mainly at the 
beginning of this period) when trade was so good and mechanized 
means of production still so underdeveloped, that there W:8.9 an 
inadequate number of workers to meet the demand, outworkers were 
capable of dictating their own terms. Firms were forced to scrabble 
for outworkers, whose wages rose well above the rates paid to 
inworkers, and who would refuse to work on poorer paid common work. 
Th · ff t d th t . d h 129. 1 6 ' lS a ec e even e mos organlze ouses: In 8 6, 'Even 
goods made to the order of one merchant were likely to be sold to 
another, if his merchant reached the cutler's shop ear lier·· on a 
Friday evening and offered higher prices ... Buyers took to entering 
workshops and bidding indiscriminately for all the work In sight".130 
However, such occasions became very rare, as trade never again 
reached the boom levels of the 1870s, whilst mechanization and the 
increasing use of young and female workers created a larger pool of 
labour. 
Overall, despite pleas to the contrary, most manufacturers 
appeared to benefit from the system as it operated in these trades. 
Apart from all the demand-orientated incenti ves available from the 
use of outworkers, manufacturers frequently played the same game as 
the factors they condemned, using the work of small masters and 
teams to cheapen their own prices, or to blackmail their own men 
into accepting wage reductions when trade was bad. 131 Prices were 
further reduced by the implementation of increased deductions and 
excess counts when the men were too weak to resist, and by 
the general lessening of trade union power which was the result of a 
dispersed, divided workforce. 132 More generally, the reliance on 
subcontractors, ridded manufacturers of many of the problems of 
direct management and administration of labour, leav ing most of 
these tasks to the team leader or subcontractor. This pol icy was 
particularly tempting In these trades, where the workers were 
133 
notoriously independent and hard to discipline. 
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For the men however, the advantages of the system were fewer, 
and diminished further as the period progressed. Their attitude was 
marked by a slow realization that the industrial structure which 
they had once willingly endorsed, no longer brought the benefits and 
advantages with which it had once been associated. They bore all 
the burdens of the flexibility which the system offered, but no 
longer gained orrmensurate advantages: their 'independence' was 
illusory I their status and pay ever declining. The industr ial 
relations of the period, reflected this steady movement towards the 
realization and acceptance that a factory-based system of production 
would offer greater rewards to the majority of workers. 
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TRADE SOCIETIES: ORGANIZATION, MEMBERSHIP 
AND STABILITY 
Although the small- scale and endemic sectionalism of the 
cutlery unions came to be recognised as a major handicap to their 
bargaining power, and at tempts were made to recti fy this, the 
unions continued to be weak and unstable. Not only were there 
separate unions for men working on di fferent products, and the 
different processes involved in their production, but further 
fragmentation related to the separate skill hierarchies of the 
various trades, and social status based on independent production 
and the small-scale employment of labour. Most trades were still 
pervaded by traditional values and understandings, rooted in past 
exper iences of skilled production and craft regulation; this was 
the mentality of the skilled craftsmen who still dominated their 
organization. Customary organizational techniques, based on a 
closeknit community of artisans remained reasonably viable and 
successful before 1890. After that date however, with the growing 
use of machinery and cost cutting techniques, based on the 
subdi vision of labour, such tradi tional methods of organization 
became increasingly out of touch with the declining status, wages 
and power of even the most skilled workers. Whilst the societies 
did at tempt to al ter their organization to cope wi th the ne\'J 
conditions, the abandonment of old beliefs and craft jealousies 
proved to be both a difficult and slow process. 
As in the period before 1870, there continued to be more than 
fourteen cutlery societies, each serving a particular craft or 
occupational group. The forgers and grinders, less affected by 
the competition of mechanized techniques and unskilled labour, 
remained the strongest. 1 However, all societies had only a small 
potential membership, and were dependent on good trade for the 
recruitment of a large percentage of this number. Most societies 
reemerged in the good trade of 1870-2, generally collapsing again 
before the late 1870s, with the exception of those that served the 
most skilled workers. 2 Low wages and frequent underemployment 
were a major handicap to recrui tment: in 1885 the Master Cutler 
commented that "the trade unions are not at all in a flour ishing 
condition in Sheffield, at the present time •.. many of them have 
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simply died of inanition owing to the inability of the workmen to pay 
the requisite subscriptions". 3 Even at the height of a trade boom, 
when some societies could count on the membership of virtually all 
workers in the trade, the unions were small: the spring knife cutlers, 
one of the largest branches, had 900 members in 1872~ whilst the table 
blade grinders' society contained 675 out of a possible 700 grinders 
in 1881.
5 
However, on the return to less prosperous trade, collapse 
was equally rapid: the SCIssor grinders' society had only 240 members 
In the early 1870s and only 20 by 1877. 6 
Organization, when it attempted to be 'modern' and efficient, was 
generally over-ambitious and idealistic about possible benefits and 
contr ibutions, failing to plan ahead to per iods of poorer trade. 
Typically, societies would raIse considerable sums of money In 
prosperous per iods, but would lose everything on the return to poor 
7 trade. The sprIng knife cutlers' society was typical of this 
ambition which could not be maintained in practice. In the euphor ia 
of 1872, balance sheets were issued to members, indicating the unions 
financial posi tion, 8 and new rules were drawn up. I t was stipulated 
that a committee of sixteen, plus a president, vice-president, 
secretary and treasurer should meet weekly, whilst general meetings 
9 
were to be held quarterly. Contributions were set at 3d. per week for 
men, 1 !d. for boys, plus a 2d. membership fee. Benefits for disputes, 
although payable only when the society had over £1,000 of funds, were 
10 high: 10d for a man, 3d. for his wi fe and 1 d. for each child, per week. 
An optional funeral society was also established, and the unIon 
1 1 
registered under the 1871 Trade Union Act. Nevertheless, just five 
years later, it was In collapse. 12 
In the earlier part of this period however, most societies clung 
to far more traditional methods of organization, particular 1 y if, 
unlike the spring knife cutlers, they were still quite skilled and 
commensurately powerful. Their policies and ideals were well-
illustrated in the evidence given before the Royal Commission of 1867
13 
which investigated instances of violence used by the Sheffield trade 
societies to enforce their regulations on recalcitrant members. These 
methods of enforcement, known as 'ratting' frequently involved non-
violent intimidation, such as the removal of, or minor damage to the 
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equipment of a man who had transgressed union rules. Failures to heed 
such persuasion, and anonymous letters of warning signed 'Mary Ann', 
led to more violent action: a Royal Commission was called when loss of 
life resulted. However, this period was regarded by the trade 
societies as halcyon days, the policies and methods of which would be 
abandoned only slowly and reluctantly, despite their increasing 
outmodedness. 
The Royal Commission revealed the extremely close relationship 
between work and home life: "the overlap between workplace and 
household was exceptionally great, producing exceptionally strong 
control by local communi ty over its members. Norms of masculini ty 
wi thin and outside the household must have been strengthened by the 
dominant posi tion in the local industry of the artisan, controlling 
his labour and skills, in conjunction with his fellows".14 The 
strength of the craft unions lay partly in their ability to express 
these neighbourhood solidar i ties. Members· would know the names and 
situations of all the other members of their trade,15 whilst the force 
of group psychology played an important role,' The trade' completelY 
dominated artisans' Ii ves: "they had a very clear consciousness of 
16 
'the trade' as almost a physical entity within which they worked", 
and it could not be escaped by simply leaving the union. In the 1860s 
the cutlery trades were socially homogenffUs containing mainly skilled 
workers, who wholeheartedly supported the union leadership, and who 
were, as yet, exper iencing very Ii t tIe foreign competition. The 
artisan still had a fairly complete monopoly of skills on which his 
tradi tional modes of de fending his trade were dependent: technical 
progress, once it made major inroads, would make such policies 
17 hopeless. 
All sober, skilled men were members, and the commissioners 
appeared to agree with the union leaders that non-unionists were often 
drunken, irresponsible workmen who could not afford union subscript-
ions because of their unsteady habits. 18 The payment of contributions, 
restriction of hours and numbers of apprentices, the maintainance 'on 
the box' of the unemployed to stop them accepting lower wages and thus 
19 Jringing down the general wage rates, were all reliant not only upon 
the non-use of machinery and a numercially stable workforce, but a 
total moral commitment of all workers to the ideals and policies of 
h . 20 : e unIon. 
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Those who unbalanced the system injured the whole of the trade and 
were both selfish and immoral. Thus ratting was acceptable because, 
hay ing disregarded the moral pressure and arguments given by union 
f · . 1 21 d t· d' th of ICla s, an con lnue In eir offences, culprits were unbalanc-
ing a system which entailed negative moral, social and financial 
consequences for the majority. 
The unions remained attached to the guild-like philosophy which 
made them aware of, and feel some corporate responsibility for the 
progress and content of the trade as a whole and in a wider sense" 
They were grieved that the Cutlers' Company no longer fulfilled this 
function (of restricting numbers, checking quality and generally 
regulating the trades) particularly after the repeal of the Combination 
Acts in 1814, after which anyone was allowed to enter the Hallamshire 
trades. "The unions never accepted this decision. Again and again they 
tr ied to recombine wi th their masters in a guild-like oganization. 
Again and again they declared themselves to be the rightful heirs to 
the guilds' power".22 Conciliation and co-operation with employers was 
always preferred to offensive action. 23 
However, the unions, and their officials In particular, In 
'rattening' wrong doers, and then denying it, demonstrated their 
distance from accepted middle-class values, and the psychological gap 
that separated them from the commissioners, and even organized labour 
in many other parts of the country. Whilst nationally, trade unions 
were fighting for their right to continued existence in 1867, the 
Sheffield cutlery trades, illustrating their mental isolation, were 
demanding the 
t . 24 prac Ices. 
right to the legal enforcement of their restrictive 
This would dispense wi th the need for rattening, but 
also circumvent the growing organizational problems caused by the 
increase in the use of a number of unskilled workers who expanded the 
labour force and brought down the level of wages and skill. 
Although the use of machinery was increasing in the early part of 
this period, along with deskilling and team work, in many of the 
25 
cutlery trades, these forces were not yet sufficiently strong to 
force any major revision of traditional goals and policies. Most 
importantly, the trades were still dominated by a body of genuinely 
skilled men, who earned higher wages, possessed greater independence 
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and discretion over their work habi ts, d ~ k 'I ~ an W,10se s 1 1 was necessary 
to produce the highest quality goods. 26 These skills had been learnt 
through long apprenticeship, and would, it was hoped, open up the door 
to employer, or at least independent status. 27 They believed that 
their skills conferred on them the right to set their own pace of work 
and to shape the character of their labour at the point of production~8 
Whilst fluctuating trade and mechanization had a tendancy to decrease 
the line of demarcation between skilled and less skilled, and no 
'gulf' separated the two, the skilled still tended to view their less 
skilled workmates as "degraded serfs",29 with no understanding of, or 
share in the her i tage, ideals and exper iences which coloured their 
understanding of the trade. Their policies and at ti tudes were a 
30 direct product of their past. Their attitudes were exclusive and 
assumed that they had skills and values to defend against outsiders. 
Sectional craft interests still dominated. One branch of a trade 
would very rarely help another branch of the same trade in a dispute: 
31 Forgers and grinders usually felt cutlers to be beneath them. Indeed, 
the policy of one branch could cause direct problems for another: when 
the forgers struck, the grinders and hafters soon became very short of 
32 
work. Co-operation rarely went beyond mutual expressions of support 
on safe and traditional issues. 33 
The abandonment of sectionalism resulting from the fairly rigid 
skill hierarchies within each trade was equally slow to die before 1890. 
Solidarity was possible between forgers and their strikers, but 
largely because both were skilled, apprenticed occupations. 34 Unity 
was sometimes possible in an attempt to combat chronic general 
weaknesses - as for example when the steel fork makers and gr inders 
society (which included gr inders, forgers and small masters and was 
the only composite labour organization in the trades) was set up in an 
attempt to improve the dreadful conditions in the trade and fight 
against the common enemy - the table kni Fe manufacturers who bought 
the forks. 35 
More often however, elitism was still the order of the day. 
Exclusive policies were operated by societies which were still quite 
secure in their skilled status: the pen and pocket blade forgers after 
attempts to incorporate the machine-operating fly blade smithers in 
the good trade of 1872, excluded them once more on the return to 
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poorer trade, to the annoyance of some society members. 36 Th.e presi-
dent however, believed that the union "had become a failure because it 
included a class of persons who had never been considered in the trade 
as pocket blade forgers. There was a species of work known as fly 
blade smithing, but it had never been considered as part of the work 
done by the pen and pocket knife 37 forgers". The razor grinders, 
another strong and secure union, as yet little affected by mechan-
ization was similarly disparaging about its less skilled workers. Its 
president felt that there were three types of work and men: the best, 
which "requires great skill and patience, and only steady industrious 
men"; the middle class, whose practi tioners were generally "indust-
rious and frugal, and "the common trash", worked upon by men who 
"seem really a distinct body, and could not ... do better work if they 
tried ... they are poorly paid, live in wretched houses, are improvident, 
and are barely recognised as belonging to the trade,,38 
The weaker cutlers' unions also attempted to implement exclusive 
poicies against their less skilled members, in an attempt to strength-
en their relative posi tion. The spr ing kni fe cutlers excluded all 
hired men from their society because, being bound by a legal contract 
to the same wage rate for a set period, they could not seek advances. 
A hired man was "a mere machine, having no control over any action 
beyond the terms of his agreement, having a body which is virtually 
39 
anothers". Moreover, such men brought down general wage rates and 
gave their emloyer an advantage over those who paid more. Thus many 
believed that the trade should be separated into two distinct groups 
with distinct societies: those that worked on high quality goods, and 
those who worked on infer ior goods. 40 Throughout, the tone of the 
debate was deeply moral: hired men lost their sel f -respect as the 
system pauperized and degraded them. 41 Similarly, the weak table and 
butchers'knife hafters excluded from their society those who worked on 
common 'shell bolster hafting' because the work was poor ly paid, 
limited normally to deskilled teams, and involved a substance which 
caused diseases in the hands, thus making its workers more likely to 
claim sick benefits. 42 
Traditional exclusive policies and restrictive practices were 
also still evident in the unions' attempts to restrict supplies of 
labour. Before 1890, the absence of any major technical developments 
meant that there were few jobs which were judged to be sufficiently 
43 Their light and simple to be given to female workers. employment, 
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largely through trade union pressure, was limi ted to a few speci f ic 
jobs: mainly warehouse work and packaging which was non-competi ti ve 
wi th men's work, as was the 'common filing of SClssors, the ir 
" db" h" 44 B dresslng an urnlS lng. ut even amongst the women there was a 
certain snobbish eli tism: warehouse girls fel t themselves to be far 
super lor to buffer gir Is whose trade was said to be 'low class' and 
'dirty' . Thus "This element of caste enters largely into the life of 
the factory worker, much more so indeed amongst the females than 
amongst the men .•. A warehouse girl would on no account associate with 
a buffer, and on the other hand, a buffer would not expect to acclaim 
45 the acquaintance of a warehouse worker". 
A further facet of these methods of restricting the supply of 
labour, were the attempts made to assist workers who wanted to 
emigrate. In the depression of1879, a society was estabished for this 
46 purpose, whilst several men were given financial assistance by their 
individual trade societies, to help them to emigrate to America. 47 
However, the main thrust of these efforts focused on the enforc-
ment of traditional apprenticeship regulations. In 1890 almost every 
trade society still technically insisted upon the observance of 
apprenticeship rules. The normal format of these regulations stipu-
lated that apprentices could only be taken on by workmen over 28 years 
of age, that only one ~entice was to be taken at a time, and that he 
48 
should be the son of a society member. Under formal, bound 
apprenticeship indentures, boys were bound for seven years, until they 
were 21 years old, but many began their apprenticeship as ear ly as 
nlne years of age. 49 Whilst many unions were incapable of enforcing 
these regulations, some of the stronger ones were still ready and able 
to insist on their observance. 50 In the 1880s, the scissor grinders' 
union forced between 70 and 80 boys to leave the trade, refusing to 
51 
allow their return, even once trade had improved. By 1871 it was 
reported that "the number of men is now so limited that their serVIces 
are too much in request for their demands to be long or generally 
resisted".52 
The unions, however, insisted that any decline in numbers was the 
result not of their policies, but the general erosion of the status, 
I "" and prospects of the workers in these trades, standards of lVlng 
"t 53 
which made them an unattractive proposition to potential recrUI s. 
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Moreover, the tendency was already growing for team leaders to employ 
a number of apprentices on speci fic, highly subdivided tasks, using 
them as cheap labour, rather than attempting to give the all-round 
training which would create a craftsman. 54 Thus the quality of 
production would eventually decline, due to the dearth of sui tably 
l 'f' d t' 55 M qua 1 Ie ar Isans. oreover, the release onto the labour market of 
these semi~killed youths, increased competition for work, brought down 
wages, and forced such poor ly trained men to work permanently In 
teams. Amongst trade unionists, the link between the problems of 
declining apprenticeship, subcontracting and deskilling, was clear ly 
56 drawn. 
The increasing inability of unions to enforce meaningful apprent-
iceship is also ev idenced by their plans to restore the prestige of 
formal apprenticeship, through recourse to examinations to check an 
apprentice's progress, and court action against masters who failed to 
provide adequate tuition. 57 Recognising that they no longer possessed 
sufficient powers of enforcement, unIons even demanded government 
intervention, in the form of legislation to further reduce the 
employment of children, by raising the minimum age of workers In 
58 grinding wheels from thirteen to fourteen years. 
Success in enforcing such limitations was, to a considerable 
extent, dependent upon societies' retention of close-kni t relations 
and their abili ty to enforce other powers of censure, particular ly 
rattening. The deep-rooted nature of these practices and their 
continued viability in the early part of this period, is illustrated 
by their frequent occurrence, 
th ' t' 59 M elr preven Ion. en were 
despi te the Royal Commission aimed at 
rattened for a variety of offences: 
because they accepted work at wages which fell below the standard 
60 61, 62 f d t ' 
rate, or employed too many boys, left the unIon, re use 0 gIve 
wage increases,63 or even for lending their tools to blacklegs.
64 
Such 
action was possible in small, close communi ties, where respect for 
artisanal values remained the norm, and in which workmen knew every-
thing about their fellows. 65 
That signi ficant changes In attitudes towards organization did 
occur at the end of this period, was largely the result of the general 
decline in wages and status of all workers, as the trades became 
increasingly subdivided and deskilled. In such an enviroment, the old 
style elitism and pride of the skilled craftsman and the resultant 
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organizational policy were both misplaced and ineffective. Although 
union leaders constantly reiterated that their trades required 
enormous skill, they also began to understand and recognise publicly. 
that their wages and status were closer to those of unskilled, casual 
labourers. 66 As in the national labour movement, the cutlery unions 
came to realize that they could not simply 19nore the sweated, 
deskilled sectors of their work forces , once the presence of these 
67 
workers began to pull down everyone's wage rates. Thus inclusion 
rather than exclusion of less skilled workers came to be the dominant 
organizational issue. 
Nevertheless, little practical was attempted until 1909, when 
stimulus was given by the good trade which acco~nied the period before 
the fIrst \fOr Id War, and pressure from Char les Hobson of the Britannia 
Metalsmiths and Federated Metal Trades Association. He pointed out 
the stupidity and wastefulness of the separation of skilled and less 
skilled workers, "Although they produce precisely the same article by 
another process, and for that reason only, there is the greatest 
antipathy between the two sections of the workmen, although they might 
work for the same firm". 68 They would be better advised to "get the 
displaced handworker employed on the machines, this being done, you 
lessen the number of unemployed, and prevent a large influx into the 
69 trade". 
As with general organizatioal advances, inclusive policies could 
only be successfully pursued when good trade allowed sUbscriptions to 
be afforded and demands for wage advances to be readily met. Thus the 
table and butchers' knife grinders incorporated the datal workers in 
70 their trade in 1911, and gave the goff blade grinders considerable 
" I" t 71 S" "I 1 help in forming a union and enforcing a new prlce lS. lml ar y, 
the pen and pocket knife forgers helped the smithers to form a union 
which, once well organized, they incorporated into their own society, 
along with hardeners and makers, although these men were not allowed 
out of work benefits. 72 The table blade forgers gave goff blade 
forgers similar assistance. 73 Whenever trade improved, all societies 
made concerted efforts at outreach and propaganda campaigns which 
would encourage new members to JOln. However, such action was 
74 
recognized to be useless when trade was poor. Membership figures 
revived enormously with the prosperity of the early 1890s, fell back 
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In 1893-5, to peak agaIn in 1896-1900, and 1910_13. 75 Membership ~Ias 
lower in 1910 than in 1891, but it had advanced enormously by 1913. 76 
The table kni fe ha fters society for example, compr ised 7m~ of all 
hafters in 1913, and was pressing for all to join. 77 
Throughout this later period, societies had a far more stable 
existence than previously: only two did not have a continuous exist-
ence between 1890 and 1914. 78 Organization however, changed markedly, 
as the close-kni t, fraternal relations where replaced by those of a 
str ictly practical, procedural nature. Whilst at tempts were made to 
restore such communal values by the arrangement of var ious social 
gatherings and whist drives,79 rank and file participation in union 
acti v i ties waned. A large turnout at meetings could be assured only 
at the peak of a period of industrial militancy.80 Consequently, 
rattening was said to have dipd out by 1889,81 and other traditional 
modes of organization and rules of enforcement became impractical as 
the tight-knit fabric of, and skill levels within the old societies 
declined. 
Apprenticeship was broadly recognised to be a thing of the past. 
Its decline accompanied the increasing acknowledgement that the trades 
were becoming low status, low paid, unhealthy occupations which so few 
apprentices were will ing to enter, that regulation became unnecessar~: 
By 1913 it was reported that " no man outside a lunatic asy lum would 
think of putting his lad into a trade In which after several years 
training he can only make 26 or 27s. a week; it is moreover, a 
83 
notoriously unhealthy trade". 
Even manufacturers acknowledged that proper apprenticeship was 
all but dead. "The training of boys or young men who are put to a 
skilled trade is of a very imperfect nature, with the result that when 
they cease to be profitable at boys' wages, in doing some small 
repeti tious operation, because they have grown up to desire a mans' 
wage, they are very often ill-trained, or only partially trained to 
act as independent workmen ... these badly trained men swell the number 
best".84 Team of unemployed, whenever trade is not at its very 
masters deliberately avoided teaching their lads all-round skills, as 
this would merely slow down production and defeat the object of the 
team system. 85 Teams were therefore found In the branches of the 
industry in which mechanization and deskilling had already progressed 
86 
the furthest - particularly amongst cutlers and hafters. However. 
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observers were ready to apportion some of the responsibility for these 
problems with the boys themselves: many left their apprenticeship as 
soon as they were partially trained, in order to earn slightly better 
wages in a team; others were forced into such action by the needs of 
87 
their 'improvident' parents. The increasing reliance of the unions 
on government assisted technical education as a means of training 
boys, has been interpreted as further evidence of their inability to 
enforce their traditional restrictive practices. 88 
Whilst a decline in the abili ty to effectively enforce apprent-
iceship regulations is indisputable, the continuing power and ambitions 
of the stronger unions should not be understated. It 1S now recog-
nised that contemporary commentators tended to exaggerate the decline 
of apprenticeship 1n Br i tish industry generally. The decline in 
formal indentured apprenticeship or learnership was acknowledged, but 
inadequate attention was given to the skills which could be acquired 
through less formal training over a long per iod, through migration, 
89 following up, and picking up a trade. Whilst the acquisition of 
skills in the cutlery trade became less closed, and the abili ties 
invol ved became narrower, considerable exper 1ence and abil i t Y were 
still necessary in this industry which continued to rely upon its 
reputation for the finest quality wares. 
Moreover, apprenticeship regulations were still nominally 
reiterated and enforced by most societies until 1914,90 and although 
ignored by most, some unions continued to sucessfully enforce them, 
when good trade permi t ted. 91 Thus, even if the power of enforcement 
became less reliable, the desire to restrict the suppy of labour to 
the trades by apprenticeship, was still strong in 1914. 
In their attempts to limit the domain of the growing number of 
female cutlery workers, the unions' success was similarly limi ted. 
There was little objection to the employment of women in warehouse and 
92 
packing work, or 1n the scissor trades. In such branches, a 
manufacturer stated that "the employment of women goes back as far as 
my memory goes back; and I should very much doubt whether the workmen 
1n the district wish in any way to interfere with the employment of 
women, or to restrict it".93 However, the number of poorly paid femal~4 
workers, particularly young, unmarried women, was increasing rapidly, 
as work was subdivided, and the lightest tasks given to women. 
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The cutlery unions were unwilling to organize the women, or admit 
them into their societies. 95 Objections to the employment of women 
were based not only on the fact that their competi tion reduced wage 
rates, but on 'moral' grounds too: the work was unsuitable because it 
was "dirty" and "not at all healthy", and it was "not at all suitable 
96 for women to be kept at work in a shop". The Women's Trade Union 
League did however campaign in Sheffield in 1910, and in 1912, the 
I.L.P. assisted in the formation of the Sheffield Women Workers' 
Organization Committee. 97 The S.F.T.C. also attempted to assist in 
the creation of women's trade unions, 98 Charles Hobson once more 
leading the cammpaign to highlight the plight of female cutlery 
99 
workers. Al though nothing was achieved which assisted the organ-
ization of women in any tangible way, employers continued to insist 
that it was trade union hostili ty which prevented the employment of 
women in many branches of work in which their labour could be, and was 
100 In Germany, used. 
Thus, if traditional artisanal ties and skills could no longer be 
relied upon to bind the men together and improve their bargaining 
position, these unions were forced to, and t8 some extent successful 
in their shi ft to more modern, technical and methodical forms of 
organization. Although the continued separate existence of small soc-
ieties caused wastage of resources and efficiency, their committees 
did become more represent ati ve and their officials more exper ienced. 
Signi ficant efforts were made to ensure that commi t tees represented 
all the men in a trade,101 and committee members were paid small sums 
t 1 b . t· 102 M t· 11 o collect the men's week y su scrIp Ions. ee lngs were genera y 
held weekly (although sometimes fortnightly or monthly) at pubs in the 
centre of Sheffield. 103 Most societies had a president and a secretary 
. . d) 104 (who often became permanent, salaried officials over thIS perlo 
as well as a vice-president and treasurer. The exceptionally long 
service and constancy of these officials helped the overall stability 
of the unions, whilst their prestige was augmented by the respect-
d h · 105 ability and civic standing of their lea ers lp. 
Printed rules were revised and updated in periods of good trade 
when the unions became more active,106 and funds became more realist-
ically and carefully managed. Contributions remained at around 1s. 
per week for a man and 6d. for a boy, and benefi ts could be claimed 
. t 107 H from between 26 and 52 weeks after joining the SOCle y. owever, 
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contr ibutions and benefi ts were often suspended when trade was poor, 
d . h d b d debts,108 h an compromIses reac e over a w ilst funds were sometimes 
further protected by the awarding of lesser benefits to less skilled 
109 
members. Unemployment benefit was generally 8 to 10s. per week for 
a man, 2 - 5 s . for his wi fe, and 1 -1 ! s. for e a c h 0 f his chi 1 d r en, for 
between eight and thirteen weeks. 110 Total unemployment was however, 
very rare and consequently unemployment benefit was seldom awarded: of 
the 2233 members of cutlery and file making societies who returned· 
questionaires to the S.r.T.C. In 1908, only two men were paid unemploy-
ment benefit, whilst 491 were on short time. 111 Several societies 
paid no unemployment benefi t at all, 112 whilst others would only pay 
h th · f d ddt· 1 11 3 S . t· b w en elr un s excee e a cer aln va ue. OCle les ecame equally 
careful in their payment of sickness and funeral benefi ts, realizing 
that their small, poor membership could not furnish extravagent 
benefi ts. In 1891 few societies gave sickness or funeral benefi ts, 
d th th t d · d . d tIll f th· d . f d 114 an ose a I pal ou on y sma sums rom elr or lnary un s. 
By 1911, most societies were still providing sickness and funeral 
benifits out of ordinary contributions,115 but additional restrictions 
were steadily placed upon claims, until only tiny sums were paid out~16 
Not surprisingly, In vIew of their own inadequacies, the cutlery 
societies and the S.F.T.C. of which they were members, were strongly 
117 in favour of government sponsored sickness and insurance schemes. 
The significant sums which were expended as strike pay, during the few 
major, large-scale disputes of this period, were generally covered by 
special levies. 118 Improved financial management was also evidenced by 
. 119 
the investment of funds in interest accruIng concerns and In co-
operative societies, although the latter was largely a hangover from 
older, more traditional modes of improving the bargaining position of 
their workers. A Cutlery Co-operative Production Society was farmed 
by spring knife workers in 1866, and in 1873 a scissor trade producers 
co-operative was established, which by 1891 had sales of over £2,000 
. t· 120 A f per year, chiefly to other co-operative SOCle les. s a source 0 
sound investment, the value of such co-operatives was more dubious: by 
1908 one was in financial difficulties and the table grinders union 
was forced to take legal action to recover the interest on its loan to 
th . 121 e co-op erati ve 
However, by far the most signi ficant of the available projects 
aimed at the creation of more powerful trade unions. was the amalgam-
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ation of the varlOUS small societies, into one large organization, 
which could function as a more general union, no longer reliant on the 
declining cra ft based skills of these trades. This goal, whilst it 
would have provided the various trades with the surest means of 
increasing their bargaining power, proved to be insurmountably 
difficult for these individualistic, craft jealous trades. Although 
delegates could sit together in the S.F.T.C.,122 any move towards even 
loose federation met with a host of objections and obstructions. The 
success of general unions nationally, combined with the ever decreas-
ing real wages and status of cutlery workers, made amalgamation 
imperative by 1914, but the abandonment of long established, ingrained 
craft sectionalism was never an easy or happy decision. 
Wi th the optimism 0 f the success ful str ikes 0 f 1890-91, loose 
federations were formed which vertically linked the forgers, grinders 
and hafters into associations of table knife, spring knife and razor 
d All 11 d · th t .. f' t h' t 123 Th pro ucers. co apse Wl ou any slgnl lcan ac levemen . e 
issue was accorded little further attention until the campaign of 
Char les Hobson brought amamlgamation into the limelight once more. 
Hobson, president of the S. F . T . C. and the Br i tannia Metalsmi ths was 
also president of the International Metalworkers Congress in 1896, and 
a prime mover behind the foundation of the Metalworkers Federation in 
1904. 124 He had campaigned for amalgamation through the pages of the 
125 Hammer in 1894, and later through the Metal Worker, (the paper of 
the Metal Trades Federation of Great Britain) and as 'Democrat' in the 
126 Sheffield Independent. As a spur to the cause of uni ted action, 
the cutlery trades were combined, with a secretary and president, to 
F d t · 127 form one of the six groups of trades that comprised the e era lon. 
Responses were cautious and reluctant. The pen and pocket blade 
forgers initiated moves towards an alliance of the societies for 
defensi ve purposes in 1906, but supported by only six of the twel ve 
t · 128 L . k . cutlery societies, they could take no further ac lon. 1 eWlse, 
the formation of the Cutlery Federation in 1907, which comprised 
129 f fi fteen societies and 2,500 members, marked no real departure rom 
traditional 
mediation 
individualism. Its 
which would prevent 
main concerns were negotiation and 
industrial disputes, joining with 
employers' organizations to discuss such common ground as the prevent-
ion of fraudulent marking and regulations concerning the grinding of 
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130 
metals. V{nilst it prov ided moral, and a Ii t tIe financial 
support in disputes, it lS more accurately seen as an expression of 
the continued commitment of the unions' leadership to conciliation and 
guild practices, than any forward-looking espousal of the principle of 
federation. It was scorned by the I.L.P. for its conciliatory 
approach, designed to blur any antagonism between labour and capital~31 
Similarly, the negotiations inaugurated in 1910 by the table and 
butchers kni fe hafters' society, came to nothing. Of the sixteen 
cutlery societies, only one favoured amalgamation into one large 
't th " t f' 1" t d t' 132 SOCle y, e maJorl y pre errlng lml e , sec lonal amalgamation. 
Furthermore, the committee established to draw up schemes for section-
al amalgamation, reached few conclusions and was criticised for its 
133 half-heartedness, whilst individual societies bogged themselves 
down in protocol. In the spr ing kni fe trade, for example, every 
proposed rule was put before each individual society to be voted upon, 
and even then, the final format, which needed a 5/6 majori ty of all 
spring knife delegates,134 was defeated by 59 votes to 130 against the 
amalgamation.13~ The practical submersion of individual loyalties was 
similar ly distant amongst the various branches of the table kni fe 
trades. 136 Thus federation and mutual support remained ad hoc and of 
an essentially moral nature, in such traditional areas of grievance as 
the defini tion of what consti tuted a 'hand forged' piece of cutlery 
and its correct marking as such.137 
Perhaps because of the slowness, difficulties and craft jealous-
ies encountered in at tempts at sectional combination, the form of 
wider union finally opted for by most cutlery societies, was membership 
of the National Amalgamated Union of Labour. (N. A. U. L . ) This course 
of action was further advanced by the national successes of such 
general unlons, and also by the abili ty and char isma of its local 
organizer, A.J.Bailey. The N.A.U.L. had organized men in steel and 
engineer ing works, ln municipal employment and coal mining, into a 
strong force in the 1890s and 1900s, and its membership was open to 
all. 138 
First to join were the table knife grinders, ln September 1913. 
They recognised the benefits of membership which, whilst leaving the 
name and identi ty of the unlon intact, and wi th certain leeway to 
manage their own affairs, also prov ided it wi th N. A. U. L . funeral, 
accident and victimisation funds, and free legal advice, all for a 
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contribution of 6d. per week, 3!d. of which went to the N.A.U.L. 139 
With the help of Bailey and the N.A.U.L., and of course, the good 
trade of 1913, the grinders gained rapid successes. Wheel rents were 
reduced from 1/3 to 1/4 of wages, and a new price list enforced, which 
represented a 5% Increase in wages. Strikes, which were necessary at 
only three firms, (which were outside the manufacturers' association) 
were speedily won, and membership increased from 250 to 850. 140 
Bailey was similar ly success ful in persuading the spr Ing kni fe 
cutlers that "the day of individual bargaining from the men's stand-
point and the day of little unions was at an end. They were now 
dealing wi th big numbers and big capi tal. I f the cutlers and gr inders 
wanted to improve their status and renumeration ... they could only do 
so wi th a national backing". 141 These two trades first uni ted In the 
Amalgamated Cutlery Union at the end of 1913, and then joined the 
142 N.A.U.L. in January 1914. Membership increased from 400 to 1100 in 
one year, whilst extra counts of fourteen to a dozen were abolished, 
d . 1· t· d b t 50 01 t th t· d f· 143 an prIce IS s Increase y up 0 ~ a e wors pal Irms. 
By 1914, then, the cutlery unions were "waking up" to the "spirit 
of the times". 144 The remaInIng craft societies complained that 
145 general unions were canvassing cutlery workers outside factory gates, 
and by 1916, the scissor forgers, and workboard hand, and the pen 
146 knife cutlers had also joined the N.A.U.L. However, whilst it was 
an acknowledgement that they were no longer an elite band of high 
status craftsmen, membership of the N.A.U.L. did not mark a complete 
break with the past. The unions maintained considerable independence 
of identity and action, freedom which they valued dearly, and further 
-more A.J.Bailey was a steadfast exponent of mediation and concili-
ation. He always stressed that "they were not out for a strike or a 
policy of down tools", 147 but peaceful, negotiated settlements which 
Id b 1 I t · 148 wou e ong as Ing. 
Thus, by the end of this per iod, the var ious cutlery societies 
had travelled some way towards recognising their declining status and 
bargaining power, and the consequent need for changes in organization-
al policy. Membership was increased by the adoption of more inclusive 
policies and some measure of federation. However, although marginal-
ized and diluted by mechanized and subdivided production techniques. 
the craft elitism149 and proud heritage of the skilled artisan 
166 
continued to colour at ti tudes towards membership and tactics. Such 
prejudices and preferences were superseded only slowly. The opening 
up of the society to less skilled workers, and federation with other 
crafts were changes which were arrived at only hesitantly, belatedly 
and reluctantly. 
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CHAPTER 6 INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 
The notable feature of industrial relations in the cutlery trades, 
IS their reliance on, and preference for conciliation and peaceful 
agreement, rather than conflict and strikes. Disputes were largely 
limi ted to the per iods of good trade which witnessed general and 
national industr ial organization and militancy: 1871-3, 1889-91, and 
1911-13. Negotiated settlements were favoured because of the general 
tendency of high-class producers, both masters and men, to see eye to 
eye on many issues, accustomed to the long-standing use of co-operat-
ive, guild-like regulation and conciliation procedures. However, 
peaceful settlements were also preferred, because both employers and 
workers were deeply divided amongst themselves. Workers were divided 
according to skill and production process but, more importantly, by 
the exclusive elitism of the skilled craftsmen, and the aloof attitude 
of the hated subcontractors. Employer unity was inhibited by rampant 
competition and jealous individualism, as well as the equivocal, 
shi fting policies of the main firms. Their own disunity, combined 
with their continued reliance on the skills of the workers, meant that 
employers were never in a position to undertake a consistent and 
substantial policy of deskilling. 
At the root of this system of industrial relations, with all its 
idiosyncrasies, was the equally anomalous structure of the cutlery 
trades, dominated by a reliance on traditional forms of production, 
traditional values and experiences. The industrial relations of this 
period were a product of the continued use of, and need for skilled 
men, varied high quality products, continued independent production, 
the respect of trading reputations, and the absence of any major 
divide between masters and men. 
The workers came to realize that many of the problems under which 
they laboured, were a product of the peculiar structure of their 
trades. However, changing the system of industrial relations in such 
a way that would enable them to be in a position to attack the basic 
structure of the industry, proved to be extremely di fficult. The 
industry remained reliant on a huge range of often high quality 
products, which kept employment units small, employers divided and the 
respect for skill still relevant. Moreover, amongst the men, independ-
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ence, craft loyalties and the habits of individual bargaining were all 
extremely deep rooted, further hampering attempts to abandon the 
traditional themes and practices of industrial relations. 
The Nature and Conduct of Disputes 
The main features of disputes In these trades were their limit-
ation to the brief periods when trade was sufficiently buoyant for 
the men to feel able to demand improvements, and their small-scale, 
dispersed nature. Disputes generally centred upon the ever-declining 
real wages available in the trades, but at the root of both conduct 
and cause of disagreements, was the traditional handicraft structure 
of the trades. This structure was the principal reason for the 
competition and jealous individualism of both workers and employers, 
the lack of clear economic or class divide between employers and 
workers, the dispersion of the industry in which personal, one to one 
relations were never superseded by a class-conscious factory-based 
proletariat, and the antiquated, disparate piece price lists and other 
vague trade customs. Grievances could be phrased in the 'modern' 
terminology of a minimum wage, but verbalization apart, they were 
essentially the old, customary demands for conditions which would 
assure craft dignity and independence. 1 
However, changes were occurring, particularly In the renewed good 
trade and organizational activity of 1910-14, which were bringing the 
pat tern of industrial relations closer to that of other industr ies. 
The men slowly came to realize that the employers gained considerably 
more from the system than they did: their 'indepedence' and skilled 
status were increasingly illusory. Divisions in the workforce came to 
reflect the distinction between the subcontracting team master and the 
rest, rather than skilled versus unskilled men, as more employment 
became subdivided, deskilled and low paid. Thus, as the skill and 
status of the majority declined, so class based divisions became 
clearer and the distinction between unionist and non-unionist greater. 
Employers were generally antipathetic towards the various cutlery 
trade unions. Ini tally, the rattenings were cited as the reason why 
unions should be kept firmly in check. Criticising the 1871 Trade 
Union Bill the Chamber of Commerce protested that "with the remember-, 
ance of the evidence given before the examiners ... into the trade 
outrages in Sheffield fresh upon their minds, your petitioners cannot 
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but regard with the greatest possible disfavour, a bill proposing to 
repeal the only statutory enactment protecting employers and workmen 
against trade 'molestation and obstruction~.. Your petitioners 
venture to assert that the act is appreciated by the more intelligent 
part of the workmen as a protection agaist the violence, threats and 
molestation of some of their comrades, who, not content with placing 
all men upon an equal level, would carry out their objects with 
compulsion.,,2 
Large employers shunned relations with the unions, preferring to 
deal with only their own workmen. Although most employers had 
recognised the unions by 1892, and allowed their secretaries onto the 
premises in the event of a dispute, some were reluctant to treat with 
the unions, persuading their workers not to join, or even refusing to 
employ unionists. 3 Rodgers attempted to deal with all their strikers 
indi v idually in 1892, offer ing "a good position" to all those who 
would concede to their demands, causing the union to state that the 
firm were interfering with their workers' "rights of free combination~4 
Like many large firms, Rodgers were proud of their good relations with 
their men which, they believed, did not require the intervention of 
outsiders or a third party. 5 At Atkinson Bros.,. relations had always 
been "amicable and cordial .•. no strikes or serious disputes have 
occurred at the Milton Works, and every matter requiring discussion IS 
settled between masters and men directly without the intervention of 
6 
any third party whatsoever". 
Reluctance to deal with a union was sometimes argued in terms of 
the small number of workmen who were members, often a minority of the 
total workforce. 7 Various large and prestigious firms were openly 
hostile to the unions. 8 A trade union secretary who aproached Hunters 
concerning their refusal to pay statement prices for government work, 
recei ved the following reply from the managing director: "He was 
rather indignant at being approached on such a matter as he knew his 
business wi thout being interfered with and he would not allow us to 
inter fere wi th ei ther his business or his men. Said if we had not 
already written to the government, we could do so ... He said he would 
not allow us to interfere with his men, if we did, he would interfere 
with us. It was not a matter of £5 with him, he looked after his men, 
they worked together, and the 9 blades they were doing over a gross, 
9 
they were making a present of". 
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Throughout this period, disputes were always small-scale, 
involving very few men, often at individual firms and always In 
separate trades. The number of workers involved was often less than 
twenty, 10 whilst the largest str ikes would only amount to the wi th-
drawal of 2-300 men. 11 Strikes generally took place at a series of 
individual firms, normally one firm at a time. 12 
This dispersion was partly the result of the lack of any agree-
ment between manufacturers in an industry In which a huge diversity 
and variety of products was the rule, and were competition was 
ruthless. A manufacturer of high quality pen knives for the domestic 
market would have little in common with a manufacturer of cheap 
scissors for the colonies; a large and reputable house would have 
nothing but mistrust and distain for small masters. Thus, united 
action was virtually impossible, 13 and the few federations or 
manufacturers' associations which were formed were fragile and quick 
to collapse in disarray.14 Even in 1909 the Cutlery Manufacturers 
Association could only count on the support of 90% of the major firms 
(let alone the host of small producers), many being prevented from 
joining because of their "very independent nature".15 Thus, workers, 
unions and even the S.F.T.C. were forced to deal with individual 
firms, a state of affairs lamented by unIon delegates and some 
16 
manufacturers. 
However, it was not simply those firms who stood outside manu-
facturers associations who refused to conform to policy:17 houses of 
similar status, who produced similar goods, often found it hard to 
18 
agree. In fact, it was the policy of the largest and most reputable 
houses which was hardest to predict. They frequently stated their 
wholehearted support for union action which aimed at bringing the 
small masters, who undercut prices and wages and also profits, into 
line. I t was claimed by such firms that they could easily afford 
statement prices, and were often paying them already, and would thus 
welcome union efforts to equalize wage rates. Similar ly, they could 
1 · d 19 refuse to grant increases until general rates had been equa Ize . 
At other times however, whilst some large firms applauded unIon 
. 20 M 
action, others refused to grant the required Increases. oreover, 
it was common practice for a prestigious firm to spearhead attempts to 
enforce wage reductions, conducting a trend setting 'sample' dispute, 
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according to which the rest of the firms in the trade would regulate 
h · . d 1· 21 S h t d f· t elr prIces an po ICY. uc respec e lrms were often accused by 
the unions of being the lowest payers in the trade. 22 
These small-scale disputes were also the result of a similar lack 
of unity and of group identity amongst the men, divided according to 
23 trade, branch, process and quality of the product they made. Occas-
ionally, assistance was given by the S. F . T . C., which acted as an 
umbrella organization, but its role was usually one of guidance, 
mediation and moral support, rather than active intervention. 24 At 
the beginning of this period, the forgers' societies, little affected 
by mechanization, and occupying a strategic position in the production 
process, were still capable of holding small-scale general strikes. 25 
However, this luxury was soon lost, and all these small unions found 
themselves unable to afford the necessary finances required to conduct 
a general strike, especially as wheel or side rent had to be paid by 
many workers, for the duration of the dispute. 26 Thus, it was normal 
procedure to call a strike at a sample firm,27 or else to transfer men 
from those firms who refused to grant the requires increases, to those 
that would. 28 Lightening strikes were also impracticable, because of 
their contravention of the customary periods. of notice In these 
trades. Although contracts of serVIce were generally oral and vague, 
and consequently manipulated by employers when the trade was bad,29 
the customary period of notice was normally one month, but occaSIon-
ally one week,30 and such notice was always served. 
Furthermore, strikes could only be held when trade was suffici-
ently busy to enable workers to afford the expense of union membership 
and manufacturers the expense of wage increases. Demands for wage 
increases were frequent and successful 1871_2,31 but were lost again 
32 
soon after, to be followed by a further spate of disputes and 
35 1911-13, thus following the concessions 1889-92,33 1900_1 34 and 
. d 36 general pattern of British trade union activity over this perlo . 
Advances could be gained and then lost again in rapid succession, 
because of changing trade conditions. 37 The threat of German compet-
ition, or of increased mechanization to replace a troublesome work-
force,38 as well as the non-perishability of cutlery which allowed 
manufacturers to clear away large stocks during a dispute,39 were all 
factors which reduced the possibilites of conducting successful 
str ikes in anything but boom trade conditions. This, along wi th the 
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hesitancy of some unions, which had never won a strike,40 made 
trade societies more ready to accept peaceful methods of ~;r;tll ~ r '~ 
disputes. I t was common for unions to agree to work less hours ~j', :~. 
t " t d t" 41 t al terna 1 ve 0 accepting wage re uc lons, or 0 agree to s t r j r~ t. j / 
temporary reductions which would last only for the duration of a d8~~ 
depression. 42 Use was even made of the courts of law to establish thr; 
outcome of quarrels over ill-defined trade customs, such as th8 
43 legality of deductions for wheel rent and 'file money'. By such 
means, disputes were fought out, settled and the results made plain to 
the rest of the trade, without the expense and disruption of a strike. 
United action was further hampered, in the earlier part of this 
period by the superior status and skill of some workers. It would be 
impossible to discern any stable, easily identifiable elite of labour 
aristocratic workers in these trades, where wages, regularity of 
employment, status and security all varied enormously within the 
various sepatate skill hierachies, and with the state of trade. 44How-
ever, it is indisputable that some workers, by virtue of their greater 
genuine skills, 45 or their author i ty in the work process, possessed 
both a di fferent outlook and abetter bargaining position. Where 
mechanization had made little progress and where there was still 
little danger from teams of deskilled labour, workers were capable of 
pushing their demands much further. 46 The skilled men, often employed 
by the most reputable firms and reaping the benefits of better pay and 
security, would sometimes stand aloof from the union. 47 More often, 
they dominated the union, regarding the less skilled as 'degraded' and 
'unrespectable', as a threat to their own status and wages, and 
th f " b h" 48 unwor y 0 unlon mem ers lp. 
The most pressing hinderance to unity were the problems associ-
ated with the increasing practice of subcontract ion work to teams of 
deskilled labour. Team work created a body of poorly paid, inadequat-
ely trained workers, supervised and exploited by the team leader, who 
was ln turn employed by large manufacturers, who found that team 
labour produced goods at a faster and cheaper rate than individual 
skilled craftsmen. During the strike of spring knife workers at 
Rodgers in 1892, the union stated that there had "been a determination 
on the part of the firm to bring the men into a condition of subord-
ination by adopting and fostering ..• the 'team' system - better known 
as the 'sweating system' -. 49 The str ike was weakened when the team 
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leaders and their men returned to work a fter six weeks, app;jf;, T !;' l..j j 
unwilling to accept that as team leaders, they should not be ;j J J r) Ilf;': :: 
higher rate of out work benefit than the rest of the men. 50 Thr; b;:;", 
leaders were rev iled for their "cowardly conduct": they had 
tools to injure their fellow workmen". 51 In turn, these men 
the unions and S.F. T • C. of interference ln a dispute which war:, r,r, +, 
their concern. 52 As late as 1907, the "indi fference" ,53 of the tJ;:;" 
masters was still cited as the most important handicap to success f 'J. 
trade unionism in the culery trades. It was asked,"Do you wonder 8t 
the methods known as 'rattening' which figured in Sheffield forty 
years ago? It is easy to see that the removal of a portion of tools 
54 
was more effective than argument" 
Moreover, because of their position as small-scale employers of 
labour, many team leaders and small masters stood aloof from the 
union, if only because of the psychological di fferences that they 
believed separated them from wage labour. Accused by the unions for 
the falling price of labour and deteriorating quality and reputation 
for Sheffield cutlery,55 the small masters counterattacked, defending 
their status with vigour. They reiterated their belief that each of 
them could become, in time, "a big employer / similar to some of the 
firms I am now working for ..• so that when my capital is large enough, 
I launch out into a respectable manufacturer and merchant, having 
retained my 'independent spirit', never having been trained to run ln 
any other man's harness, but to rely on my own skill and persever-
56 
ance". Trade union criticism was bitterly resented and judged to be 
directed at "driving back the small manufacturers into the ranks of 
workmen so as to strengthen the union ... But the 'little masters' ... did 
not intend to be snuffed out without a struggle". 
The aspirations of these subcontracting small masters, who were 
despised by the traditional elite of skilled craftsmen, further 
divided the workforce and complicated industrial relations. Sometimes 
the small master was himsel f so poor, and relations with his under 
hands were so close, that these workers were incapable of formulating 
any precise grievances against their team leader. At other times. the 
small master's position of authority in the work process and his aloof 
tt ·t ddt· . t hl·m. 58 I th l' part nf a 1 u e, encourage BC lon agalns n e ear ler ~. 
this period, it was the firm belief of the unions that the 'middlemen' 
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and small masters were responsible for all the problems which afflict-
ed the cutlery trades,59 thus it was their aim to JOln with the 
respectable manufacturers to reduce the cut-throat competition of the 
small masters. Inevitably, however in concentrating on competition 
and the need to raise prices, attention came to focus on 'the market' 
and 'the buying public' who refused to pay the higher prices which 
would have enabled both workers and employers to obtain a decent wage. 
The unions bemoaned the changing attitudes of consumers who seemed to 
be no longer willing to pay a decent price for a quality product: 
cheapness had become their fundamental concern. 60 At root lay the 
unions' deep dislike of competition and their continued attachment to 
the days when Sheffield had monopolised the world production of 
cutlery, whilst guild regulations had restricted internal competition. 
Furthermore, the absence of any clear divide between masters and 
men, reinforced the pragmatic, simplistic view of the problems of the 
industry, which placed all blame with the 'bad'employers. Attention 
was focused on individual employers, who were sel fish and unjust. 
Such men were in sharp contrast, it was believed, to the 'old world' 
employers who had cared less about their personal profits and more 
about their trading reputations and honour, as well as the condition 
of their employees. 61 During the dispute at Rodgers in 1892, a 
leading trade unionist attributed the cause of the friction to 
attitudes of the managing directors; things would have been different 
in 'the old days': "He could not think that Mr. Maur ice Rodgers, if 
left to himsel f, would have allowed the present state of things to 
62 
come about". 
Finally, compounding all the divisions and obstacles to the clear 
conceptualization of industr ial problems which the eli tism of the 
skilled and the small masters created, was the further fundamental 
difficulty of the disunity which resulted from the general physical 
dispersion of the workforce. It was extremely rare to find workers 
concentrated in large numbers under one roof, executing similar tasks, 
for one employer, for long periods. In 1889, it was recognised by a 
factory inspector that "the organization to keep together \000 men and 
women who work for one common object but who reside allover the 
63 d· t th communi ty, is very di fficul t and great". However, accor lng 0 e 
same inspector: "from my experience, I find that when the outworking 
188 
system is ln existence there is no cohesion between one workman and 
another; that one outworker goes into the office by himself, is talked 
to by himsel f by his employer ... Suppose the employer employs 100 
outworkers, which is a very common thing, he treats with them individ-
ually. If they were all employed ln, no man gets a deduction without 
its being known to the 99 inside; the 99 of course, are opposed to it 
all at once; self-interest makes them opposed to the action of the one 
man. But with an outworker, it is not so; having agreed to a deduction 
he can go away, and the 99 know nothing about what price he is going 
to take; and therefore the outworking system is responsible for the 
want of cohesion".64 
Dispersion was horizontal, related to trade group, firm and 
workshop; but also vertical, according to age, sex, skill and status. 
It was therefore an almost insuperable task to weld workers together; 
to create a group consciousness and to put a stop to the practice of 
individual bargaining. 65 Outworkers suffered particularly badly from 
their isolation and consequent weakness. They were the first workers 
to be dismissed when trade slackened, were subject to more severe 
rules concerning notice and deductions, and were generally least able 
t . t 1 tt k th' . t . 66 o reS1S emp oyers a ac s on elr POSl lone 
The end of this period however, did witness significant moves 
towards the clarification of the labour/capital divide, and a clearer 
and more uni ted conception amongst the workforce, of their role and 
position in this divide. These changes, like those assisting the 
67 growth of more inclusive, federated unions in these trades, were the 
result of the reality and realization that virtually all workers in 
these trades were becoming poorer and overworked. 
In the Birmingham metal trades, unity was forged on enhanced 
class consciousness, as foreign competition and mechanization created 
a factory-based system dependent on factory discipline, wi th Ii t tIe 
place for the former small master, who was forced into the wage 
68 laboured ranks of his former employees. In Sheffield, whilst 
mechanization, foreign competition and deskilling were also powerful 
forces, resulting in the incorporation of some small masters into the 
growing number of self-contained factories,69 outwork and subcontract-
ing and the independent production of a huge range of goods, remained 
central to the production of cutlery. Thus, any polarization of wage 
earners and employers, which was never as acute in Bi rmingham, was 
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based on the men's recognition that their growing poverty could only 
be hal ted by radical changes in the tradi tional structure of the 
industry. All workers, even those with considerable skills and those 
who were small-scale employers, were suffer ing as a result of the 
exceSSIve competition and declining working conditions which were 
brought about by the traditional structure of the industry. 'Independ-
ence', 'raising onesel f', being a specialist and ones 'own master)' 
were realized to be outdated and meaningless ideals in trades where 
"there is always a scramble for corporation and other scavengers 
. 70 Jobs" . Demands grew for changes which would dismantle the entire 
traditional structure of the industry - "let us leave the old heredit-
71 
ary customs and put workmen upon a different system", until by the 
period immediately before the First World War, unionists were demand-
ing changes which would ensure a living wage to bring cutlery workers 
up to "efficiency rate".72 
In many ways these changing 
the grOWIng national 
perceptions reflected the twists and 
debate on the so called 'sweated turns of 
73 trades' . Employed originally in the 1840s and 50s to describe the 
awful condi tions under which London tailors and shoemakers worked, 
'sweating' came to denote any employment which involved low pay, long 
hours and insanitary condi tions, in premises which were frequently 
unregulated. Although Kingsley in the 1860s, associated 'the sweating 
system' with a subcontractor, who was typically a villainous character, 
and often a Jew, by the 1880s sweating was no longer seen as a 
'system': the House of Lords Select Committee on the Sweating System 
saw the subcontractor as consequence, rather than a cause of the 
problems of sweating. Whilst considerable debate still centres on 
whether the 1880s did in fact mark a turning point in the definition 
and estimation of 'sweating', 74 by the ear ly 1900s, new solutions to 
the problem were being advocated. Sweated trades came to be seen as 
'parasitic' on other industries and on the community at large, in the 
damage they inflicted on the physical efficiency of the individual and 
the nation. Thus, such concepts as the minimum wage and the national 
minimum were advocated as possible solutions, the debate culminating 
in the creation of the National Anti-Sweating League and finally the 
1909 Trade Board Act which created wage fixing boards in six sweated 
trades. 75 This focus of national debate and at tent ion must have 
affected the cutlery workers, helping them to rethink and rede fine 
their problems and aspirations. 
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Thus, for most of this period, the traditional handicraft 
structure of the cutlery trades, as well as blurring the di vision 
between labour and capital, divided both workers and employers amongst 
themsel ves, and made the occurrence of any clear-cut, large-scale 
dispute very rare. However, aspects of this structure, particularly 
the antiquated procedures by which payment was regulated, had further 
signi ficant effects on the pattern of industrial relations in the 
cutlery trades. I t will be argued that such features as deductions 
from gross wages and archaic piece price lists which reflected the 
peculiar structure of these trades, somewhere between handicrafts and 
modern waged labour, furthered sectionalism and if not causing 
disputes, hampered their quick and easy settlement. Nevertheless, as 
with the overall framework of the industry, the workers came to favour 
modernization of traditional methods of payment, which they realized 
were an impediment and not an aid to their prosperity and status. 
Wages were calculated according to price lists which were both 
old and complicated. Many dated back to the early 19th century,76 and 
varied enormously according to the particular trade,77 and to the 
78 quality, type and size of the product. Usts were then further 
complicated by the addition of 'extras', or supplementary charges for 
79 fine or fancy work which improved the product. Moreover, whilst 
alterations took place according to percentage charges in price lists 
- for example a 5% increase or decrease, according to 
trade - these alterations were also modified according to 
of a union,80 the quality of the work,81 and the standing 
good or bad 
the strength 
f f " 82 o a lrm. 
In fact the sheer confusion of these lists forced many firms to adopt 
their own simplified price lists, which was a further factor compell-
ing the men to make individual bargains. 83 This was compounded in the 
earlier part of this period by the efforts of the most skilled workers 
to maintain the large wage di fferentials which separated their high 
84 quality work from that of less skilled cutlers. Wage differentials 
increased with the expansion of 
85 
received low datal wages, but 
semi-skilled employment, much of which 
overall, real wages fell considerabl~~ 
As wage rates declined, efforts to implement more standardized, 
equalized rates increased, often with the consent of the larger, 
better paying houses, and individual bargaining was strongly discour-
87 
aged and condemned. 
17 , 
The problems facing attempts to enforce comprehensive, standard-
ized price lists were however daunting, not least the re-education 
required to discourage the men from making individual bargains. 
Whilst ever the industry continued to manufacture highly speci fic, 
individualistic products, price lists were forced to remain detailed, 
segregated and complicated. 88 Indeed, the mere fixing, let alone 
enforcing, of a standard rate, presented enormous di fficul ties. The 
1908 Fair Wages Wmmittee, when it investigated modes of establishing a 
standard rate for government contract work, recognised that there was 
no accepted trade union rate in these trades, and moreover, the trade 
societies represented insufficient workers for their rates to be 
89 deemed as 'standard'. The commissioner could only conclude that 
"the trade is a very complicated one, and ... it is extremely difficult 
to arrive at any decision as to what is the current rate, the process 
of manufacture di ffer ing so much at each firm, and the number of 
90 
operations being so great". 
A further traditional, handicraft remnant of the industrial 
structure, which had once been valued by the workers as a symbol of 
their 'independence' and distance from the status of mere wage 
labourer, were the deductions from gross wages for the rent of work 
space, tools, power and necessary materials. Although originally 
negotiable, these deductions had, in reality, been fixed and imposed 
for decades. 91 This did not however, prevent them from being vague 
and somewhat discretionary in their precise value and application, 
dependent upon the relative strengths of employers and workers. The 
imprecision of these deductions is evidenced by the various court 
cases which were undertaken to define their precise legal status. 
In 1875, workmen at Rodgers took the company to a court of 
arbi tration to test the legality of deductions for 'file money'. The 
spring knife cutlers argued that the 1d. in each shilling they 
received as 'file money' was a right, stemming from an old agreement 
according to which, the men provided their own files and were paid 1d. 
in each shilling, towards their cost. The company claimed that the 
1d. was a gratuity, generously bestowed by them when trade was good. 
Arbi tration v indicated the men's posi tion: whilst ever the 1810 and 
1824 pr ice lists remained operati ve, file money had to be paid, 
. t 92 O· . t· n of because these list prices allowed for 1 • nce In a POSI 10 
17L 
strength however, In the poor trade of 1877, the company stopped the 
f 'l d th' Id d th' 93 1 e money an e unlons cou 0 no lng. 
Again in 1907, the pen and pocket blade forgers union took 
Rodgers to court to prove that the company charged "unreasonable" sums 
in rent, for troughs which, because of illness, men failed to use. 
Once more, these deductions, which were normally verbal understandings, 
were found to be unreasonable and illegal, leading many firms to adopt 
formal written agreements to clarify these customary understandings. 94 
Furthermore deductions, as they varied enormously in type and 
value, according to the trade, the item produced and the relative 
strengths of employers and workers, were a further source of division 
amongst the men. Grinders, who occupied most space, and used most 
power, were always charged the heaviest sums, paying not only rent for 
their trough, but normally finding all their own tools and materials?5 
For forgers, deductions were less of a burden: charges were normally 
only made for gas, the price of which differed with the season. 96 
Cutlers were charged for gas In winter, for the rent of their 'side'-
normally 6d. per week - and sometimes for their tools and materials, 
97 
when these were provided for them by their employer. Outworkers 
provided themselves with space, materials and tools. Although 
recelvlng the same piece rates as inworkers, prIce lists normally 
stipulated that they should be allowed an additknal 1d. In each 
shilling as 'tool money'. The outworkers however, bring disorganized 
and weak, frequently failed to realize these extras. 98 When tools 
were provided by employers, deductions ranged from 5 to 40% of 
earnings. 99 Thus, the effects of weakness and disorganization were 
cumulative in these trades: those men who were members of reasonably 
effective unions were less troubled by deductions, whilst the weakest 
workers were unable to resist their enforcement and extention, which 
100 
rendered them even weaker. I t was broadly acknowledged that "The 
men who are members of trade societies do not take these deductions 
without acquainting the officials of their union, and they defend them 
and prevent that. Employers do not attack trade union members , so 
far as deductions are concerned as they do other men, and for that 
101 
reason". 
Trade union opposition to these deductions was long-standing: In 
1892 the Webbs identi fied them as the major source of gr ievances In 
102 
the grinding trades. The Royal Commission on Labour found that 
most workers would have preferred to earn a net piece wage, employers 
providing all tools and materials. 103 Such reforms were still being 
demanded IOn 1907~04 Em 1 1 P oyers were a so accused of profiteering from 
the system in other ways. I t was complained that rent was charged 
when no other work was provided by the employer, and even when 
premIses were closed for stocktaking or holidays. Such charges,~when 
there was no work available, forced men to accumulate large debts. 105 
Unionists also claimed, but could not prove, that some employers made 
handsome profits from the excessive charges they imposed for deduct-
ions, sufficient infact, to cover the upkeep of the factory and the 
f th 0 t d 106 wages 0 e engIne en er. Employers vigorously denied these 
charges, asserting that the only advantages gained from th e charging 
of deductions, were through the improved habi ts of the men: they 
became more frugal, and wasted less materials and fuel. 107 
Despite the depth and long duration of these grievances, the men 
were too badly organized and segregated to undertake positive action 
to put an end to deductions until the very end of this period. Public 
meetings were held to discuss deductions dur ing the organizational 
spurt of the early 1890s, but nothing practical resulted. 108 A further. 
general meeting was held in the boom year of 1901, but wi tnesses 
before the 1907 Departmental Committee on the Truck Acts, admitted 
that the unions were both poorly informed on their legal rights with 
109 
regard to truck agreements, and powerless to implement change. In 
their defence, union leaders cited the enduring difficulties 
encountered In at tempts to change practices which, hav ing grown up 
over long per iods, and become customary, were hard to define, much 
less dismantle. 110 
The conclusions of the 1907 Committee came as a source of 
encouragement and impetus. Employers, along with the facory inspector 
claimed that the deductions, being an accepted and established trade 
custom, were so deeply ingrained, that their alteration would dislo-
111 
catethe whole structure of the cutlery trades. They were ada~ant 
in their belief that the workers were too independently minded and 
habituated to their semi-autonomous status to ever accept the regime 
of factory based labour: deductions were the price paid for this 
independence. 112 The commissioners recognized the difficulties which 
the adoption of a system of net wages would invol ve: pr imar ily the 
regular ization of employment in pr i vate factor ies, which would push 
more men into the public and semi-public sector, where the implement-
ation of the net wage system was virtually impossible. 113 However, 
the commissioners did recognize and agree that deductions for mater-
ials, tools, standing room, light and heat should be made illegal, and 
recommended their abolition.114 
The increasingly focused and vocal agi tation to end deductions 
was a product of the trades realization that their 'independent' 
status wi thin the tradi tional structure of the industry was now an 
anachronistic source of disadvantage, not benefi t. Their declining 
status was frequently admitted ln the poslng of such rhetorical 
questions as "Did you hear 0 f an engine-dr i ver pay ing rent for his 
engine, or a quarryman for his quarry, or a clerk for his desk?,,115 
Such burdens, they believed, were not only incommensurate with their 
continued skill, but a source of their poor remuneration and diffi-
cuI ties in sticking together and holding out in disputes. 1/ You may 
search the country 0' er, and you will not find a body of workers 
employed ln an industry demanding physical strength, skill and 
judgement, so burdened wi th the expenses of production which rightly 
belong to capital, and at the same time so ill paid".116 
Thus, between 1909 and 1913 var ious success ful, but qui te easy 
struggles were fought by the individual unions to eradicate the 
application of deductions to their trade. Successful protests were 
mounted against the charges for rent at wheels which were shut or 
117 118 broken, and against the non-payment of tool money to outworkers. 
Similarly, by 1911, most unions had obliged employers to provide all 
.. k 119 the tools required by thelr lnwor ers. 
The final signi ficant cause of industr ial disputes, which was 
another traditional, handicraft remnant, which had been gradually 
distorted by the employers, in their favour, was the practice of 
counting more than twelve items as a dozen. Originally twelve and a 
half, thirteen or fouteen blades had been counted as a dozen to allow 
for 'wasters' or blades that were spoilt in the process of production. 
The extra count ensured that any spoilt blades could be replaced out 
of the extras, rather than necessitating the production of another 
dozen, just to replace one 'waster'. However,' wasters' gradual 1 y 
17/ 
came to be charged on top of these extra counts, and whilst improved 
production techniques virtually eliminated 'wasters', the extra counts 
. d 120 
remalne . Once more, these counts di ffered "according to the 
. ,,121 th bargaIn, or e strength of the men involved. 
As part of their general opposition to deductions, the trade 
unions mounted a vigorous campaign against extra counts, claiming that 
they represented "the old world employers' idea of speeding up".122 
Manufacturers denied this: overcounts were said to be allowed for in 
the price lists, which were altered accordingly; demand for their 
aboli tion was merely a tactical and emotive way of demanding a wage 
increase, shielding "behind an appeal to the eighteenth century".123 
However, with the excellent trade and enhanced unity and vision which 
marked the period 1911-13, most unions experienced little difficulty 
in obtaining price lists in which twelve items were defined as a 
dozen. 124 
Conciliation and Collaboration 
Throughout the period under consideration, the peaceful settlement 
of disputes and joint action of labour and capital, were preferred to 
offensi ve or mili tant action. Primarily, the impetus behind this 
preference came from the men, as a result of their continued belief in 
the traditions of guild co-operation,125the recognition of their 
weakness In disputes, and the efforts of the unions to uni te wi th 
'respectable' employers to marginalise the undercutting small masters. 
The whole structure of these trades, with their small production 
units, close personal ties, quality concerns, and traditions of social 
mobility, was more amenable to negotiation and peaceful accommodation 
than conflict. In line wi th their general antipathy towards trade 
unionism and their staunch individualism, employers although uninter-
ested in formal channels of conciliation and arbitration, were keen 
advocates of factory paternalism and close relations with their own 
workers. Overall, the cutlery trades are notable for the extent of 
the co-operation between masters and men, and the readiness to take 
steps towards some measure of joint regulation of the industry. 
The commitment of the union leadership to conciliation is well-
125 
illustrated in their attatchment to the local Liberal party. and 
also through the policies of the S.F.T.C., an organization which was 
196 
dominated both numerically and ideologically by the cutlery trades. 127 
From the early 1870s the S.F.T.C. was pressing the Chamber of Commerce 
to join with it to form joint boards of conciliation and arbitration~28 
The employers however, despite the influence of A J M d 11 
. . un e a, the 
champion of organized arbi tration, were unwilling to participate in 
129 
such a scheme. 
Trade unionists who represented the trades before the Royal 
Commission on Depression, bemoaned the indisposition of their employ-
ers towards conciliation, a policy which they believed would have 
helped to contain and resolve the merchandise marks scandal. 130 The 
Master Cutler and cutlery manufacturer, Charles Belk was dismissive of 
such action,131 but such talks did finally take place when the scandal 
reached its peak, and the manufacturers were forced to take action to 
defuse the situation. 132 
By 1894, the same unionists had become even more fervent support-
ers of conciliatory techniques. This commitment was basically moral: 
one party in its time of strength, should not take advantage of the 
133 
weaker. Rarely were these beliefs formulated into preCIse, 
practical, workable schemes, 134 but employer hostility was once more 
cited as the major obstacle to implementation. 135 
The S.F.T.C. was a similarly persistent advocate of conciliation, 
consistently passing resolutions to this effect, although their 
schemes for boards of conciliation and arbitration were rejected by 
the T.U.C. in 1892~36 The S.F.T.C. was one of the few labour organi-
zations which accepted with alacrity the 
Union of Employers and Employed in 1895, 
objects of the Industrial 
but the organization soon 
137 failed through lack of support. By 1908 there was still no 
. . t 138 b t 
organization for conciliation or arbitration In eXIs ence, u 
despi te the growing mili tancy of the pre-war years, the S. F . T . C. 
h . d 1 139 remained pledged to suc 1 ea s. 
As trade unionists were ready to point out, the employers were 
never convinced of the value or relevance of such negotiatory proced-
ures. Boards of conciliation challenged and threatened the intense 
individualism, secrecy and rivalry of the cutlery manufacturers. One 
employer "thought that the businessmen of Sheffield were able quietly 
and in a friendly manner to settle any difference they might have ... " 
140 
without the need to "consult with their rivals". Another pocket 
knife manufacturer refused to submit a dispute to a panel of employers 
197 
and employees because he stated "I am not gOIng to teach competi tors 
b ' ,,141 my USlness . 
In practical terms however, there was considerable ev idence of 
joint action, particularly in the sphere of the general regulation of 
the industry, rather than specific labour/captial issues. Considerable 
negotiation and discussion surrounded the framing of the regulations 
governing the grinding of metals, introduced in 1908,142 the defence 
of the 'Sheffield' trade mark, 143 and the defini tion of what const-
144 i tuted a 'hand forged' piece of cutlery. The rate of payment for 
government contract work was also debated, al though employers were 
never keen to adopt a fixed, standard, identified price list. 145 
More readily subscribed to by employers, were joint ventures 
designed to promote Sheffield cutlery, through its reputation for 
quality and workmanship, to the rest of the nation and the world. 
Typical enterprises were industrial exhibitions like those organized 
by the London Cutlers' Company in 1883, 146 and the Sheffield Cutlers' 
Company l'n 1885.147 In 1885, lIt bl oca no a es sponsored the exhibition 
in an attempt to quieten the criticism and fears which surrounded the 
merchandise marks scandal: "the exhibition will gIve a splendid 
opportuni ty to Sheffield workmen to prove that they are still cele-
brated for skilled labour, and the display of really good work cannot 
do otherwise than have a most beneficial effect on the local 
industry ... The exhibition will be a practical and conclusive answer to 
those carping cr i tics who have been too ready to say that Sheffield 
148 
has been tardy in the modern race for manufacturing supremacy". 
The tradi tional predilections of the men, their desires to produce 
'the best', 
awarded, and 
were used by manufacturers to boost trade. Prizes were 
the exhibition which attracted enormous public interest, 
Prince Albert .149 However, the number of entrants was was opened by 
150 
not large, and various cutlers complained that the prizes 
d t ' 151 0 too small to cover the expenses incurred in pro uc Ion. ne 
were 
prIze 
winner declared the exhibi tion to be the work of one manufacturer. 
J.E.Bingham, and not the Cutlers' Company who "as a body, never took 
up the matter with energy until he opened his purse, and a prince was 
152 
coming, and then they seized the opportunity for personal show". 
A similar attitude pervaded the opening in 1878, of a subscription 
fund to finance the visit, by nineteen workingmen who represented the 
Sheffield trades, to the Paris Exhibition. It was intended that the 
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men should learn from, and report on the goods on v lew, but the SIX 
cutlers were condemned for their unintelligent and uncritical reports, 
which merely applauded Sheffield's supremacy.153 
By far the most widespread and apparently successful mode of 
cementing ties and co-operation between masters and men was however, 
through the paternalism and philanthropy of individual employers and 
firms. The older and more esteemed a business, the greater the 
likelihood that it would invest considerable time and effort in caring 
for and cultivating a loyal and able workforce. 
Joseph Rodgers was perhaps the most assiduous promoter of cordial 
relations wi th its workforce. From 1863 onwards, the firm held an 
annual athletics competition for the men, at which there were over 
154 £100 worth of prizes to be won, and normally over 6000 spectators. 
An annual gathering also took place at the Surrey Street Musical Hall. 
Maurice Rodgers, head of the company in 1898 "was convinced that such 
gatherings were conducive to that proper understanding and goodwill 
between emmployers and employed which was needful and should exist,,~55 
Such events were occasions for mutual congratulation. The represent-
atives of the workmen would express their pride in the firms achieve-
156 
ments, and their gratitude at being employed by such a house. When 
the Prince of Wales visited Rodgers in 1875, a celebrati0n dinner was 
held to mark the occasion, at which 800 employees and friends of the 
company were present. The relations between labour and capital were 
cc described in the following terms: In this firm, there is more of the 
personal tie between employer and employee than in the newer houses, 
and from the highest to the lowest, Mr. Newbould is respected and 
loved. By his action he has proved that he has the best interests of 
157 the workmen at heart". In a letter which appeared in the Sheffield 
" Independent, the workers thanked Rodgers for the occasion: We have 
always been proud of the honourable distinction which the name of 
Joseph Rodgers and Sons has obtained throughout the world and we feel 
that the success of the firm in future greatly depends upon the good 
158 
feeling existing between employer and employed". 
A recurring feature of the various exchanges of 'good will' which 
took place between the management and workers at Rodgers, was the 
pride in, and respect accorded to the long service of workmen, and the 
service of whole families at the firm. At the 1870 sports day. the 
worker who presented the men's address had been with the firm for 
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56 years. His father has been employed by Rodgers for 40 years, and he 
had three sons, four grandsons, and three nephews, all of whom worked 
159 
for Rodgers. In the 1911 publication, Under Five Sovereigns, the 
firm pr inted a photograph, wi th accompany ing names and lengths of 
serv ice, of the 36 workmen who had been employed for more than 50 
160 
years. The firm had always been proud of the loyalty of its 
161 
craftsmen, and was rewarded by the continued allegiance of a 
section of the workforce, who refused to heed the demands of the 
unions to strike at the firm. 162 
Similar demonstrations of paternalism were the invitation of large 
numbers of workers to the celebrations marking the election of their 
employer to the posi tion of Master Cutler, or to other family fest-
ivities. In-coming Master Cutlers and their wives received generous 
163 presents and praise from their workers, and the celebrations were 
used by employers to reaffirm friendly relations, to lssue 'pep 
talks', and even veiled ultimatums. S.G.Richardson, elected as Master 
Cutler during the industrial militancy of 1889, used his celebratory 
dinner to show that "it was possible for employers and employed to go 
on mutually respecting one another for a long term of years, without 
realising the disastrous effects of such strikes as those which were 
brought before their notices so prominently at the present time ... they 
had always been willing to meet the other In a conciliatory spirit. 
They had never required the services of any outside people to deal 
with the difficulties that might arise from time to time. (Cheers),,~64 
Master Cutler Robert Belfitt, used his celebration to tell the 
employees of George Butlers that "it was the duty of the manufacturers 
and workmen to place themsel ves abreast of the times ... The time had 
gone by when a firm could prosper upon prestige obtained in ancient 
days. The excessive competi tion demanded that employers and workmen 
alike should be able to deal with things of today rather than those of 
the day before".165 The custom of entertaining workers might be 
maintained, but generally, custom and tradition were being depreciated. 
A. J. Hobson, In 1902, used his celebration to warn employees, and 
enlist their support behind the changes which were to come: he 
"expressed the hope that the goodwill now existing between employers 
and employed would long continue. I f the firm were to keep up to the 
fL'ont, they must give him their best goodwill and assistance In the 
use of new appliances and new methods, and not say that because a 
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thing was good enough for their fathers it was good enough for them,,~66 
Employees were also invited to such family occasions as the 
167 
coming of age of the employer's sons, whilst some notable manufact-
b d 1 t W k . th· ·11 168 urers remem ere se ec or men 1n e1r W1 s. The obviously 
paternalistic reasoning behind such gifts was illustrated by W.Hobson's 
gift of £150 plus £700 in annuities, to his workmen, a fact quoted by 
his son, when his father was flosthumously accused of being an anti-
169 
unionist and underpayer. 
In contrast, indications that labour/capital relations were 
falling into a less familiar pattern, governed by economism rather 
than paternalism, were rare. Summer day trips, financed by the 
employer, although common in the prosperous early 1870s,170 declined 
sharply thereafter. In 1873, the Sheffield Independent, commenting on 
this trend declared that the labour/capital relationship was "becoming 
one of contract pure and simple, the employer seeking to get the most 
efficient service at the lowest cost, and the workman is naturally 
endeavouring to sell his labour to the most remunerative market".171 
Similarly, there 1S scattered evidence of a more class-based 
hostility in trade union criticism of the increasing extravagance of 
their employers, their luxurious homes, and their lack of concern for 
the plight of their workers. Many were accused of placing their love 
of money before their concerns for their trading reputations, the 
172 quality of their work and the livelihood of their employees. Robert 
Holmshaw, for example, believed that if manufacturers' complicity In 
the merchandise marks frauds "did not set class against class, it 
173 
ought to". 
However, such hostility and abandonment of the traditions and 
ideals of close, congenial ties between menagement and workers, were 
exceptional. Demands might be made for improved or changed conditions, 
occasional strikes took place, but overall significant disagreements, 
at least in public, were rare. I t is hard to disagree wi th the 
comments made by the factory inspector in 1887: "I f there are any 
serious differences in op1n1on now, between employer and employed, or 
between the men themsel ves, it must be admi t ted that they do not 
appear in public. Week after week, we read in the local press of 
complimentary banquets and complimentary speeches given masters to men 
or by the men to their masters; on the other hand, we hear very little 
. 174 
of bad feellng". 
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58. G.Crcssick, 1=P.53-9; R.Gray, p.3; J.Fos1Er, ClEss St.ru;:gle ad tI-E Ird.stri81 
Pe.cl.utim: Early .Ird..strial Ccpi. taliS11 in ThreE ErgliEtl T Otm, Lm::tn, 1 g]4, 
p.234; A.Fox, 1=P.fD-62.59. 
59. P.P.1889, XIII, S.C. m 9£atirg, ?Uttley, qs.24710-7, 27852-3; 5.1., 27.3.18ffJ, 
3].3.1889, 16.4.1889. 
60. P.P. 1889, XIIT, s.c. m 9£ati.n;h C.l.aJJ, qs 250+6, 2iJ37, 25IJJ1, W.J.Davis, 
q.25:HJ; A.Fox, 1=P.64-5, "tre p..blic in its careless ig rna re, paid uhaiEver 
tJ-e 10JESt priCE hEqB"B:i to l:E wi th::ut tro..b1irg to a:rsicEr t.J-E1tEr SLd1 a 
priCE r:cid ire erployer a 'I'B:H:fEtJle' profit, a-d ire tJJJrI<m:n a 'fair' 1.lBJ=. 
ll-e mferceless WJrkrral, 1::h3 stn..g]lirg erp1.oyer, IJEI'8 at tre JTEI'CY of tJ-e 
ir:resp::mible 1:uyi.rlJ p.1Jlic." 
61 • S.D. T ., 7.2.1 B72; see MID::t-a-dise tJ'arks 5:crdal, ~tEr 3, pp. 
62. 5.1., 16.8.1892. 
63. P.P. 1B99, XIII, S.C. m Sillatin;l, W.J.Davis, q.25395. 
fA. lliid, q.25326; J.A.9:mis:h:n, 9.t.eataj Irrl.Etries, p.189, in tt-e clothirg tra:Es 
tt-ere lLBS a hig, cEgree of digmp d.satim a-d strati ficatirn, ''te:a:i m en 
int:e-re Ici:nJr WIJEti tim, m cin:ntralif:Ed 1TEth:ri3 of prn:iJ:tim, ad 
offerin;;) qJ3Si ccpi talist stah13 to m:ny WJI'i<ers." 
65. 5.1.,2.121911,7.11.1913; P.P. 1002, XXXVI, R.C. m I aTIIr, R.~~, q.19391. 
66. fi:n b1.a:E forg:rrs' mirutes, 27.6.1~, 29.8.1%; 5.1.,27.3.1009, 8.4.1875, tte 
Lnim m:xg Jised that in disnisgirg tJ-e I1Ibillrkers first, in 1tEir 1875 
disp.rtE with 1Teir rutiers, ~'S t.&Er8 rulllB c.in;:J "with tt-e t.LB:kest of tt-e rTBl, 
urn trEy a::uld disniss at a II0lB Its ruti.cE. It lLBS grtt.irg in tJ-e thin ~ of 
tt-e ~." 
67. f:ee dl:ptEr 5. 
68. A.Fox, p.67. 
69. :re dl:ptEr 4. 
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Itl. S.D. T. ,4.8.1913; 5.1., 29.11.1911, "rrmy ski lle:f rTBl in tt-e a.rtlery tra:Es ~ 
IlEla:TTB:f jetE as ~rs or tre like, ratrer 1hcn a:ntin..E m 1:tE miserchle 
pi tta-ce th3t has fal..lm tn treir lot. 'To tE a tran a:n:iJ::tor ad p3I'tiaJlar 1 y 
a lIotm rrm' tn q..ntE ITE t.nir:n official, 'is tn I:E pro-rutEd to tre aristn::ra:y 
of lEin.Jr so far as trey are a:nl:!IlaJ.'" 5:E alSJ 5.1., 11.1.1St"2, 10.7.1913, 
4.8.1013; R. PriCE, Lctn..Lr in Sri tis, 5:x:iety: Al n l1ErfJlative Histmy, Lcrrbl, 
19ffJ, p.93, "1l-e mid-ce11liry d.istircti.cns tE1:t...e3l IB5p£tmle crd n:n-I~t­
ciJle, skilled ad u-skill.ej, IJ.EI'8 esse Jtially stab...s id:ntificatims. lh:re 
of tt-e latE 19th CHTtl.lry reste:1 4Il1 en unic critEria trat IlEre lirl<B:J nnre 
explicitly to class ic:Enti ficaticn: 51< j 1 ] e::J ad LJ"Ekilla:l, l.J1.im crd rrrH.Ili.m. 
It W3S a p3rti.al ref1a:tim of this that tt-e localist, ~st crd 
excllt3ia-ary features wi thin uorkirg class org:nisatim ad actim t.e-ffij in 
diminish. II 
71. 5.1., 26.1.1B9S. 
72. 5.1.,10.7.1913,24.11.1911; S.F.T.C., Ih1.Jal.l!pJrt, 1914, p4; P.P.1~, XXXIV, 
Fair ll.F.J;ts Carmi ttEe, R .l-blrrsl"HrJ, q. 2576. 
73. For mtails SEE E.P .1-8,0:1<, 'R::M:rty a-d 9:ri.al TI-eo:ry in Erglad: ll-e Exj::EriB"'CE 
of tt-e 1BlTh! S:J:ial History, I, 1976; H.Lynj, E[9la-d in ti-e 1E3lD3, r-B..LJ York, 
19'+5; G .StaiTB1 .l::res, o.rtcast Lm:b1; J. A. 5::hniEdal, 9....eatro Irrl.Etries; 
o .l3ythell .; W. 203-54 . 
74. lliid., it has bxn arg..a:f th3t tl-e rep:lI't of tt-e 1889 53la:t Carmi tire, in 
f8\lCUI'irg srsilile tm::E l.J1icniSll a-d tt-e plLgJirg of lcq:E in existirg fa:::tmy 
a-d ei rnticral legislatim, ~ lte::i m rat d=:p3r1lJre frnn tra::iiticral 
t..n:i:!rsta"l:ii.rg3 • 
75. R.C.K.ErBJr, '1m Pra:tical Case for t.rE legal f'linirrun l1.I:g3', Nireta31th 
Cartury crd AftEr, LXXII, 1912; C .Eila:k, 9.£ataj IniEtry crd tI-e r·1ininun utg:: 
Lm±n, 1 W; O. Bythell ., J=.P .233-5. 
76. Uoyd, W. 2B7-8 , in 1913, taile blaE haftErs ha:llists of 1et+6 ad 1859 
resp-:!:tively. W3:iJ ~'EiS., J=.P.201 ,314, razor bla:E fOIlflIs ad ocisoor grin::i:rrs 
ha:f 1 B1 0 a-d 1 ~+ priCE lists, ~tively. 
77 • E. g., razor bla::E crd taJle bla:E fOly~I'S l1EI'8 plld a:xrrrdirg to ttE Cf1tiq..ata:i 
sysiBn of 'd3y' WJrk, a 'days' lJ.DI'k tEirg tte 8l11Ilt of wID< uhidl L.EB:f to te 
ctre in a my. I-h.ever, with iJTprrNerelb3 in tre ~tim of ste:U, crd in 
tools a-d rro:ilirEry, it b:nJle ~ible to rnrplete rnrl1 rmre t.rHl a 'd3ys' 
LtDrk in a day, Uayd, p.291, W:tiJ M3S, J=.P.201-3, Z76. IJt:tEr traJ±;, e.g. 
sciSSJI' unrk to3rd herds, ~ to I"OCEive very laJ ~, a:xrrrdirg to 
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c:H:rEpi t priCE lists, tut ire intro:i.cti.m of na:hirery e-BJled tt-an in 
aJiple1E a far grea1Er am..nt of w:n:k th:n tJ-at if Ita tBJ llhn tJ-e lists UEre 
cf:raJJ1 Lp, W3::b MJS., ~. 29&-DJ. 
78. Fffl ad Bla::E F~rs Prirn Ust, 1891; N.A.U.L. TEhle ad B.1b:::I ers 81.cd= 
Grin:Ers1 Assri.atim, PriCE Ust, 16th 1l:tri:Er, 1913; Ll¥ p.291, s:rre 
trn::Es tID ~te priCE lists for ire hig-er qJ3lity 'a:JJltry' m3I'ket, crd 
trn liliEI' q.Elity foreigl rrmket. 
79. 5.0.T.,4.11.1911, 5.1.: 3.3.1876. 
00. P.P. 1892, XXXVI, R.C. m Lctn.n:, R.HJl.rrEhau, qs.19+03, 19+14-5, mim rTH1 
rralntai.rej trnir priCE lists lEttEr th:n rm-t..nim rTBl, differs lES ~ 
trn ihn auld alllJlt to 40\6 of total ~. 
B1 • W:tiJ MJS., p .147, cEd..r:ticns m lEttEr q.Eli ty a.rtl.ery l.tEI'8 rever as great ffi 
ttnse m d ~, us...ally foreigl rutlery. 
82. 5::e ~. 183 ,P. P .19]8 , XXXIV, Fair lLEg::s Crnmi t1Ee , R.I-blJrEh:w, q. 2489, 
g::rerall Y tI-E l8I'g3r, rrore prestigiOJS I-n.Ees l.tEI'8 rrore likely in p3y g:rrI 
~. 
83. hlii:J ~'ES., 1+1.147, 317, 314, tt-e scisSJI' grin:tID3' price list lJ.ES a "tulky crd 
formid:tJle l.a:hlrg volUTE;" Ll.oyd, p. 3J1; P. P. 1 sm, XXXIV , Fair Ill:g;s Cmmi t1Ee, 
R.HJl.rrEhau, q.247B, lllil sp:cific rates IlEI'8 oftEn Enforced for g:JV8IT1TB1t 
LXI Itra:t WFk. 
84. 5.1., 4.11.1872, 24.2.1872, 4.3.1876, 14.3.1876, ITD3t Lnicrs mlacW for greatEr 
.i.rcreases m trnir hig, q.Eli ty unrk thal m trnir a.lrecrl:I p:nr ly plid 1O.LJ 
q...eli ty IillI'k • For W3!J3 rate cEtails, m= CQ:B dix 5. 
85. 5::e EqEI d.ix 5; P. P. 1892, XXXVI, R.C. rn Lci:nJr, PraEr to q..esticrE of Grup A 
~ .14-15, II1JI'BJVer, ITHlY WJrkers t JEItirular ly thJse lJn ltEIB less ski 11 ED or in 
tEars, ltEre JEid I.J.rekl y , or by tt-e d3y, task or Uffik. P. P .1912, II, r€J::mt of 
tt-e Crnmi t~ rn ElIthnrkers, W.I-tla::n, qs. 4lli9-P2, 41 CB-14 , it lJ.ES irrp:Esible in 
calrulate Ell 'avE!:rc:JJ=' tJ..Eg3 in tt-Ere tra::Es, nor ltEIB lLEIJ3 rates esta:JlistH.1 
with a viBlJ to I-UJJ rru::h a rrHl sI-culd earn JEI' tnrr; ~ varied er tJl1lu.sly, 
i3Xl.JI'di.r1] in tt-e tra:E - rutlers l1EIB still ~d less 1h:n grin:Ers crd h3f1Ers 
- crd, IlIEt inp:Irtantly, a:::mrdi.nJ to skill. 
86. ::ee cncptEr 8 pp. 266-9; cq:a dix 5. 
87. 5.1., 10.3.1913, "p:m::o-El ~ I1U3t ~," "if a price for WJrk W3S 
lLBltBj, they rTU3t give a cmbire:I price." P.P.19E, XXXIV, Fair tt.EJ;g; Cbnnittffi 
R. ~blrrshaLJ, 2474-B+; P. P. 1913, III, Crnmi t1Ee m trn T ru:k kts, 1917, 
R.HJl.rrEhau, q.12D74. 
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88. S.C.L., lL.[E R ZV4, 25.9.1gJ2, 29.9.1gJ2, tJ-E :reJi~ pricE list for fargirg, 
~ crr1 h3rc.En:irg JBl ad ~t knives W3S still extrnrely anplicata:i. 
S. C. L., Wl3. R 23/5 crd /7, tJ-E razor grin::Ers' 1912 :reJ~ price list, th3t of 
tre JBl crd p::d<et bla:E fDrg:!L'S of 1912, crd tre tcble grin:Ers' list of 1913, 
lLEre alSJ very cEtaj 1 ed an::f a::rrplicata:f. 
89. P.P. 19]9, XXXIV, Fair IJ..Iy:s CarrnitiEe, R.I-brB:latJ, qs.2525-253J, 2:85-99. 
~. Thid., G.H.9lcw, q.2659. 
91. P.P.1g]], ill, D:mnitiEe (Jl tre Tru::k kts, A.J.H:iJ:ul, q.12391. 
92. S.1., 4.3.1874, 17.4.1874, 18.4.1874. 
93. S.1., 18.4.1874, 3.2.1877. 
9.-. S.1., 3.5.1 SID; P.P.19J8, ill, Carrnit1Ee (Jl tre Tru:k kts, 1917, A.J.I-tiH:n, 
q.12479. 
95. TraE 1B89 8 1W b 
Felt ad [ffi rtetErials fblt 
Tchle Wfe I-BftErs 1s.6:i. - 2s.6:i. fd. 1s.3]. - 1 s., pllJ3 Ed gas 
Fb:ket 8la::E Grin::Ers 33. - 4s. 1 s.6:i. 4s. - 33.Ed. 
T ctJ1.e B1.a:E Grin:Ers 5s. - 7s. - fE. - 6s.fd. 
:pr.irq IW fe D..Itlers 1s. -33 1s. 
:h.m::E: a. P. P .1 B89, XIII, S.C. (Jl 9.t.eatirg, S. Uttley , qs. 24742, 24EU3, 
cq::a dix 0, J:ll. 708-9. 
b. P. P .19J8, III, Carmi tiEe m 1TE T ru:k kts, 1917, RJblrrshatJ, 
qs.1aRJ, 1aE2, A.J.rtiB:n, 1240+. 
P.P.1892, XXXVI, R.C. m Wxur, R.~, qs.1gj)5-13, 19512-3; P.P.1~, ill 
Cbmrl.ttre m tre Tru:k kts, 1917. J.[b:ip:n, q.1157, A.J.rtiB:n, q.1240+; Lloyd, 
p.222. 
96. P.P. 1913, ill, CrnmitiEe (Jl tre Tru:k Pets, 1917, A.J.I-tiHn, q.1240+, 
R.~, qs.12CE2, 12226; S.C.L., N.V.T.7. 
97. Thid., Lloyti p. 223-4. 
98. A. J .1-t.tH:n, qs 1239+-5. 
99. Thid., J.[b:ip:n, q.1U19; A.J.rtiB:n, q.124OJ, R.~, q.1 aE1; P.P. 1892, 
XXXVII, R.C. m I cbur, A.Fre1h.eli, q.1~3 .. 
100. Thid., W.F • lL8rdley , 12~9. 
1U1. Thid., q.12310. 
102. W:ti:J t13S. p.149 
103. P.P. 1892, XXXVI, R.C. m I ctnIr, R.~, qs.1S491 , 195ED-69, 19576-8. 
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1~. P.P.19:E, III, Cmmittee m tre Tru:k kts, 19J7, R.rtJJ.rrsra.lJ, qs.12rn5, 12119, 
12162, 12169. 
105. P.P.1892, XXXVI, R.C. m I ctrur, R.~~, qs.19+42, 19..58-62, 1~91 
19579-81, A.F reiJ.JEll, qs .19639, 191+0-3; P. P .19lJ, Cormi ttee m tre T ru:k A:ts, 
1W, R.f-blrrshaJ..l, qs.1207B-ffJ, 12lE, A.J.H:tscJl, qs.1~, 12337. 
11lJ. P.P.1sm, III, Crnmittee m tre Tru:k Pets, 1917, R.I-b1Jrsh3J.J, qs. 12191-2, 
12198-9, 12(E6, "lrE Blployer of a ~ foc1nry dra.s fron relts adl a lary= 
sun of rrITEY trnt it proctj call y p3ys, or rmre -t:Ta1 pays, trn CXEt of n.rni.rJJ 
tre foctary, 00 that it d::ES rut IT8tter 1n tt-E erpJ..oy9r, q:mt frun grttirg off 
his on:Ers, of a:J.JI'S3, tJ-etmr tJ-e fTBl are lLIJrkirg or rut. I-En:E lIE have in 
9-Effield a sys1Bn of ta:i liB BJ3IB It in tre tJEy tre tJ.IJI'k is given a.rt by tre 
1Tffllfa:1urer, ta:a Ee t-e kro.t.s that m 5ab..lrt:t:ly his I'EJlt is arre. f-e kru.ts 
that his I'EJlt will pay for tt-E mal cn:f tre ~ire ill LEI: IS llBJ3S, crrJ all tre 
rest of it, CTd leave him a ni.cE balcrce to tre g:n::i." 
107. Thid., A.J.I-tbu1, qs.12405, 124ill-16, 12392, 12411, 12437, 12475, ~'En..rfa:turers 
attBTpta:i to pI.UJ8 that tt-Ey did rut profiteer, by statirg that treir I'Blts 
lJEI'8 tl-E 8aTE as thJse ~ in p..blic tJ-eels, or lllier, so trnt stffile, 
skilled, reliciJl.e irtJDI'kP..rs I.olld be ~ to stay with tre finn, "trmB 
W3S rut mly m profit, rut tl-Ere UES a disti.rct loss m h3virg Iliilt that ffiJ.I 
fa:tary th3t if I-E hcd BTPl.oye:1 a..rtllI:rrkers crd Iliil t m unrkst-qJs, t-e urul.d 
have I:e31 tEtter off 1tlm with the fa: tmy." q .12411 • 
100. P.P. 1892, XXXVI, R.C. rn I FtU.Ir, R.I-blrrshaJJ, qs.19'+63-4, 19541-7. 
1 !JJ • P • P. 1913, III, Cmmi ttee m tl-E T n.d< Pets, 1 917, R.I-blrrshaJJ, qs.1 Z2OO, 1 Z212-3, 
12358-9. 
11 D. Thid., 1213)..45. 
111. Thid., J.D:ri]ocn, qs. 1012, 1015, 1[l38-93, 11!JJ; A.J.H±a:n, qs. 12421-4, 124:J3, 
124~. 
112. Thid., J.D:ri]ocn, qs.989; A.J.H::i::arl, qs. 1 dY+5-6, 12403-5, 1244-6; SEE aloo 
ch:~:JtEr 8, pp.271-4. 
113. Thid., R .1-bl.rrEtBJJ, qs .122'it}-75 • 
114. Ibid., ~ t, 5:!::tirn 2[}J, pp. 78-9. 
115. 5. I., 29 .11 .1911, "TI""E artiSCTE of tre East Erd ••• lJ.lllld rut tnlera1E it far a 
day." 5.!.,17.7.19:B. 
116. ll-e t'htal librker, vol.II, m.15, N3I'!:n 1 sm, p.70, lliid., p.1:lJ, "It is tre I'Blt 
systan uhid1 lJ"1:Ermires ttE a:n:i..ct of tre rutl.ery lJDI'ker." S. 1., 17.9.1 SUJ. 
117. T role bJ.a.E gri.rl:Ers I mirutes, 14.1.1 SU3. 
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118. 5.1., 3.11.1911; J:B1 crd p::d<et b1.a:E fo:rg:!rs' rnirutEs, 11.6.1W, 9.7.1912. 
S • RJllard , History, p. 220. 
119. S. 1., 3.11 .1911, this ltES chtaira:f bj iTE JB1 a-d p::d<et blaB forg=rs crd 
haj aJ.reajy b:B1 a:hieva:f by razor rissor ad tchle b1.a:E forg:rrs. 
120. P.P.1sa3, ill, Carmit1:Ee 01 tre Tru:k Pets, 19]7, A.J.H±s::n, q.12'.llJ; 
W. F.1illrdley qs .12321-2; Uoyd, p. 23]. 
121. Thid., A.J.H:iH1I, q.125llJ; J.W.D::rlJ;nl, q.997, in 1W, a cbze1 W3S al..ntsj as 
1 ~ in iTE tchle knife tra:E, 14 in tI-E rissor tra:E, ad 12 1n 14 in tre 
p::d<et knife tra::E. 
122. 5.D.T., 17.9.1913. 
123. Thill. 
124. 5.1., 17.9.1913, 18.10.1913; tci::Jle blaB grin::Ers' rnirutEs, 5.5.11.1 sm, 
12.11 .1~, 27.8.1 g:j3, 5.10.1911, Prim list, 16 A..g.l3t 1913; S.C.L., hlE 23/9. 
125. 5=e dlqJ"tEr 1 ,pp.6, 15, ad ~tEr 5. 
126. SE~"tEr 8 ~. 
127. Thid., 
128. D-rarter of 0:JmErce rnirutEs, rv8y 1 B75, 5. C. L. LD .19ffi/1 • 
129. Thid., .l:n.1874, 5.C.L.1986/1; W.H.G.Anni~, A.J.~'l.rl=Ella, 1825-1897: th~ 
L.iI:Eral. Bcckgr:urd 1n tJ-e I ctn.Ir l\bvB I BIt, Lrn::b I, 1951., ~. 31 8-20. 
1 ?fl. P. P .1BaJ, XIII, R. C. 01 1:t"e [)pBssirn, R. f-blm3t-a..tJ, qs .1244-9. 
131. Thid., C. tElk, qs. Zl28-?fl, Z789. 
132. 5=e~"tEr 3, mff. 
133. P.P. 1892, XXXVI, R.C. m I rj-Olr, W.F.l1Brdley, qs.19293, 19329, 19351; 
R • f-b.1rrsl-BJJ, q .12427 • 
124. Thid., W.F .UErdley, qs.193]J..5, 19JJ~1, 1 %23; R.I-b1.rrsh:w, qs.19'+27-~, 
19+83. 
135. Thill., W.F .UErdley, qs.193?8-42, 19]]1. 
1:iS. 5.F. T .C., An..El f€pJrt, 1 893, ~.5-6; J.~"ErrElSCll, et al., ~.43-4. 
137. D-rarter of D:rrrerce rnirutEs, .l:n .189+, .l:n .1896, 5. C. L., L. D. 19ffi/4; 
J.r'-'En:hls:n et al., ~.43-4. 
1 ::i3. TI-E ~'8tal Ubrker, vol. II, ro. 23, rhI.19E, p. 243. 
139 • 5. F • T • C., Pm...el fJ!m't, 1912, p. 5, "Uhile lJ.E crlni. t trnt 1Tese are tiJres 
t.J-m strikes ~ 1:t"e mly effoct.ive ~, lJ.E IJ.ElaJrE 1:t"e grnui.rg 
tEl d3 cy to SLtmi t diSJlilEs to arbi tratim. It is a l-qEful sigl of tre tiJrEs 
that 1Te ih3rd of TraE h3s crea1B:f a PIa::Eli3 It for itrelf, by s1J:+pirg a..rt:sicE 
tt-e frere provin:E of ontirary rcutirE •••• Sir (krry3 ~ th res earrej tt-e 
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grati 1l..J:E of all, by tre ciJle IJB.f in tJU.d1 I-e I-Es 0TIicta:f pIl I ff!:lirrJs th3t 
in rl'BlY cases have fomro t:t-e ba3is of anicctJle sett:1£nmt or agree IS It." 
140. 0laTtEr of CmrrercE mirutEs, .l:n.1893, S.C.L., L.D.19aJ/4. 
141. 5.1., 4.11.1911. 
142. 533 dl1:pter 7 , pp. 225, 237-8. 
143. ~ ~1PJ' 3, 1=lJ.973. 
144. Ibid. 
145. P. P .1 ~, XXXIV, ~t of t:t-e Fair lLt:g;s LDTTili ttae, R.I-b.l.rrEh:tlJ, q. 24ffi , 
G.H.9la.tJ, q.263ti, A.J.I-tB:n, q.5626. 
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